Mdewakanton Sioux Indians Minnesota v. Zinke

• Citation: 255 F.Supp.3d 48
• Decision Date: 09 June 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 16-2323 (RC).
• Parties: MDEWAKANTON SIOUX INDIANS OF MINNESOTA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ryan ZINKE, Secretary, United States Department of the Interior, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

255 F.Supp.3d 48

MDEWAKANTON SIOUX INDIANS OF MINNESOTA, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Ryan ZINKE,¹ Secretary, United States Department of the Interior, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 16-2323 (RC).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed June 9, 2017

Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal, & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs.

David Bernard Glazer, U.S. Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs are currently engaged in litigation to compel various federal entities to recognize them as an American Indian tribe. Plaintiffs now seek a temporary restraining order, followed by a preliminary injunction, barring an election to amend the constitution of a different tribe, because Plaintiffs assert the amendments would impair their rights. Because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate an irreparable injury, neither a temporary restraining order nor a preliminary injunction is appropriate.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are several individuals and the Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of Minnesota, which they allege is an American Indian tribe to which they belong. Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs brought suit in this Court to compel the United States defendants "to acknowledge [the tribe's] existence and to enjoin the United States from continuing arbitrary decisions without informing the [tribe] that have the consequence of adversely affecting the rights or potential rights of the [tribe]." Compl. at 2. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, see generallyFed. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 10, and that motion remains pending.

Plaintiffs now seek a temporary restraining order, followed by a preliminary injunction, to stop the June 14, 2017 Secretarial election of the Prairie Island Indian Community.² See generally Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Temp. Restraining Order & Prelim. Inj. (Pl.'s Mot.), ECF No. 17. Plaintiffs assert that the amendments to the Prairie Island Indian Community's constitution at issue in the election would impair Plaintiffs' tribal rights. Pl.'s Mot. at 7–9; see also Pl.'s Mot. at 3 (asserting that the proposed amendments, if passed, would "effectively terminate [Plaintiffs' tribe] without congressional Act").

III. LEGAL STANDARD

"Preliminary injunctive relief, whether in the form of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, provides an ‘extraordinary remedy’ that is ‘never awarded as of right.’ " Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. de C.V. , 901 F.Supp.2d 54, 55–56 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ). Because a temporary restraining order is "an extraordinary and drastic remedy," it should not be granted "unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Nat'l Head Start Ass'n v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 297 F.Supp.2d 242, 246 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong , 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) ).

In order to receive preliminary injunctive relief, the movant must demonstrate "(1) that it has a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that it will suffer irreparable injury if injunctive relief is denied, (3) that other interested parties will not suffer substantial harm if injunctive relief is granted, and (4) that the public interest favors the granting of injunctive relief, (or at least, that the granting of injunctive relief is not adverse to the public interest)." Paleteria La Michoacana , 901 F.Supp.2d at 56 (citing Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc. , 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Federation Internationale D e Football Ass'n v. Nike, Inc. , 285 F.Supp.2d 64, 68 (D.D.C. 2003) ).

Regardless of how the other three factors are analyzed,³ it is required that the movant demonstrate an irreparable injury. See, e.g. , Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("A movant's failure to show any irreparable harm is therefore grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief.").

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court considers if Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they will suffer an irreparable harm absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, and concludes that they have not. Because showing an irreparable injury is mandatory, the Court does not consider the remaining factors.

Plaintiffs' motion devotes only a single paragraph to discussing the irreparable injury requirement. Pl.'s Mot. at 43–44. Plaintiffs argue that preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to avoid increased litigation expenses, specifically, that:

Due to the actions of the federal guardian leaving the [Plaintiffs] without resources, the cost of the litigation is being borne by the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs' resources are limited. If the Plaintiffs' resources are exhausted by litigation expense, the litigation will end—an irreparable injury. Preserving the legal status quo reduces the cost of this litigation and makes it more likely the Plaintiffs will cross the litigation finish line.

Pl.'s Mot. at 43–44.

However, it is well established that litigation expenses are not an irreparable injury. The D.C. Circuit "has set a high standard for irreparable injury." Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In general, "economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm." Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Jackson , 768 F.Supp.2d 34, 50 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Wis. Gas Co. v. F . E . R . C . , 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ). This is because an irreparable injury is one which is "beyond remediation"—and for economic harms " ‘[t]he possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.’ " Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches , 454 F.3d at 297–98 (quoting Wisc. Gas Co. v. F . E . R . C . , 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)).

The rule against economic losses constituting irreparable harm applies with full force to litigation expenses. Litigation costs cannot constitute an irreparable injury for the purposes of granting a preliminary injunction. See Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd. , 698 F.Supp.2d 25, 45 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has held that ‘[m]ere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury,’ " even when those costs "are likely to be substantial" (quoting F . T . C . v. Standard Oil Co. , 449 U.S. 232, 244, 101 S.Ct. 488, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980) )).

The irreparable harm alleged by Plaintiffs is precisely the type of litigation costs previously rejected by the Supreme Court, and Plaintiffs offer no legal authority to the contrary. As to Plaintiffs' suggestion that they may not be able to "cross the litigation finish line," Plaintiffs cite no cases suggesting that this outcome would constitute an irreparable harm. Even if such a harm could suffice, Plaintiffs have not stated the applicable facts here with any specificity. Plaintiffs provide nothing more than a conclusory statement: they do not describe their expected expenses, expected costs, or the possible effects of denying preliminary injunctive relief on either. Indeed, the Court notes that briefing of Defendants' dispositive motion is already complete,⁴ which presumably represents a large portion of expected litigation expenses (barring the instant motion, which Plaintiffs initiated).

In their reply, Plaintiffs expand their discussion of irreparable injury from one paragraph to two. See Pl.'s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. (Pl's Reply) at 9–10, ECF No. 19. However, Plaintiffs still do not elaborate on the irreparable injury posed by litigation costs, except to state conclusorily that "Plaintiffs are not in a position of funding years of litigation." Pl.'s Reply at 9. Plaintiffs' claims that they may run out of money remain speculative and unclear. As discussed above, this does not suffice to overcome the general rule that litigation expenses are not an irreparable injury. Plaintiffs also briefly attempt to introduce a new irreparable injury. See Pl.'s Reply at 9. However, because this argument is new in Plaintiffs' reply, the Court will not consider it.⁵ See Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau , 785 F.3d 684, 695 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (refusing to consider new arguments for irreparable injury in a movant's reply brief because the opposing party "had no opportunity to respond" and the movant "offer[ed] no reason, much less an extraordinary one, for its failure to raise these arguments in its opening brief" (citing CTS Corp. v. E . P . A . , 759 F.3d 52, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2014) and United States v. Whren , 111 F.3d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1997) )).

* * *

As discussed above, Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction fails because Plaintiffs do not demonstrate an irreparable injury. This conclusion is further bolstered by the disfavored nature of injunctive relief barring an election when only one outcome of the election would allegedly impair the movants rights. Because the proposed measures may yet be voted down and the controversy avoided, many courts have declined to enjoin elections in analogous circumstances. See, e.g. , Ranjel v. City of Lansing , 417 F.2d 321, 325 (6th Cir. 1969) (reversing a preliminary injunction against a referendum on a proposition that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment because "[w]e believe the better practice [i]s ... [to] allow[ ] the election to proceed and rule[ ] on the validity of the measure after its passage"), cert. denied , 397 U.S. 980, 90 S.Ct. 1105, 25 L.Ed.2d 390...