Mcwhorter v. Pensacola & A.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 November 1888
• Citation: 24 Fla. 417,5 So. 129
• Parties: McWHORTER et al. v. PENSACOLA & A. R. CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

5 So. 129

24 Fla. 417

McWHORTER et al. v. PENSACOLA & A. R. CO.

Florida Supreme Court

November 21, 1888

Appeal from circuit court, Santa Rosa county; JAMES F. McCLELLAN Judge.

Action by the Pensacola & Atlantic Railroad Company against George G. McWhorter and others, as railroad commissioners, to enjoin them from promulgating rates for transportation, and procuring or permitting the institution of suits for the violation of rates heretofore fixed. From a decree overruling their demurrer defendants appeal.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The rule which forbids suit against officers of a state, because in effect, a suit against the state, seems to apply only where the interest of the state is through some contract or some property right of hers, or where her interest is in a suit in her own name, brought or threatened by her officers to enforce some alleged claim of hers.

Railroad commissioners being authorized by statute to make reasonable rules and regulations for all railroads in the state as to charges for transportation of passengers and freights, and to furnish each company with a schedule of charges made for its observance, and having fixed certain rates for one of the companies which it deems not reasonable and just, said company filed a bill against the commissioners to enjoin them from promulgating said rates, or any other rates substantially the same. Held, that this is not, in effect, a suit against the state; but the statute having prescribed a penalty for violation of the rates fixed, and authorized the commissioners to institute action in the name of the state to recover the penalty, in so far as the bill seeks to enjoin them from doing this, it is in effect a suit against the state.

Where the law invests an officer with discretion in the performance of an act, the courts will not interfere with or control his action by injunction. If injustice is done by his action some other remedy must be sought. The statute gives these commissioners discretion in making rates for railroads, and they are entitled to the benefit of this rule.

Whether rates made by the commissioners are reasonable and just or not, even if subject to judicial control, is not open to inquiry in a suit to enjoin their discretionary action.

A statute conferring on a commission authority to regulate the charges of railroads for transportation of passengers and freights is not a delegation of legislative power forbidden by the constitution of this state.

COUNSEL The Attorney General, for appellants.

A. Blount, for appellee.

OPINION

MAXWELL, C.J.

Appellants are commissioners, under an act of the legislature of Florida of 1887, 'to provide for the regulation of railroad freight and passenger tariffs in this state; to prevent unjust discrimination in the rates charged for transportation of passengers and freights, and to prohibit railroad companies, corporations, and lessees in this state from charging other than just and reasonable rates, and to punish the same, and prescribe a mode of procedure and rules of evidence in relation thereto, and to appoint commissioners, and to prescribe their powers and duties in relation to the same.' They bring this case here for a reversal of the decree overruling their demurrer to the bill of the Pensacola & Atlantic Railroad Company against them, which also enjoins them from 'promulgating, as binding upon the complainant, the rates for transportation of freight and passengers heretofore prescribed by the defendants for the complainant, or other rates substantially the same as said rates, and from procuring or permitting the institution of any suits against the complainant for any alleged charges by the complainant in excess of the said rates heretofore fixed, or in excess of any other rates which may he fixed by the defendants for the complainant, substantially the same as the said rates.'

The gravamen of the bill is that the Pensacola & Atlantic Railroad Company is a corporation of the state of Florida empowered to construct and operate a railroad from some point on the Appalachicola river to the city of Pensacola; that the road was completed and began to operate in April, 1883, and has been operated ever since; that the defendants were appointed commissioners, under the act above mentioned; that they have fixed rates for freight and passenger transportation on the railroads of the state, including that of complainant, which they have determined to be just and reasonable charges to be made by said railroads, and have ordered the several companies, including complainant, not to make any charges greater than the rates so fixed; that they have fixed three cents per mile as the uniform rate to be charged by complainant for passengers, and have fixed rates for freight, varying with the distance of transportation, and with certain classification of the various kinds of freight, which they have arbitrarily adopted; that the rates thus fixed were made in spite of facts hereinafter stated, and argument thereon before defendants; and, as authorized by the act, complainant protested to defendants against the enforcement of said rates, but the defendants refused to change the same, and thereupon complainant appealed to the board of revisers provided by the act, but that board confirmed the action of defendants; that complainant, for reasons hereinafter stated, declined to adopt the rates thus prescribed, and have charged for passengers and freight more than said rates, but the rates so charged were just and reasonable, and in no instance has it made a charge that was not just and reasonable, never having charged for passengers more than five cents per mile, the rate authorized by its charter; that consequent upon such charges by complainant, which defendants allege to be in violation of the act and of their order, they demanded that complainant restore to the persons so charged the excess over the rates fixed by them, and upon complainant's refusal they have procured the attorney general of the state to bring several suits (naming them) to recover the penalties prescribed by the act for charges in excess of rates so fixed; that numerous persons who have been charged by complainant more than the rates fixed by defendants, relying on the authority of defendants to fix rates, have brought suits against complainant to recover damages for said alleged excessive charges; that said suits of the state, and of the said persons, are now pending, and the defendants announce their intention to procure other suits to be brought by the attorney general for every case of a charge by complainant in excess of the rates fixed by them; and that there are numerous cases of such excess, and complainant will continue to so charge until it be judicially determined that it has not the right to do so; that defendants have not the power to determine the justice or reasonableness of complainant's charges, because that involves a judicial function which they are inhibited from exercising by the constitution of the state; that if not judicial, it is legislative, and cannot be exercised by defendants; that if defendants have any power whatever in the premises, it is restricted to fixing rates that are in fact just and reasonable, and they cannot require complainant to reduce its rates to charges which are not reasonable and just to it; and that he rates prescribed by defendants are much less than those heretofore charged by complainant for the same services, and are neither just nor reasonable; for though its charges have been much greater than is allowed by the rates fixed by defendants, and have brought a much larger gross income than would be realized from said rates, yet complainant has not only failed to realize any interest upon its investment, but has failed to realize enough to meet the necessary expenses connected with the operation and ownership of its road. The bill then proceeds to give figures and statements as to the cost of construction and equipment of the road, and its actual value, and as to earnings and expenses of its operation, going to show excess of expenses over earnings, and actual loss from the operation of the road during the more than five years of such operation to date, and alleges facts in regard to the condition and business of the country through which the road runs to show that such loss, even on the basis of its charges, will probably continue for some years. It further alleges that the rates prescribed by defendants are also unreasonable and unjust when compared with those permitted by them to other roads in the state, giving figures to show the difference; and that a reduction of its charges to the rates prescribed by defendants would compel complainant to forego any possibility of earning any interest on its investment, or any income from the operation of its road, and that to continue the operation at an actual loss would render its road valueless; and that defendants cannot, under the law, so act as to produce this result, for thereby complainant would be deprived or its property without due process of law, contrary to provision of section 1, art. 14, Const. U.S. The prayer of the bill was for the relief which was granted by the injunction.

On the argument of the demurrer to the bill the commissioners filed an affidavit, intended mainly to show that in their dealings with complainant they were not led to expect such complaints as the bill makes, and they say that if application had been made to them for a change or increase in the rates, and it had appeared to them reasonable and just, they doubtless would have made proper changes, as they did in cases of application by other roads.

The preliminary question raised by the demurrer arises on two of its grounds, the third and fourth,...