Rousan v. Sachse
| Decision Date | 19 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:16-CV-01502-SPM |
| Parties | WILLIAM BRENT ROUSAN, Petitioner, v. JENNIFER SACHSE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner William Brent Rousan's ("Rousan" or "Petitioner") amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 24). Respondent filed a response to the Petition. (Doc. 36). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 5). For the reasons set forth below, Rousan's petition for writ of habeas corpus will be stayed to allow Petitioner to exhaust all available state court remedies.
Rousan is currently an inmate at the Jefferson City Correctional Center in Jefferson City, Missouri. On March 4, 1996, Rousan was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole on two counts of first degree murder, after pleading guilty in exchange for a waiver of the death penalty. Rousan was sixteen years old at the time he committed the offenses.
Rousan filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and attempted to withdraw his guilty plea. (Doc. 24-1 at 3). That motion was denied without a hearing, and the motion court's ruling was affirmed on appeal. Id. Subsequently, Rousan filed a pro se direct appeal in 2005, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, which was dismissed as untimely on February 6, 2006. Id. Rousan then filed a motion for a writ of habeas corpus in 2012, in the Circuit Court of Cole County, which was denied on April 23, 2012. Id.
On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In Miller, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. Id. at 479. The Court reasoned that "[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences," the "family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional," the "circumstances of the homicide offense," and "the possibility of rehabilitation[.]" Id. at 477-78.
On March 12, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Missouri Supreme Court, alleging that his sentence was unconstitutional in light of Miller. On January 27, 2016, while Rousan's petition was still pending, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), holding that the rule of Miller must be retroactively applied in collateral cases to persons sentenced to mandatory life without parole for juvenile sentences before Miller was decided. Id. at 732. The Court clarified, however, that this retroactive application "does not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory life without parole." Id. Rather, "[a] State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered forparole, rather than by resentencing them." Id. Regarding this remedy, the Court cited a Wyoming statute that allows a juvenile convicted of homicide to be eligible for parole after 25 years incarceration. Id. (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2013)). The Court specifically held that "allowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment." Id.
On March 15, 2016, the Missouri Supreme Court issued an order in Petitioner's habeas case, as well as all other similarly situated cases, stating that the Missouri General Assembly had yet to enact a constitutionally valid sentencing provision in accordance with Miller and Montgomery. Therefore, the Missouri Supreme Court granted Rousan's petition in part and ordered that he (and those similarly situated) would be eligible to apply for parole after 25 years' imprisonment on their sentences of life without parole unless their sentences were otherwise brought into conformity with Miller and Montgomery by action of the governor or enactment of the legislature.
On July 13, 2016, the Governor signed into law Missouri Senate Bill No. 590, 98th General Assembly, which states, in relevant part:
In light of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047, the Missouri Supreme Court issued an order on July 19, 2016, vacating its March 15 order, overruling as moot the motions for rehearing or resentencingfiled by Rousan and others similarly situated, and denying the pending petitions for state habeas corpus.
Because Rousan is serving two consecutive sentences of life without parole, he is not eligible to petition for parole until he has served twenty-five years on each sentence, a total of fifty years, at which time Rousan will be 69 years of age. (Doc. 36 at 2).
On October 14, 2016, Rousan filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, raising one ground for relief: that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047 is unconstitutional as applied to him because he will not be eligible for parole until he is 69 years old, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 1). Subsequently, this Court appointed counsel to represent Rousan, after which Rousan submitted the amended petition currently before the Court, in which he asserts the same sole ground for relief.
On February 28, 2017, Rousan filed a pro se writ for habeas corpus in the Missouri Supreme Court pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91, in which he similarly asserted that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047 is unconstitutional as applied to him. (Doc. 24-1 at 5). The Missouri Supreme Court denied the petition without prejudice pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 84.22(a), which states, "No original remedial writ shall be issued by an appellate court in any case wherein adequate relief can be afforded by an appeal or by application for such writ to a lower court."
Respondent, in the response filed on August 13, 2018, asserts that Rousan's sole ground for relief is not properly before the Court because it has not been exhausted in state court. (Doc. 36). Although given the opportunity, Rousan did not reply to Respondent's response. In his amended petition, though, Rousan asserted that his claim has been fairly presented to the state court and is exhausted.
"In a habeas setting, a federal court is bound by the 'Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA] to exercise only limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions." Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003); 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under this standard, a federal court may not grant relief to a state prisoner unless the state court's adjudication of a claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
A state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies before obtaining federal habeas relief. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Section 2254(b)(1)(A). This requires that a prisoner "give state courts a fair opportunity to act on their claims." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844; accord Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 722 (8th Cir. 2012). "The exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b) ensures that the state courts have the opportunity fully to consider federal-law challenges to a state custodial judgment before the lower federal courts may entertain a collateral attack upon that judgment." Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178-79 (2001). "The exhaustion rule promotes comity in that 'it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.' " Id. at 179 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)). The requirement prevents a federal court from granting a habeas petition based on a constitutional violation that could be redressed adequately by pursuing an avenue of state relief "still open to the habeas applicant at the time he files his application in federal court." Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,516 (1972). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by showing either that he "made a fair presentation of his claims to the state courts or that he has no other presently available state remedies to pursue." Gentry v. Lansdown, 175 F.3d 1082, 1083 (8th Cir. 1999); accord Meador v. Branson, 688 F.3d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 2012). The burden is on the Petitioner to show that all available state remedies have been exhausted or that exceptional circumstances exist. Carmichael v. White, 163 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 1998).
After careful review of the record, the Court concludes that Rousan's claim has not been properly raised before the state courts and...
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