McWilliams v. Exxon Mobil Corp., CA 12–1288.

• Decision Date: 15 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. CA 12–1288.,CA 12–1288.
• Citation: 111 So.3d 564
• Parties: Monte McWILLIAMS v. EXXON MOBIL CORP., et al.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

111 So.3d 564

Monte McWILLIAMS

v.EXXON MOBIL CORP., et al.

No. CA 12–1288.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana,Third Circuit.

April 3, 2013.

Rehearing Denied May 15, 2013.

Harry Alston Johnson, III, Phelps Dunbar, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendants/Appellants, Texaco, Inc., Union Oil Company of California.

Wells Talbot Watson, Baggett, McCall, Burgess, Watson & Gaughan, Lake Charles, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Monte McWilliams.

Terrence D. McCay, Lake Charles, LA, for Defendants/Appellants, Texaco, Inc., Union Oil Company of California, Chevron USA, Inc.

Robert Scott, Blank Rome, LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendants/Appellants, Texaco, Inc., Union Oil Company of California, Chevron USA, Inc.

Darren Lee Brown, Provost Umphrey Law Firm, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Monte McWilliams.

Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, BILLY HOWARD EZELL, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.

EZELL, Judge.

[3 Cir. 1]Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Texaco, Inc., and Union Oil Company of California (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Defendants”) appeal two judgments of the trial court below. They appeal the trial court's interlocutory judgment striking of all their defenses for violations of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1471. They also appeal the jury award of $12,000,000.00 in punitive damages, prejudgment interest on future damages, and the award of $458,419.87 in past medical expenses in favor of the plaintiff, Monte McWilliams. For the following reasons, we hereby affirm the judgment in part, as amended, and reverse in part.

In this case, Mr. McWilliams alleges that he developed acute promyelocytic leukemia as a result of exposure to benzene while gauging barges during twenty-seven years as a petroleum inspector employed by numerous independent contractors. During five of those years, he worked on premises or vessels owned by the Defendants. None of the Defendants are domiciled in Louisiana, and all the work alleged to have led to Mr. McWilliams' cancer took place in Texas. In July 2009, Mr. McWilliams brought suit under maritime law and the Jones Act. His suit named thirty-five defendants, but only the Defendants remained in the case at the time of trial.

Throughout the course of this case, the Defendants were, at best, uncooperative in discovery. Mr. McWilliams sought depositions of corporate representatives under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1442 for six months while the Defendants refused to even respond to the requests. When Mr. McWilliams finally set the deposition dates unilaterally, the Defendants' response was to file a Motion for Protective Order to delay trial. On March 18, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the motion and denied it, ordering the depositions be set within ten days. The trial court also noted the Defendants' behavior and warned them “if something like that happens again I'm not going to [3 Cir. 2]have any sympathy whatsoever.” By the deadline ten days later, all the depositions had still not been set. The trial court gave the Defendants until the next day to do so. The trial court ordered that all of the Article 1442 depositions had to be completed by May 16, 2011. The trial court further ordered that documents requested in the deposition notices be produced one week in advance of the depositions.

However, documents were often not produced one week before the depositions, as ordered, but instead were given a few days in advance. When documents were produced, they were produced without any identification or response to the specific subjects, but in mass document dumps, effectively making the production meaningless. The Article 1442 designees had not reviewed many of the documents and were not fully prepared to testify about them. The corporate representatives testified that they were not fully familiar with the deposition notices, did not bring subpoenaed responsive documents to the deposition, had not reviewed the responsive documents, and that many responsive documents existed that were not produced. As a result of this non-responsive discovery, Mr. McWilliams filed a motion to compel and sought sanctions against the Defendants.

At the June 30, 2011 hearing on the motion for sanctions, the trial court ruled that multiple orders had been in place regarding the depositions and documents to be produced. The trial court found the Defendants to be in bad faith violation of those orders, noting that the Defendants' actions had resulted in a continuance of the trial, prejudiced plaintiff, and caused a year of discovery to be lost. Further, the trial court ruled that restarting the discovery process would be unreasonable, impractical, and unduly burdensome to Mr. McWilliams. The trial court invoked La.Code Civ.P. art. 1471 and struck all defenses asserted by the Defendants, “leaving only the issue of damages.”

After the June 30, 2011 hearing, the Defendants sought a writ application to this court on the judgment striking its defenses. In an unpublished opinion, we [3 Cir. 3]unanimously denied the writ application, finding that there was “no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling.” The Supreme Court also denied writs on the issue, upholding this court's determination. McWilliams v. ExxonMobil Corp., 12–144 (La.1/27/12), 79 So.3d 1017.

A jury trial begun on February 6, 2012 and the jury was charged that “the amount of damages is solely for you to determine.” As a result, the Defendants were found liable for $5.5 million in actual damages and $12 million in punitive damages. From that decision, the Defendants appeal.

On appeal, the Defendants assert five assignments of error. They claim:

1.

The trial court abused its discretion in entering an interlocutory judgment ordering as a sanction for allegedly inadequate discovery responses that “the defenses of defendants be stricken under LCCP art. 1471, leaving only the issue of damages.”

2.

The trial court erred in refusing to apply Texas substantive law to all issues not governed by federal maritime law.

3.

The trial court erred in numerous evidentiary rulings which it mistakenly thought were required by the striking of defendants' defenses, which resulted in: (a) excusing plaintiff from the obligation of presenting a prima facie case of causation and liability, and informing the jury that those issues had been “established”; (b) lack of evidence before the jury with respect to plaintiff's significantly shortened life expectancy, resulting in a grossly excessive compensatory damage award; and (c) lack of evidence before the jury with respect to comparative fault.

4.

The trial court's award of $12 million in punitive damages deprived the defendants of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

5.

The trial court's award of $12 million in punitive damages and $5,498,391.87 in compensatory damages is a violation of federal maritime law, which limits any award of punitive damages to a sum not in excess of compensatory damages awarded.

In an attempt to be as concise as possible, we will address these assignments of error slightly out of order.

[3 Cir. 4]Sanctions

The Defendants first claim that the trial court erred in striking all of their defenses for failure to follow the trial court's orders regarding discovery. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1471 sets out the sanctions available against a party failing to comply with discovery orders. The statute states:

A. If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Article 1442 or 1448 to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Article 1464 or Article 1469, the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others any of the following:

(1) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order.

(2) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence.

(3) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.

(4) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.

(5) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under Article 1464, requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders as are listed in Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this Article, unless the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such person for examination.

As noted in Horton v. McCary, 92–2315 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 199, 203 (alteration in original):

There is a distinction between the sanctions available for failure to comply with discovery and the sanctions available for disobedience of court ordered discovery. MTU of North America, Inc. v. Raven Marine, Inc., 475 So.2d 1063 (La.1985). Refusal to comply with court ordered discovery is a serious matter. See Chilcutt v. U.S., 4 F.3d 1313 (5th Cir.1993). Trial judges must have severe sanctions available to deter [3 Cir. 5]litigants from flouting discovery orders. National Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976). Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 Harvard L.Rev. 1033 (1978).

The Louisiana rule, like Federal Rule 37, allows the trial court to sanction a disobedient party with dismissal or a default judgment. Both dismissal and default are draconian penalties which should be applied only in extreme circumstances. Barnhill v. U.S., 11 F.3d 1360 (7th...