Meacham v. Louisville & N.R. Co.

• Citation: 169 S.W.2d 830,293 Ky. 642
• Parties: MEACHAM v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.
• Decision Date: 19 March 1943
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

169 S.W.2d 830

293 Ky. 642

MEACHAM v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

March 19, 1943

Appeal from Circuit Court, Union County; M. L. Blackwell, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Annie Hamner Meacham against Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company to recover for the removal of tracks and a switch from lands conveyed by plaintiff's predecessors in title as a right of way. From a judgment dismissing plaintiff's petition on her refusal to plead further after a demurrer to portion of answer was overruled plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Welborn B. Harris and G. I. Drury, both of Morganfield, for appellant.

King Flournoy & Ruark, of Morganfield and H. T. Lively, of Louisville, for appellee.

SIMS Justice.

The appellant, Mrs. Annie Hamner Meacham, sued appellee Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, for $10,000 damages alleged to have been done her farm when the company removed its tracks and switch from lands her predecessors in title had conveyed the grantee as a right-of-way. The answer denied the damages and affirmatively averred in a second paragraph that it was a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce and that the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered it to abandon this particular part of its line, which was a branch between Clay, Kentucky, and Morganfield, Kentucky. By a third paragraph the company offered to quitclaim the right-of-way to the plaintiff. The court overruled a demurrer to the second paragraph of the answer, plaintiff declined to plead further, and her petition was dismissed.

In 1905 plaintiff's parents and predecessors in title, W. E. Hammer and wife, conveyed by a general warranty deed to the Morganfield & Atlanta Railroad Company, hereinafter referred to as the M. & A., an 80 foot right-of-way through their farm. The deed recited the consideration for the right-of-way, which consisted of 7.66 acres, was the agreement by the M. & A. to erect and forever (our italics) maintain at some point on the premises a switch to be called Hamner, which would be a flag station where the grantors, their heirs and assigns, could load and unload freight. The grantee also was to maintain a fence on both sides of the right-of-way, and agreed to dismiss and pay all cost of a condemnation proceeding it had instituted.

The M. & A. operated its trains over this track until 1921, when the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company purchased the line. In 1939 the latter company obtained an order from the Interstate Commerce Commission under paragraphs 18 and 19, § 1, of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A.§ 1 (18, 19), authorizing it to abandon that portion of its branch line extending from Clay, Kentucky, to Morganfield, Kentucky, as public convenience and necessity no longer required its operation. After due notice this branch line was abandoned, the track and switch removed, and in 1940 Mrs. Meacham instituted this action.

It is insisted by plaintiff that under the deed conveying the right-of-way to the M. & A., that railroad and its successors were obligated to erect and maintain forever this switch; that the L. & N., as successor in title to the M. & A., was not forced to abandon this line but voluntarily sought and obtained permission to do so from the Interstate Commerce Commission. She avers her farm was damaged by being deprived of the switch and by the unsightliness of the right-of-way with the rails removed running through her elegant farm.

The defendant contends that the Interstate Commerce Commission had not only the authority but the duty to direct the abandonment of this branch line when the public convenience and necessity no longer required its operation, and that a proper construction of the deed relieves it from liability to maintain this switch and flag station after the Commission ordered the line abandoned.

A fundamental rule in the construction of contracts is to determine the intention of the parties from the contract as a whole and to give it such an interpretation as will carry out that intention, and in so doing, the court may consider the subject matter of the contract, the object to be accomplished, the situation of the parties and their surrounding conditions and circumstances. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, 707, § 297; Hawkins & Chamberlain v. Mathews, 242 Ky. 732, 47 S.W.2d 547; Monroe's Adm'r v. Federal Union Life Ins. Co., 251 Ky. 570, 65 S.W.2d 680; Keen v. Ross, 186 Ky. 256, 216 S.W. 605; Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Moore, 281 Ky. 689, 136 S.W.2d 1086.

Applying this rule to the right-of-way deed it is clear that it was the intention of the parties the grantee would operate a railroad and would maintain this switch and flag station so long as the line, of which it was a part, existed. But plaintiff urges the parties were free to contract as they saw fit and as they agreed the switch should be maintained forever the railroad could not cease to operate this line; or if it did, then it must respond in damages. The answer to this...