Mead v. Jasper County

• Decision Date: 25 November 1924
• Docket Number: 25749
• Parties: HARRY J. MEAD v. JASPER COUNTY, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

266 S.W. 467

305 Mo. 476

HARRY J. MEAD v. JASPER COUNTY, Appellant

No. 25749

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 25, 1924

Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court; Hon. Sardis W. Bates Judge.

Affirmed.

Roy Coyne and Frank L. Forlow for appellant.

(1) The county courts, in the different counties of the State, shall in the November term of each year, make the allowance to the sheriff for the boarding of prisoners in the county for the succeeding year. Sec. 11003, R. S. 1919. The allowance shall not exceed seventy-five cents per day. Sec. 11002, R. S 1919. County courts are courts of record, made so by statute. Sec. 2323, R. S. 1919. Trial courts may, for good cause shown, vacate their judgments at any time during the term at which they were rendered. Nelson v. Ghislein, 17 Mo.App. 663. It is a general principle which has come down to us, from the practice of the English courts of law, and which may, therefore, be regarded as the rule of the common law that, during the entire term of the court, the records and proceedings of the court are in the breast of the judge, for the purpose of making amendments, or vacating improvident orders, and for the more general purpose of establishing justice between the parties before it. In re Mayfield, 17 Mo.App. 689. Courts of record speak only through their records. Kansas City v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 285; Cummings v. Brown, 181 Mo. 711; Henry County v. Salmon, 201 Mo. 136. (2) Contracts with county court must be proved by the record, and cannot be established by parol. Dennison v. St. Louis Co., 33 Mo. 168; Maupin v. County, 67 Mo. 327; Johnson County v. Wood, 84 Mo. 489; Funk v. Seehorn, 99 Mo.App. 587; Wright v. Heatherlin, 209 S.W. 871. (3) County courts are only agents of the county, and can bind county only when acting strictly within the scope of statutory authority. Bayless v. Gibbs, 251 Mo. 492; Saline County v. Wilson, 61 Mo. 237. The administration acts of county courts are not res adjudicata, but may be inquired into and corrected. Marion County v. Phillips, 45 Mo. 75. And may be revoked at subsequent term. State ex rel. v. County Court, 17 Mo. 507. (4) County courts act ministerially in ordering payment of sum as gratuity, in approving collector's bond, in settling with collectors, in settling with sheriffs. County courts act judicially in assessing taxes. State to use of Roberts, 60 Mo. 402; State ex rel. v. County Court, 47 Mo. 594; Owens v. County Court, 49 Mo. 372.

C. C. Spencer and A. E. Spencer for respondent.

(1) Section 11003, imposes on the court the duty of making an order fixing the fee. It must be done at the November term of court in each year, and cannot be done earlier. With equal force, it must be done at said term before the ensuing January first, for it must fix the fee for one year, commencing on the first day of January next thereafter, that is, next after the making of the order. It is apparent that the Legislature not only withheld the power until the November term each year, but it also intended that the order should be prospective in form, made before January first next following the order, and that an order retrospective in form or effect was not contemplated or authorized. The sheriff is required to board the prisoners, as a part of his official duties. This order fixes his rate of compensation for this for the ensuing year. He should know in advance what the compensation is to be, so he can make his arrangements accordingly. He should not be required, as defendant necessarily contends, to furnish this board, or contract with another for it, for fifteen days or any other portion of the new year, and then submit to an order fixing the compensation for both what he has done, and what remains to be done during the year. When the county court made the order of December first, it acted within the period fixed by the statute, and the order was strictly within its limitations in all things. When the certified copy was filed, there was a full and complete exercise of the powers given by the statute, and the matter ended for the year 1923. Even if there was power to modify the order before January first (and this we do not concede), that power ended with the advent of January first, because there is no power to make an order retrospective in effect. (2) Orders under the general powers of the court could not be set aside after rights have accrued thereunder. State v. Morgan, 144 Mo.App. 35; 15 C. J. 470, sec. 123.

David E. Blair, J. All concur, except James T. Blair, J., not sitting, and Walker, J., absent.

OPINION

BLAIR

This is an action by the sheriff of Jasper County to recover from said county the balance alleged to be due on account of board furnished by him to prisoners confined in the county jail. Trial before the circuit court without a jury resulted in a judgment for plaintiff for $ 1014.51, from which judgment defendant county has appealed. Because the action is against a county, we have appellate jurisdiction.

There is no controversy concerning the facts. The abstract of record contains the following admission:

"It is admitted for the purpose of this trial that the plaintiff was, during 1922 and all of 1923, the duly elected, qualified and acting Sheriff of Jasper County, Missouri, as such he had charge of the county jail and the boarding and feeding of prisoners in the county jail under criminal charges, for which board the county was liable. It is admitted that at the November term, 1922, of the County Court of Jasper County to-wit, on December 1, 1922, the county court made an order of record fixing the fees to the plaintiff for furnishing each of such prisoners with the board for each day for one year, commencing on the first day of January next thereafter, and fixing the fees to the plaintiff for the period from January 1, 1923, to December 31, 1923, at seventy-five cents per prisoner per day; that on December 4, 1922, the Clerk of the County Court certified to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the defendant county, a copy of such order, and same was on that date, filed in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court. It is admitted that during 1923, from January 1st to December 31st, the plaintiff had in his custody and confined in the county jail of defendant county, and furnished board for prisoners, for whose board the defendant is admitted to be liable, as stated in the petition. It is admitted that the statement of the prisoners confined and the number of days each prisoner was confined during 1923, as stated in the petition, is correct; that about the first of each calendar month beginning February 1, 1923, the plaintiff made and rendered to the county court of defendant county, an itemized statement of the bill for the board of such prisoners, which bill had become due and payable for the preceding calendar month, such statement covering the items and rate set out heretofore in the petition. It is admitted that the defendant made payments on said account, as stated in the petition, and that no payments have been made except as so stated. It is also admitted that the county court of defendant county, on January 16, 1923, and during the November term, 1922, of said court, made and entered of record the order copied and set out verbatim in the answer, and that on the same day, to-wit, January 16, 1923, the Clerk of the County Court certified the copy of said order to the Clerk of the Circuit Court, and filed same with him. It is also admitted that during the period from January 1st to January 16, 1923, both inclusive, the plaintiff had in his charge and custody in the jail various of the prisoners, included in the list set out in the petition, and was furnishing them board each day. It is admitted that the aggregate of board furnished to the prisoners during the year 1923, was 9678 days, which at seventy-five cents per day, would amount to $ 7258.50; at sixty-five cents per day, it would amount to $ 6290.70; that the defendant made payments on said account in the amounts and on the dates set up in the petition, and that the total of said payments is $ 6266.65; that the only question in dispute is whether the rate of allowance to the sheriff is seventy-five cents per day per prisoner or sixty-five cents per day per prisoner, and that the money amount of the principal of the difference is $ 967.80, which amount is unpaid. The monthly demand is admitted also, as stated in the petition."

The only other evidence in the case consisted of the introduction of certified copies of two orders made by the County Court of Jasper County. The order of December 1, 1922, during the November, 1922, term of said court, was as follows:

"Court orders that allowance made sheriff covering board of prisoners in county jail for period (January 1, 1923, to December 31, 1923) shall be seventy-five cents per prisoner, per day."

During the same term of said county court and on January 16, 1923, the following order was made:

"Whereas the county court did on December 1, 1922, on the 18th day of the November term, 1922, enter of record the following 'Court orders that allowance made sheriff covering board of prisoners in county jail for period (January 1, 1923, to December 31, 1923) shall be seventy-five cents per prisoner per day', which order is taken up by the court on its own motion on this the 16th day of January, 1923, on the 50th day of the November term, 1922, and it appearing to the court that said order was and is ill-advised, that provisions are as cheap or cheaper than in 1922, when sheriff was allowed sixty-five cents per prisoner per day, and that no good reason exists for the increase of ten cents per prisoner per day and that such increase is an improper and unjust burden upon the taxpayers of Jasper County, and wholly unwarranted;

"Now,...