Meade v. Montrose

• Citation: 173 Mo. App. 722,160 S.W. 11
• Parties: MEADE v. MONTROSE.
• Decision Date: 30 June 1913
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

160 S.W. 11

173 Mo. App. 722

MEADE v. MONTROSE.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

June 30, 1913.

1. LANDLORD AND TENANT (§ 167)—INJURIES FROM DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS—LIABILITY.

A servant, invited guest, licensee, or customer of a tenant injured while on the leased premises by reason of such relation, does not possess the rights given by law to members of the general public, but has only such rights as accrue by virtue of the contract with the tenant, and, as against the landlord, only such rights as the tenant has.

2. LANDLORD AND TENANT (§ 125) — CONSTRUCTION OF LEASE—IMPLIED COVENANTS.

In the absence of any representation or agreement, there is no implied obligation or warranty on the part of a landlord to his tenant that the premises are habitable or fit for the use to which the tenant intends to put them.

3. LANDLORD AND TENANT (§ 162)—INJURIES FROM DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS—LIABILITY.

A lessee cannot assert a claim for damages against the lessor on account of the condition of the premises at the time of the demise, unless there is some hidden defect known to the lessor at such time, but not apparent to the lessee, of which the lessor is bound to inform the lessee.

4. LANDLORD AND TENANT (§ 167)—INJURIES FROM DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS—LIABILITY.

As a general rule, a lessor is not liable for injuries to the person or property of any person who may be on the leased premises, caused by defects existing at the time of the lease.

5. LANDLORD AND TENANT (§ 167)—INJURIES FROM DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS—LIABILITY.

To make a landlord liable to a tenant or his servants, licensees, etc., for hidden or concealed defects existing at the time of the lease, the landlord must know thereof at such time, or have knowledge of facts from which he ought to know or will be presumed to have known of them.

6. LANDLORD AND TENANT (§ 169)—INJURIES FROM DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS — ACTIONS— SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

In an action against the lessor of a garage for injuries to an automobile kept therein under a contract with the tenant, caused by the fall of the roof under the weight of rainwater collected thereon, evidence held insufficient to show that there were any hidden or concealed defects in the premises, or, if there were, that the landlord knew or should have known thereof.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Wm. O. Thomas, Judge.

Action by James F. Meade against Stephen V. Montrose. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Sparrow, Page & Rea, of Kansas City, for appellant. Edward J. White, H. H. McCluer, and Omar E. Robinson, all of Kansas City, for respondent.

TRIMBLE, J.

Appellant is the owner of a building which he erected and rented to a tenant for a garage. Respondent placed his new automobile in this garage to be cared for by the tenant for hire. Plaintiff claims that in the erection of the building the flat roof thereof was not made strong enough, and no sufficient outlet for rainwater falling thereon was provided. During a rain, the water collected on the roof in such quantities that its weight, together with the insufficient supports to the roof, caused one of them at the rear end of the building to give way, allowing that portion of roof supported by it to fall, damaging respondent's automobile, for which damage this suit is brought. The basis of the suit is the negligent, unsafe, and dangerous manner in which appellant built the roof, in that he failed to support it with materials of sufficient strength or number, and built it of poor materials, and so constructed the roof as to cause water from ordinary rainfalls to accumulate and remain thereon, by reason of all which the roof fell. The answer contained a general denial, and set up that the rain in question was of such an unusual character as to constitute what is to some minds irreverently termed an "act of God." The reply denied this, and there was no proof thereof. The jury returned a verdict for $425 in favor of respondent.

Appellant insists that under the facts shown there is no liability upon him to respondent. In order to properly determine this question we must bear in mind, not only the nature and basis of the suit, but also the position and relation sustained by plaintiff to defendant. The suit is one based on negligence; that is, want of ordinary care in the erection of the building. The position occupied by plaintiff is that of a guest, licensee, or customer of defendant's tenant, a man named Flack. There is no privity of relation or contract existing between defendant and plaintiff. The former leased the building to Flack with no representation or warranty that the building was safe, nor clause agreeing to keep it in repair.

Whether a landlord is liable for an injury to a third person caused by a defect in the demised premises depends sometimes on what the landlord has agreed or undertaken to do in his dealings with his tenant, and sometimes on the status of such third person. If such third person is a stranger to both the landlord and the tenant, for instance, an adjacent or nearby dweller or property owner, or a passer-by on the adjoining highway, then both landlord and tenant may be liable to him for injuries caused by the defective condition of the building. But if the injured person is one who sustains only a private contractual relation with the tenant, and is injured only by being on the premises by reason of that relation, such as a servant, invited guest, licensee, or customer of the tenant, then his right to recover damages is ordinarily limited to the tenant, and only within certain narrow limits can that right extend beyond the tenant to the landlord. In such case the rights possessed by the injured person are not those given him by law as a member of the general public, but are those, and only those, accruing to him by virtue of his contract with the tenant. When this is the case, he has no greater rights against the landlord than the tenant has. Peterson v. Smart, 70 Mo. 34; Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393, 20 Am. Rep. 767.

In the case now before us, the landlord had not agreed or undertaken to do anything with regard to the premises, so that feature of the case is eliminated; and therefore all cases in which the landlord in the lease either warranted or represented the premises to be in good condition, or agreed to keep them in repair and failed to do so, or undertook to repair them and did so negligently, are not applicable to the question here presented. Such cases are: La Brasca v. Hinchman, 81 N. J. Law, 367, 79 Atl. 885, where the landlord undertook to make repairs, but made them negligently; Meyers v. Russell, 124 Mo. App. 317, loc. cit. 328, 101 S. W. 606; Shute v. Bills, 191 Mass. 433, loc. cit. 437, 78 N. E. 96, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 965, 114 Am. St. Rep. 631; Barman v. Spencer (Ind.) 49 N. E. 9, 44 L. R. A. 815. In the cases where the landlord undertook to repair, he is liable for negligence in doing so as for any other negligent act on his part resulting in injury to another. 1 Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant, 660.

Also, in the case before us, it must be remembered that the plaintiff is not a stranger, such as an adjacent property owner, or passer-by on the sidewalk, deriving his rights, by operation of law, from his position as a member of the general public. Consequently the cases wherein a landlord has been held liable to a stranger are not in point. Such cases are: Stoetzele v. Swearingen, 90 Mo. App. 589; Gordon v. Peltzer, 56 Mo. App. 599; Helwig v. Jordan, 53 Ind. 21, 21 Am. Rep. 189; Pickard v. Collins, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 444.

We come then to the question of defendant's liability within the precise limits presented by the facts in this case. The authorities are generally agreed that, in the absence of any representation or agreement to the contrary, there is no implied obligation or warranty on the part of the landlord to the tenant that the premises are habitable or fit for the use to which the tenant intends to put them. 1 Tiffany on L. & T. p. 556; McKenzie v. Cheetham, 83 Me. 543, 22 Atl. 469; Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398, 15 Am. Rep. 438; Burdick v. Cheadle, 23 Ohio St. 393, 20 Am. Rep. 767; Towne v. Thompson, 68 N. H. 317, 44 Atl. 492, 46 L. R. A. 748; Hart v. Windsor, 12 Mees & W. 68; O'Brien v. Capwell, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 497; Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, loc. cit. 364, 14 N. E. 117, 1 Am. St. Rep. 469; Dyer v. Robinson (C. C.) 110 Fed. 99; Grant v. Tomlinson, 138 Mo. App. 222, 119 S. W. 1079. It follows from the above rule, and it is established by the authorities cited and others, that the lessee cannot assert a claim for damages against the lessor on account of the condition of the premises at the time of the demise. 1 Tiffany on L. & T. 559, and cases cited. This rule, however, is subject to an exception that, if there is some hidden defect known to the lessor at the time of making the lease, but which is not apparent to the intending lessee, the lessor is bound to inform the latter thereof, and if he fails to do so, he is liable to the tenant for injuries arising therefrom. 1 Tiffany on L. & T. 562, and cases cited.

The same rules apply to persons other than the tenant rightfully on the premises by the tenant's request or permission....