Mead v. Parker

• Decision Date: 04 September 1874
• Citation: 115 Mass. 413
• Parties: Franklin Mead v. Jonas Parker
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

115 Mass. 413

Franklin Mead v. Jonas Parker

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

September 4, 1874

Suffolk. Contract to recover damages for an alleged breach of the following contract in writing signed by the defendant "Boston, December 17th, 1872. This is to certify that I Jonas Parker, have sold to Franklin Mead a house on Church Street for the sum of fifty-five hundred dollars; and, in payment, said Mead assumes the mortgage of twenty-nine hundred dollars, and pays cash one hundred dollars; balance bill of sale of a steam engine and crushing machine, and trucks and railway, and all the implements in the building and also the building in which the said machinery and tools, now with the same; and papers necessary to convey above to be made and passed on or before 25th December, 1872."

The declaration alleged that the house referred to was on Church Street, Somerville.

At the trial in the Superior Court, before Putnam, J., the defendant contended that the writing declared on was not such an agreement in writing as was required by the statute of frauds, Gen. Sts. c. 105. The court ruled that the writing was a sufficient agreement within the meaning of the statute. The case went to the jury, and evidence was offered by the plaintiff to prove the identity of the property, and that the bargain was made between the parties on the premises.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant alleged exceptions to the above ruling.

Exceptions overruled.

A. J. McLeod, for the defendant.

J. H. Hardy, (G. W. Morse with him,) for the plaintiff.

Wells, J. Colt & Endicott, JJ., absent.

OPINION

Wells

In the opinion of a majority of the court, there is no substantial point of difference by which to distinguish this case from Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545. In that the writing disclosed an agreement for the sale of "a house and lot of land situated on Amity Street." There being several such, parol evidence was admitted to show that there was one only which the defendant had any right to convey, and that the parties had been in treaty for the sale and purchase of it. The court held that the subject matter of the contract might thus be identified; and when so ascertained the writing might be construed to apply to it; and was thus made sufficiently definite and certain for specific enforcement in equity.

In that case, the location of the property in Lynn appeared from the writing. In the present case, the writing bears date at Boston; which might indicate that the property was in Boston. But that is an inference of fact, not conclusive. If it appeared that there was no Church Street in Boston, or that the defendant had no house there, but did own one upon Church Street in Somerville, the identification of that as the subject of the negotiation...