Mead v. Salter
| Decision Date | 14 February 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 06A04-8908-CV-375,06A04-8908-CV-375 |
| Parties | John MEAD, William J. Mead Franklin J. Mead, III, d/b/a Buttonwood Properties, an Indiana Partnership and Revel Companies, Inc., Appellant, v. William SALTER, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
James A. Goodin, Jon C. Abernathy, Goodin and Kraege, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Denise Page, Sheeks and Ittenbach, James M. Secrest, P.C., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This case involves an appeal from a $400,000 jury verdict in favor of plaintiff-appellee William Salter, who was injured when he fell down a stairwell located at the entrance of a downtown Indianapolis office building. He sued the owners and managers of the building, John Mead, William Mead, Franklin J. Mead III d/b/a Buttonwood Properties and Revel Companies, Inc. (collectively referred to as the "Owners").
Owners appeal, raising the following issues:
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Owners' summary judgment motion II. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant Owners' motion for directed verdict that Salter was contributorily negligent as a matter of law;
that Salter was a licensee as a matter of law;
III. Whether the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony concerning Salter's medical history and condition; and
IV. Whether the trial court erred in admitting photographs of Salter's back surgery.
We affirm.
On November 7, 1983, Salter was on his way to keep an appointment with his attorney, James Secrest, whose office was located in an Indianapolis office building on the Monument Circle. Salter did not recall in which building Secrest's office was located. He entered the Guaranty Building as he started around the Circle, intending to consult the building directory to determine whether Secrest's office was located therein. As he entered the building, he took a step and fell to the bottom of the stairwell located just inside the entrance to the building. He claimed injuries and damages resulting from the fall and filed a complaint in Marion County against the Owners. The suit was venued to Boone County. On May 5, 1989, after a week-long trial, the jury returned a verdict for Salter, and the court entered judgment on the verdict in the amount of $400,000.
The entrance to the Guaranty Building has two large glass doors. The left door opens directly into the lobby where there is an elevator to the offices located on the floors above the entry level. A directory is located near the elevator. The entry door on the right opens to a stairwell leading to a lower level where--at the time of Salter's fall--a restaurant and a health club were located. A glass panel divides the lobby side from the stairway to the lower level.
Salter testified that the lobby floor of the left side of the building could be seen reflected in the glass of the right door, so that when he opened the door on the right he thought he was entering the lobby of the building. As he opened the door to enter, he fell down the marble stairway located approximately twenty-two inches inside the doorway. There was a sign in black on the glass doors warning visitors to watch their step; however, Salter--who had no sight in one eye due to a childhood accident--claimed he did not see the sign. Pictures showing the reflection were introduced and there was testimony from expert witnesses regarding the visual clues presented by the reflections and lighting.
Salter broke his foot in the fall and did not immediately report back injury, but later developed back problems requiring multiple surgeries. Doctors testified that the resulting back injury, which necessitated surgery, was consistent with a fall such as the one he had sustained.
Other facts will be added as necessary to this opinion.
Issue I--Salter's status: Licensee or Invitee
Owners contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment on the issue of Salter's status. They argue that summary judgment should have been granted because Salter was a licensee as a matter of law since he entered the building for his own convenience, curiosity or entertainment. Fleischer v. Hebrew Orthodox Congregation (1987), Ind.App., 504 N.E.2d 320, trans. den. (1989), Ind., 539 N.E.2d 1.
Salter contends that the court did not err and argues that he was an invitee because the office building is held open to the public to enter and do business with its tenants and occupants. A building directory is located in the lobby and used by the public to determine which specific individuals have offices in the building. Therefore, Salter asserts, his entry into the building was clearly within the use contemplated for an office building open to the public. We agree.
Indiana still follows the common law categories of invitee, licensee and trespasser for determining liability of landowners. City of Bloomington v. Kuruzovich (1987), Ind.App., 517 N.E.2d 408. If Salter was an invitee when he entered the Guaranty Building, the Owners owed him a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances and he would only need to prove the Owners were negligent to recover. Id. However, if Salter was a licensee, the Owners only owed him a duty to refrain from willfully and wantonly injuring him. Id.
Recent cases have extended the invitee category to cover a public invitee. That is, "when one invites the public, or a large segment thereof, onto property for a particular purpose, he is liable to those he invites onto the land for any hazardous conditions he causes or negligently allows to remain on the land." City of Bloomington, supra, at 413, citing Fleischer, supra. City of Bloomington and Fleischer adopt the "public invitee" test as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 332 (1965), which provides in relevant part:
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business invitee.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land.
The Owners cite French v. Sunburst Properties, Inc. (1988), Ind.App., 521 N.E.2d 1355, claiming that Salter does not meet the public invitee test as interpreted by French. In French, the plaintiff, who tripped over barricades set up in the apartment complex, sought damages from apartment owners. French had been chasing his dog who had strayed into the apartment complex. The court found that the pet owner ran upon the apartment complex property for his own convenience and, therefore, was not a public invitee. The Owners contend Salter merely entered the building intending to check the directory, and thus, like the plaintiff in French, entered the building for his own convenience.
Salter argues that the disparity between French and the present case is obvious. In French, there was no evidence that the apartment owners encouraged or invited pet owners to enter the property. In the present case, the building includes a lobby open for the public to enter and do business with its tenants. James Greenwood, a former Guaranty building manager and engineer, testified that the ten-story office building was open to the public and the only public entrance was the one used by Salter at the front of the building. He further stated that the lobby was a busy one used by the public to check the building directory.
In Roberts v. Menorah Medical Center (1989), Mo.App., 777 S.W.2d 330, the Missouri court considered a case similar to the case at bar. Missouri follows the common law categories and also follows the public invitee test as set forth in the Restatement of Torts. In Roberts, a woman was injured when she slipped on water on the floor of a hospital hallway. Roberts had gone to the hospital upon receiving a call informing her that her brother had become ill at work and had been taken to the hospital. She drove to the hospital expecting to see her brother, but he had been taken to his doctor's office instead. As she left the hospital to go to the doctor's office, she slipped. The defendants in that case, like the Owners in the present case, argued that Roberts was a licensee because her brother was not at the hospital. The Missouri court disagreed, holding that, under the Restatement definition of a public invitee, visiting those who are in the hospital is a purpose for which the hospital is held open to the public and her status as an invitee was grounded upon her purpose in visiting the hospital. The court concluded that her purpose was consistent with the nature of business conducted there and it was irrelevant that her brother was not actually in the hospital.
We find the Missouri court's reasoning is sound and that it applies to the present situation as well. It is irrelevant that Secrest's office was not in the building as Salter's purpose in entering the building--to check the directory for a potential tenant --was consistent with the purpose for which the building was open.
Salter further points out that a negligence action is rarely appropriately disposed by summary judgment, citing Stumph v. Foster (1988), Ind.App., 524 N.E.2d 812. Furthermore, whether an injured party's actions are reasonable in light of his status as it relates to the property owner are issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Wright v. International Harvester Co., Inc. (1988), Ind.App., 528 N.E.2d 837. Here, the question--whether the purpose for which Salter entered the building was of a nature consistent with the purpose for which the building was held open to the public--was properly submitted to the jury. The trial judge instructed the jury on licensee versus invitee status; therefore, we find no error in the trial court's failure to find that Salter was a licensee as a matter...
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