McWilliams v. State

• Decision Date: 11 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. S–12–0126.,S–12–0126.
• Parties: Aline H. McWILLIAMS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

289 P.3d 780

2012 WY 153

Aline H. McWILLIAMS, Appellant (Defendant),

v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. S–12–0126.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Dec. 11, 2012.

Representing Appellant: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Alden.

Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Darci A.V. Arsene, Special Assistant Attorney; Matthew F. Redle, Special Assistant Attorney. Argument by Mr. Redle.

VOIGT, Justice.

[¶ 1] This is an appeal from the district court's order modifying a previous deferral order entered pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35–7–1037 (LexisNexis 2011), the district court's entry of judgment of conviction on one previously deferred count, and the district court's entry of judgment and sentence on that count. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] 1. Are the State's Motion to Reconsider and the subsequent Order on State's Motion to Reconsider, and the subsequent Judgment and Sentence nullities, and therefore void?

2. If the Motion to Reconsider was not a nullity, was it deemed denied under W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2)?

FACTS

[¶ 3] The appellant was charged with three counts of illegal drug possession, two counts being felonies and one count being a misdemeanor. Without having entered into a plea agreement with the State, the appellant pled guilty to all three counts at arraignment. The district court found that a factual basis existed for all three counts, but ordered a presentence investigation without accepting any of the pleas or adjudicating guilt.

[¶ 4] After the sentencing hearing some months later, the district court, over the objections of the State, entered an Order Pursuant to W.S. § 35–7–1037. The relevant term of that order, for purposes of this appeal, is the district court's deferral of further proceedings without adjudicating guilt on both of the felonies.^FN1

[¶ 5] One day after the order was entered, the State filed a Motion to Reconsider. The Motion to Reconsider was based on three arguments: (1) the appellant did not deserve a deferral; (2) Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35–7–1037 is unconstitutional in that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers by not requiring the State's consent to a deferral; and (3) the district court lacks authority to grant a deferral where an information contains multiple counts. The Motion to Reconsider was filed on November 17, 2011, but it was not heard by the district court until March 27, 2012, which was 131 days later.

[¶ 6] During the motion hearing, the district court stated that it believed it had erred as a matter of law in granting deferrals on both counts, withdrew one of the deferrals, accepted the appellant's guilty plea on one count, and proceeded to sentencing. A Judgment and Sentence was filed on April 20, 2012, followed five days later by the Order on State's Motion to Reconsider. The gravamen of the order is contained in its first two findings:

1. W.S. § 35–7–1037 does not authorize the Court to order deferral of multiple counts of an information or indictment;

2. The Court erred in deferring entry of conviction and sentence in both Counts 1 and 2[.]

[¶ 7] The appellant now challenges both the Order on State's Motion to Reconsider and the subsequent Judgment and Sentence. As can be seen from the appellant's statement of the issues set forth above, see supra ¶ 2, the appellant is not herein contesting the district court's determination that it lacked the authority to grant two deferrals in the case.^FN2 Rather, the appellant is challenging the district court's authority to consider the State's Motion to Reconsider.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] [¶ 8] The parties agree that this appeal is in the nature of a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, which is a question of law that we review de novo. Eckdahl v. State, 2011 WY 152, ¶ 16, 264 P.3d 22, 27 (Wyo.2011).

DISCUSSION

Are the State's Motion to Reconsider and the subsequent Order on State's Motion to Reconsider, and the subsequent Judgment and Sentence nullities, and therefore void?

[¶ 9] In Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, ¶ 3, 125 P.3d 1022, 1023 (Wyo.2006), a mother filed a motion to reconsider after the district court entered an order granting her ex-husband's request for child support abatement. The district court denied the motion and the mother appealed. On its own motion, this Court held that motions to reconsider, and orders entered thereon, were “nullities” and therefore void, because no court rule provided for such a motion.

Id. at ¶¶ 7–10, 125 P.3d at 1024–25. See also Ragsdale v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 2007 WY 163, ¶ 7, 169 P.3d 78, 81 (Wyo.2007). Of more significance to the instant case, we held in Steranko v. Dunks, 2009 WY 9, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1096, 1096–97 (Wyo.2009), “that the rule of Plymale should not be extended to pre-judgment motions to reconsider.” Our reasoning was two-fold: (1) the concern with whether a motion to reconsider stays the time for filing an appeal is not present pre-judgment; and (2) district courts traditionally have had the authority to revise their rulings prior to final judgment. Id. See also Freeman v. State, 2011 WY 21, 246 P.3d 601, 601–02 (Wyo.2011) (tolling of time for filing appeal), and Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo.1987) (district court's authority to revise rulings).

[2] [¶ 10] The rule of Plymale v. Donnelly, which rule is the central focus of the appellant's argument, does not apply to pre-judgment motions to reconsider. The State's Motion to Reconsider was filed and heard before judgment was entered and was not, therefore, a nullity.

If the Motion to Reconsider was not a nullity, was it deemed denied under W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2)?

[¶ 11] We are tempted to decline to answer this question because nearly half of the appellant's brief is dedicated to an argument that would make W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) inapplicable to her case. Before we dissect that argument, we will set forth the court rules that give the argument some plausibility. W.R.Cr.P. 1 contains, inter alia, the following sentence: “In the event that a procedure is not established by these rules, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern.” W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) provides that “[a]ny motion, under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 59 and 60(b), not determined within 90 days after filing shall be deemed denied....” In turn, W.R.C.P. 60(b) authorizes the trial court to “relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for any of numerous listed reasons. In the second issue raised in this appeal, the appellant contends that if this Court should determine that the State's Motion to Reconsider was not a nullity because it was really a W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, then the motion was deemed denied 90 days after it was filed.

[¶ 12] Arguing alternatively to her primary argument that the State's motion was a nullity because it was a motion to reconsider, the appellant contends in regard to this second issue that, “[i]f the Court determines that Rule 60 W.R.Civ.P. should be bootstrapped into criminal procedure then it is necessary that the time limits governing its exercise also be bootstrapped with it.” Prior to making that assertion, however, the appellant sets forth numerous reasons why she does not believe W.R.C.P. 60(b) was available to the State as an avenue for relief: (1) W.R.Cr.P. 1 does not allow the incorporation of civil rules into the criminal rules where a procedure is already available in the criminal rules; (2) the State could have filed a bill of exceptions, or it could have filed a motion under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) or W.R.Cr.P. 36; (3) the State's motion truly was a motion to reconsider as it did not contain a prayer for relief seeking any relief available under W.R.C.P. 60(b) (citing Padilla v. State, 2004 WY 66, ¶ 8, 91 P.3d 920, 922 (Wyo.2004)); (4) the motion did not seek to relieve the State from the deferral order, inasmuch as the State was not burdened by the order; (5) simply asking a judge to change his or her mind is the purest form of a motion for reconsideration; and (6) this Court has previously declined to import the civil “deemed denied” rule into criminal proceedings, where the rules of criminal procedure and constitutional due process govern the timely disposition of proceedings (citing DeLoge v. State, 2005 WY 152, ¶ 12, 123 P.3d 573, 578 (Wyo.2005)).

[3] [¶ 13] The record supports the conclusion that the State's motion was not a W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, but was purely a motion to reconsider the district court's deferral order. The issue of a potential deferral under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35–7–1037 in a multi-count information came up as early as the arraignment, with the State taking the position that such exceeded the authority of the court. It was raised again at the first sentencing hearing, where the district court entered the deferrals despite the State's objections.

The Motion to Reconsider was exactly what its title suggested; it was a request that the court reconsider its decision and “change its mind.” In response, during the motion hearing, the district court acknowledged that “the Court was wrong,” and that “[y]ou get one, you don't get two.” This was strictly a motion to reconsider, not governed by the deemed denied provision of W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2).

[¶ 14] Finally, the tenor of some statements made in the dissenting opinion demand a response. The gravamen of the dissenting opinion, as it relates to the issue raised by the appellant, is the contention that the State's motion for reconsideration is a post-judgment motion, rather than a pre-judgment motion. But the dissenting opinion ventures far beyond that central focus. For instance, the dissenting opinion asserts in ¶ 24 that a deferral order “is not an order that a district court may revisit and revise in the exercise of its discretion.” Where is the authority for that proposition? Does that mean never? Does that mean not even at the...