McREADY v. DEPT. OF CONSUMER & REG. AFF.

• Citation: 618 A.2d 609
• Decision Date: 11 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-CV-884,91-CV-884
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Parties: Edward C. McREADY, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, et al., Appellees.

618 A.2d 609

Edward C. McREADY, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER & REGULATORYAFFAIRS, et al., Appellees.

No. 91-CV-884.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 2, 1992.

Decided November 20, 1992.

As Amended Nunc Pro Tunc January 11, 1993.

Appeal from the Superior Court, Nan R. Huhn, J.

Edward C. McReady, pro se.

Lutz Alexander Prager, Asst. Deputy Corp. Counsel, with whom John Payton, Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Robert J. Harlan, Jr., Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, DC, were on the brief, for appellees.

Before FERREN, SCHWELB and KING, Associate Judges.

KING, Associate Judge:

Appellant appeals a ruling denying him attorney fees and costs and other relief in an action seeking documents pursuant to the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act (hereinafter "DC FOIA"). The following issues are presented in this appeal: (1) whether a prevailing pro se attorney is eligible to receive attorney fees and costs, (2) whether appellant prevailed in whole or in part in his action in the trial court, and (3) whether the trial judge erred in denying appellant's various motions for sanctions and contempt. We conclude that: (1) under the DC FOIA, a prevailing pro se attorney^* is entitled to costs but not attorney fees, (2) the trial judge did not err in finding appellant did not prevail with respect to some of the documents sought, (3) a remand is necessary to permit the trial judge to determine whether appellant prevailed, in part, with respect to other documents, which would entitle him to receive costs related to those documents, and (4) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying appellant's requests for sanctions and contempt.

I.

This matter began in 1986 when both appellant, who is an attorney and an accountant, and another accountant (Moss) were employed at a local university. Appellant was terminated from that employment. Believing Moss was responsible for that action, appellant filed a complaint with the Board of Accounting ("the Board") of the District of Columbia Department ofConsumer and Regulatory Affairs ("DCCRA"), claiming various violations of District accounting laws and regulations. The Board ultimately requested that the complaint against Moss be pursued, but the Office of the Corporation Counsel declined to do so. Appellant also filed a civil action in the Superior Court against the university because of the termination.

In July 1987, appellant submitted a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request to DCCRA for documents relating to the investigation of Moss. In response, a small portion of the documents requested were provided. In September 1987, appellant submitted a second FOIA request seeking all documents relating to the Board's investigation of Moss. Production of those documents was denied on privacy grounds in January 1988.

In mid-1988 the Board requested that the Corporation Counsel reconsider its decision not to proceed with disciplinary action against Moss. The Corporation Counsel responded that the Superior Court had issued a protective order, in the civil action appellant had brought against the university, designating certain documents involved in that litigation as confidential. The Corporation Counsel concluded that some of those documents would be needed for any administrative action against Moss, and that, therefore, any disciplinary action would have to be deferred until after resolution of the civil suit when it was expected that the documents would become available.

In the meantime, the administrative appeal of the denial of the appellant's FOIA request had been referred by the Mayor to Dr. Herbert Reid, Sr., for resolution.¹ In August 1988, Dr. Reid directed that the undisclosed records be provided to him for review.

In November 1988, appellant filed the instant action in the Superior Court seeking the documents in question. The trial judge granted appellee's motion to stay the proceeding pending the outcome of the review by Dr. Reid. In April 1989, Dr. Reid issued a comprehensive Memorandum of Decision ("M.O.D.") in which he determined that nine ("exemption (2) documents") of the twenty-eight requested documents were exempt from disclosure for personal privacy reasons because of the ongoing investigation of Moss.² The remaining documents were ordered released.

In September 1989, appellant made a third FOIA request seeking all documents that came into existence after August 1988, i.e., any documents created after the documents that were the subject of Dr. Reid's M.O.D. All but one of those documents were made available. In December 1989, appellant filed a fourth FOIA request with the Board for documents relating to events involving Moss that occurred in April 1989.

In December 1989, the District filed a motion for summary judgment in this case defending the withholding of the exemption (2) documents on privacy grounds. It offered to submit the documents for in camera review, and the trial judge agreed. After examining the documents, Judge Huhn granted the District's motion for judgment and placed the documents under seal in an order dated March 12, 1990. A notice of appeal from that determination was filed and the case was designated appeal No. 90-445.

In July 1990, appellant filed two new POIA requests seeking other documents. A separate action has been filed in the Superior Court with respect to these requests.In July 1990, DCCRA responded to the December 1989 and the July 1990 requests by making various documents available to appellant. Included with the material provided were the exemption (2) documents, previously denied to appellant in this case, which had been placed under seal by the trial judge. The documents were released by DCCRA's new FOIA coordinator, who was unaware that this action seeking those documents was pending. The documents were released because the investigation of Moss had been completed resulting in his public censure.

Thereafter, in February 1991, the District moved this court to remand No. 90-445 to the trial court. That motion was granted and the trial judge then conducted a hearing to determine whether the case had become moot. The trial judge found the case was moot because all of the documents previously withheld had been provided in response to new DC FOIA requests.

Earlier appellant had moved for Rule 11 sanctions, Super.Ct.Civ.R. 11, claiming that counsel for the District had violated the rule in filing two pleadings, viz, a motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss. In addition, appellant sought contempt sanctions against those responsible for releasing the documents on the grounds that releasing them violated the March 12, 1990 sealing order. Finally, in a separate motion, appellant moved for Rule 11 sanctions on the grounds that DCCRA had previously failed to submit all required documents to the trial court for in camera inspection. The trial judge denied all of the sanction motions.³

After further briefing the trial judge ruled that appellant, a pro se attorney, was not entitled to receive attorney fees under the DC FOIA. She also concluded that since appellant had not prevailed, within the meaning of the statute, he was not entitled to attorney fees on that ground as well. For the same reason he was not entitled to an award of costs. This appeal followed.

II.

The question of whether a pro se attorney who prevails in a DC FOIA action is eligible for an award of attorney fees has never been decided by this court. The provision authorizing an award of fees is set forth in the margin.⁴ The trial judge concluded, relying upon Kay v. Ehrler, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991), that an unrepresented litigant, even one who is an attorney, is not eligible to receive such fees. We agree.

In Kay the Supreme Court unanimously held that an attorney, acting pro se, who prevailed as a litigant in a civil rights action was not eligible for an award of attorney fees under The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).⁵ Kay, supra, at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1437-38. In so ruling, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit which had relied upon Falcone v. Internal Revenue Service, 714 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 1689, 80 L.Ed.2d 162 (1984), which denied a fee award to an attorney acting pro se in a federal Freedom of Information Act ("federal FOIA") case.⁶In Kay the Supreme Court made the following observation with respect to Falcone:

The Court of Appeals [in Falcone] reasoned that attorney's fees [to an attorney acting pro se] in FOIA actions were inappropriate because the award was intended "to relieve plaintiffs with legitimate claims of the burden of legal costs" and "to encourage potential claimants to seek legal advice before commencing litigation." The court relied on the fact that "[a]n attorney who represents himself in litigation may have the necessary legal expertise but is unlikely to have the 'detached and objective perspective' necessary to fulfill the aims of the Act."

Kay, supra, ___ U.S. at ___ n. 4, 111 S.Ct. at 1436 n. 4 (citations omitted). In denying a fee award in the case before it, the Supreme Court expressed a view similar to that expressed by the Sixth Circuit in Falcone when it concluded that:

Even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage in contested litigation. Ethical considerations may make it inappropriate for him to appear as a witness. He is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and in making sure that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen developments in the courtroom. The adage that "a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client" is the product of years of experience by seasoned litigators.

A rule...