Meador v. Branson

• Decision Date: 18 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–3088.,11–3088.
• Citation: 688 F.3d 433
• Parties: David L. MEADOR, Petitioner–Appellant v. Pat BRANSON, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

688 F.3d 433

David L. MEADOR, Petitioner–Appellant

v.Pat BRANSON, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 11–3088.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 12, 2012.

Filed: Aug. 16, 2012.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 18, 2012.

Steven R. Morrison, argued, Grand Forks, ND, for appellant.

Jonathan Ray Byers, AAG, argued, Ken R. Sorenson, AG, on the brief, Bismarck, ND, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

David Meador appeals from the district court's ¹ denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argues that the decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court, interpreting the state's sex offender registration statute to apply to sex offenders even when they have no permanent residential or mailing address, is an unforeseen and retroactive expansion of statutory language. We affirm the district court's denial of that claim, holding that the state's interpretation of its statute as applied to Meador is not a constitutional violation sufficient to meet the high standards for success under AEDPA.

I

In 1994, David Meador was convicted of sex crimes in Kentucky. Because of this conviction, when Meador moved to North Dakota in 2008, he was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12.1–32–15(2). In accordance with this requirement, Meador registered with the Valley City Police Department (VCPD) on August 9, 2008, listing his residence as a gas station parking lot where he was living in his truck. However, on August 14, the police evicted Meador from the parking lot.

Between the nights of August 14 and August 20, Meador did not formally register his location. The night of August 14, Meador went to a local hospital to address some breathing problems. The next day, he drove to Chataqua City Park in Valley City, but the VCPD told him to leave. Meador then went to a trailer park in Valley City, where he stayed the nights of August 15 and 16. On August 17, Meador left the trailer park and stayed on city property in the northwest part of Valley City. During the three-day period between August 15 and 17, Meador was in contact with the VCPD, telling them where he was spending the night and that he was looking for a more permanent place to stay. On August 17, an officer at the VCPD suggested he stay nearby at Lake Ashtabula.

Meador spent the night near Lake Ashtabula on August 18 and 19. On August 19, he called the VCPD and the North Dakota Attorney General's office and told both that he did not have a place to stay. He also asked how to register as a sex offender under his particular circumstances. An officer at the VCPD told Meador that he should let police know more or less where he was living. On August 20, Meador sent a notification to the county sheriff that he was moving to Tower City, North Dakota. On August 22, Meador properly registered in that county.

Despite this, on August 20, 2008, North Dakota filed a criminal complaint against Meador, charging him with failure to comply with registration requirements in violation of N.D. Cent.Code § 12.1–32–15(7), a class C felony. The statute requires that, “upon a change of address, the individual required to register shall also register within three days at the law enforcement agency having local jurisdiction of the new place of residence, school, or employment.” A jury found Meador guilty of this charge. The trial court then sentenced Meador to five years' imprisonment, plus two years' supervised release. Meador appealed his conviction and sentence to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the state district court erred and violated his due process rights in interpreting § 12.1–32–15(7) as requiring him to register within three days even though he had not obtained a residence. The state supreme court denied Meador's claims, and held that “[t]he plain language of the statute requires an individual to register within three days of a change of address.” State v. Meador, 785 N.W.2d 886, 891 (N.D.2010).

Following the state supreme court decision, Meador filed a timely pro se petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court. His petition alleged several errors, including an ex post facto violation and a claim that “the trial court abused its discretion or authority in denying a motion to dismiss, where, the appellant did not move to a new residence for three days under N.D.C.C. 12.1–32–15(7) (2007).” Meador also filed a memorandum supporting position, which included the following question: “Whether the petitioner was denied due process of law by the State's attorney having changed the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 12.1–32–15(7) to include persons who have no residence to register?”

On August 23, 2011, a Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation. It recommended ordering Meador's petition be amended to include a due process claim based on an unexpected judicial expansion of statutory language. It then recommended denying Meador's claims and dismissing his petition, but granting a certificate of appealability on Meador's due process claim. Both parties objected to the Report and Recommendation, and the U.S. District Court adopted it, denying Meador's claims but granting the certificate of appealability on the amended claim.

II

We must first address the issue of whether Meador's claim is properly before this court. Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The government argues that we should not consider Meador's habeas claim because he failed to exhaust the issue of whether the state's interpretation of § 12.1–32–15(7) was an unforeseeable and retroactive expansion of narrow and precise statutory language. To exhaust a claim in state court, a habeas petitioner “must show that he either made a fair presentation of his claims to the state courts or that he has no other presently available state remedies to pursue.” Gentry v. Lansdown, 175 F.3d 1082, 1083 (8th Cir.1999).

Here, Meador presented to the North Dakota Supreme Court the question of whether his conviction was a violation of his “substantial due process right to fair notice.” That court characterized this argument as asserting that “the statute does not require a sexual offender [to] locate a new address within three days, but requires an offender to register a new address within three days of obtaining a new residence.” Meador, 785 N.W.2d at 891. Meador also presented the facts of his case, which supported his argument that the state improperly required him to register an address when he was a transient.

In response, the North Dakota Supreme Court held:

The plain language of the statute requires an individual to register within three days of a change of address. Meador requested the jury instructions include language from State v. Rubey, 2000 ND 119, ¶¶ 18–19, 611 N.W.2d 888, in which a majority of this Court held the word “address” under a prior version of the statute included mailing and residential addresses, and he does not argue that a different interpretation applies under the current version of the statute. Furthermore, Meador did not argue the statute is unconstitutionally vague. See Santos v. State, 284 Ga. 514, 668 S.E.2d 676 (2008) (registration statute is unconstitutionally vague as to homeless offenders because it does not provide sufficient notice of how they can comply with the registration requirement). We conclude that Meador's argument is without merit and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss.

Id. Thus, the state supreme court ruled on the merits that the “plain language” of § 12.1–32–15(7) and Rubey required Meador to register even though he was transient, and that he was on notice of this requirement. Moreover, the court's assertion that Meador did not raise a vagueness claim appears to be referring to a claim that he did not know how to register as a transient, rather than the claim he raises here, which is that the state courts interpreted the statute in an unforeseeable and retroactive manner. Although Meador's argument—and the state's treatment of it—might not have been as fully developed as it could have been, we find that it was sufficient to fairly present his claim to the North Dakota state courts.

The state also argues that we should not consider Meador's AEDPA petition because his constitutional claim of an unforeseen and retroactive expansion was not included in his petition to the federal district court. Ordinarily, a federal district court “should not grant habeas relief to a petitioner based upon a legal theory that involves an entirely different analysis and legal standards than the theory actually alleged” in the petition to that court. Frey v. Schuetzle, 78 F.3d 359, 361 (8th Cir.1996). However, we relax these requirements where a petitioner represents himself pro se. Id. (“We note that as a general rule a pro se habeas petition must be given a liberal construction and that such a petitioner is not required to identify specific legal theories or offer case citations in order to be entitled to relief.”).

Here, while Meador may have presented his constitutional challenge to the North Dakota sex offender registration statute somewhat inartfully, it is nevertheless sufficiently presented to the district court. In Meador's habeas petition, he presented the following question: whether “the trial court abused its discretion or authority in denying a motion to dismiss, where, the appellant did not move to a new residence for three days under N.D.C.C. 12.1–32–15(7) (2007).” In the memorandum accompanying his petition, he also presents an additional question to the court: “Whether the petitioner was denied due process of law by the State's Attorney having changed the meaning of N.D.C.C. 12.1–32–15(7) to...