MD RECLAMATION ASS'N, INC. v. Harford County

• Decision Date: 30 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 105,105
• Citation: 855 A.2d 351,382 Md. 348
• Parties: MARYLAND RECLAMATION ASSOCIATES, INC. v. HARFORD COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

855 A.2d 351

382 Md. 348

MARYLAND RECLAMATION ASSOCIATES, INC. v. HARFORD COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al.

No. 105, Sept. Term, 2003.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 30, 2004.

William D. Hooper, Jr. (Hooper and Jacobs, L.L.C., Bel Air, James P. Nolan, Council, Baradel, Kosmerl & Nolan, P.A., Annapolis, on brief), for appellant.

Sherrilyn Ifill (University of Maryland School of Law, Baltimore, Jennifer M. Schwartzott, Miles & Stockbridge, P.C., Baltimore, on brief), for appellees.

Nancy Levy Giorno, Deputy Cty. Atty. (Harford Cty. Dept. of Law of Bel Air, on brief), for appellees.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, GREENE, ELDRIDGE, JOHN C. (retired, specially assigned), JJ.

HARRELL, J.

The present case is the latest in a sequence of litigation between the parties beginning in 1990. As a consequence of the immediately preceding decision in that sequence, Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. v. Harford County, 342 Md. 476, 677 A.2d 567 (1996), Appellant, Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. ("MRA"), asked the Harford County Zoning Administrator ("the Zoning Administrator") for certain interpretations of the Harford County zoning ordinance, and particularly a 1991 amendment, as it may apply to a proposed rubble landfill on property owned by MRA. MRA also sought a zoning certificate. Following a lengthy gestation period, the Zoning Administrator, in a 22 February 1999 letter, essentially ruled that the 1991 amendment applied to MRA's proposal and also denied the zoning certificate application. The result of the Zoning Administrator's decisions was that MRA, as far as Harford County was concerned, could not establish its proposed rubble landfill on its property unless it obtained variances from the requirements of the zoning ordinance, as amended in 1991.

MRA filed an administrative appeal from the Zoning Administrator's rulings to the Harford County Board of Appeals ("the Board of Appeals").¹ On 11 June 2002, the Board of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the Zoning Administrator. Ten days later, MRA sought judicial review of the Board of Appeals's decision in the Circuit Court for Harford County. The Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Appeals on 22 October 2003. MRA appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We, on our initiative and before the appeal was briefed or argued in the Court of Special Appeals, issued a writ of certiorari principally to determine whether the Circuit Court, in view of the appellate history of the underlying matter, properly affirmed the Board of Appeals. Maryland Reclamation v. Harford County, 379 Md. 98, 839 A.2d 741 (2004).² MRA presents the following nine questions for our consideration:

I. Has MRA exhausted its administrative remedies such that its claims of error based upon State law including preemption, estoppel, vested rights, non-conforming use and constitutional violations can be heard by this Court?

II. Are the federal issues raised by MRA as grounds for its assertion that Bill 91-10 can not be applied to MRA's proposed rubble landfill ripe for review by this Court?

III. Is Harford County preempted by State Law including the comprehensive regulatory scheme set forth in the Environmental Article of the Maryland Annotated Code and regulations adopted in support thereof, from applying Bill 91-10 to MRA's property on Gravel Hill Road given that Bill 91-10 was enacted and purportedly applied to MRA's property after Harford County zoning and Solid Waste Management Plan approvals had been given to MRA's rubble landfill application during Phase 1 of the State rubble landfill permit application process?

IV. Is Harford County prevented by the United States and/or Maryland Constitutions and/or the Maryland Declaration of Rights from applying Bill 91-10 to MRA's proposed rubble landfill on its property given that MRA had a vested right in its County zoning approval to proceed with Phases 2 and 3 the MDE's rubble landfill permitting process without Harford County being permitted to rescind its prior zoning approval and thereby veto the MDE's permit application process?

V. Is Harford County estopped from applying the provisions of Harford County Bill 91-10 to MRA's proposed operation of a rubble landfill on its property pursuant to its State-issued permit given that MRA purchased its property in justifiable reliance on Harford County's zoning and Solid Waste Management Plan approvals during Phase 1 of the State's rubble landfill permitting process, Harford County arbitrarily and unreasonably applied Bill 91-10 to MRA's proposed rubble landfill after MDE's Phase 1 permit review was complete, and MRA suffered substantial damages by being prevented from using its property for a rubble landfill by Harford County's application of Bill 91-10 to MRA's property?

VI. Will MRA's operation of a rubble landfill on its property at Gravel Hill Road pursuant to its State-issued Refuse Disposal Permit No. 92-12-35-10-D and as renewed by Refuse Disposal Permit 1996-WRF-0517 violate applicable Harford County zoning given that Harford County granted zoning and Solid Waste Management Plan approval to MRA's proposed rubble landfill during Phase 1 of the State rubble landfill permit application process?

VII. Will MRA's continued operation of a rubble landfill on its property pursuant to its State-issued permit constitute a valid non-conforming use pursuant to Harford County Zoning Code, Section 267-18 of the Harford County Zoning Code?

VIII. Did Harford County properly fail to issue MRA's grading permit due to the passage and application of Bill 91-10 to MRA's property, which grading permit issuance is a condition of MRA's Solid Waste Management Plan approval, even though all applicable County review agencies, including zoning, approved the grading permit application before the enactment of Bill 91-10?

IX. Did the Hearing Examiner properly rule that MRA is not entitled to rely upon its 1989 County Site Plan approval which pre-dated the enactment of Bill 91-10 given that this issue was not raised by MRA in a Request for Interpretation and was not ruled upon or mentioned by the Zoning Administrator but was raised sua sponte by the Hearing Examiner?

We hold that MRA was required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to the Circuit Court considering its petition for judicial review in this matter. MRA failed to do so because it has not sought variances from the Board of Appeals. Therefore, we shall vacate the Circuit Court's order and remand with directions that consideration of the Petition for Judicial Review be stayed. Accordingly, we need, and shall, not address at this time the other questions raised by MRA.

I.

The present case is the third reported opinion from Maryland's appellate courts addressing the parties' dispute. The factual history was summarized extensively in Holmes v. Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc., 90 Md.App. 120, 600 A.2d 864, cert. dismissed sub nom., County Council v. Maryland Reclamation, 328 Md. 229, 614 A.2d 78 (1992) (MRA I), and Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. v. Harford County, 342 Md. 476, 677 A.2d 567 (1996) (MRA II). We need recount here only a brief portion of that history. In 1989, MRA began the arduous process of seeking governmental approvals to operate a rubble landfill on its Gravel Hill Road property in Harford County. Late in 1989, Harford County included MRA's Gravel Hill Road property as a rubble landfill site in the County's Solid Waste Management Plan.³ In 1990, after an electoral turnover at the top rungs of the Harford County local government, Resolution 4-90 was introduced in the "new" County Council providing for the removal of MRA's property from the County's Solid Waste Management Plan. In the litigation that ensued over the passage of this resolution, the Court of Special Appeals held that Resolution 4-90 was invalid because it was preempted by the State's authority to regulate solid waste management plans and the issuance of rubble landfill permits. MRA I,90 Md.App. at 157,600 A.2d at 882.

During the pendency of the litigation in MRA I, Bill 91-10 was introduced in the County Council. Bill 91-10 proposed to change the spatial zoning requirements for a rubble landfill, as a permitted use, by increasing the minimum number of acres required and changing the buffer, setback, and relative topographic elevation requirements. Bill 91-10, as enacted, became effective on 27 March 1991, and is now codified as section 267-40.1 of the Harford County Code. The Gravel Hill Road property could not conform strictly to many, if not all, of the requirements added or changed by Bill 91-10. MRA filed a complaint in the Circuit Court against Harford County challenging the enactment and application of Bill 91-10 and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In MRA II, the upshot of the initial litigation over the enactment of Bill 91-10, we held that, because MRA had not exhausted its administrative remedies, the issue of the application of Bill 91-10 to the Gravel Hill Road property was not ripe for judicial determination. MRA II, 342 Md. at 497, 677 A.2d at 578.

In MRA II, we explained that "there clearly were administrative remedies [then] available to Maryland Reclamation,"

"[Section] 267.7B(5) of the Harford County Code authorizes the Zoning Administrator to render decisions on the applicability of zoning regulations to particular property under the factual circumstances presented, and § 267-7E of the Code authorizes an appeal from his decision to the Board of Appeals. Maryland Reclamation could have sought a ruling by the Zoning Administrator under that section and could have prosecuted an appeal from any adverse ruling, but it failed to do so. Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the May 2, 1991, letter from the Director of Planning was such a decision under § 267.7B(5), Maryland Reclamation failed to pursue its appeal to the Board of Appeals.

"Moreover, if it was determined that Bill 91-10, or any

...