Meadow Park Land Company v. School District of Kansas City
| Decision Date | 31 December 1923 |
| Citation | 257 S.W. 441,301 Mo. 688 |
| Parties | MEADOW PARK LAND COMPANY, Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF KANSAS CITY |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Thad B. Landon Judge.
Affirmed.
Scarritt Jones, Seddon & North for appellant.
(1) The Legislature in expressly providing that school districts may condemn land for school purposes "in the same manner as provided for condemnation of rights of way in Article 2 of Chapter 13 of the Revised Statutes," made that article being the general condemnation law, and that article as interpreted and construed by the Supreme Court, a part of the School District Act. R. S. 1919, secs. 11403, 11428; R. S. 1919, secs. 1791 to 1800, being General Railroad Condemnation Act; State v. Peyton, 234 Mo. 517; Gaston v. Lamkin, 115 Mo. 30; Crohn v. Tel. Co., 131 Mo.App. 313; Gray v. Ry. Co., 81 Mo. 126. (2) In every condemnation proceeding founded upon the Railroad Condemnation Act, Art. 2, Chap. 13, being Secs. 1791 to 1800, R. S. 1919, from the time of the enactment of that statute until the present, it has been ruled in the appellate courts that a condemning corporation, by instituting and then discontinuing a condemnation proceeding before the accomplishment of its purpose, is liable to pay the defendant the cash outlay incurred by him in connection with the abandoned proceeding. Railroad v. Lackland, 25 Mo. 515; Railroad v. Reynal, 25 Mo. 534; Leisse v. Railroad, 2 Mo.App. 105, 5 Mo.App. 585; St. Joseph v. Hamilton, 43 Mo. 282; Owen v. Springfield, 83 Mo.App. 557; Sterrett v. Railroad, 108 Mo.App. 650; Kirn v. Railroad, 124 Mo.App. 271; St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Railway, 138 Mo. 591; Gibbons v. Railway Co., 40 Mo.App. 146; Lohse & Miller v. Ry. Co., 44 Mo.App. 645; Railroad v. Railroad, 126 Mo.App. 272. (3) Cases relied upon by the respondents deal with condemnation laws differing materially from the General Condemnation Act and therefore are not precedents to and should not control the case at bar. St. Louis v. Meintz, 107 Mo. 611; Simpson v. Kansas City, 111 Mo. 237; Brewing Assn. v. St. Louis, 168 Mo. 37; Lester Real Estate Co. v. St. Louis, 170 Mo. 31; Nauman v. Drain. Dist., 113 Mo.App. 575; Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210; Moxley v. Pike County, 276 Mo. 449; State ex rel. School Dist. v. Gordon, 231 Mo. 547; Reed v. Howell County, 125 Mo. 58. (4) It was clearly the intent of the Legislature when it conferred power to condemn lands, upon the School District of Kansas City, and only to condemn lands, "in the same manner as provided for condemnation of right of way in Article 2, Chapter 13, of the Revised Statutes," to give the school district all the rights and privileges conferred upon railroad companies by that law and to impose the same obligations upon it that a railroad company would incur if it should commence a condemnation proceeding and then abandon it before its purpose was effectuated; that is to say, it is obligated to compensate the owner for the cash outlay that he incurred by reason of the abortive proceeding, otherwise the same act, the same legislative language, would mean one thing if a railroad company were involved and another thing if a school district were involved, which is absurd. Authorities heretofore cited, and State ex rel. v. Goodrick, 257 Mo. 51; Lohse & Miller v. Railroad, 44 Mo.App. 654. (5) This is not an ordinary lawsuit. The Land Company had done no wrong. It was in the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of its property rights when the school district said: We will take your land for school purposes. We will now institute a proceeding conformable to the statute for that purpose. The landowner says: Very well; pay me what I am entitled to under the law. The school district drags that proceeding along for a year and a half; and it is reasonably to be inferred from this record that its purpose was, not in good faith to proceed according to law to ascertain the value of the owner's property sought to be taken and then pay him for it, but to use the process of law to constrain him to take less for his property than the wisdom of the law would allow him. School directors are human like other people. And the Legislature, doubtless recognizing these human traits, thought public necessities and public honesty would be best subserved by requiring that the school district, and any other public or quasi-public corporation which enjoys the extraordinary rights and powers of the Railroad Condemnation Act, should compensate the owner for his cash expenditures in case the condemnation suit were abandoned before its purpose was accomplished, and so wrote the law. See authorities heretofore cited. (6) The construction of this statute here contended for comports with common fairness and equity and the reasonable intendment of the constitutional restrictions on the aggressions of governmental authorities against the rights of property owners under the guise of eminent domain. Mo. Constitution, art. 2, secs. 11, 21; St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Railway, 138 Mo. 595; Kirn v. Railroad, 124 Mo.App. 276; Lohse & Miller v. Railway, 44 Mo.App. 645.
McCune, Caldwell & Downing for respondents.
(1) The right of the school district to institute and abandon condemnation proceedings is granted by Section 11428, and also by Section 11143, R. S. 1919. By the provisions of these sections the procedure is in accordance with the general statute governing the condemnation of rights of way. This statute (Art. 2, chap. 13, R. S. 1919) authorizes the abandonment of the proposed appropriation and provides for the payment of the costs of the proceeding. R. S. 1919, secs. 1793, 1796. (2) The general condemnation statute does not authorize the recovery of attorneys' fees or other expenses of the kind sued for in this action. "The costs of the proceedings" referred to in Section 1796 means the sum fixed by law as charges for the services enumerated in the fee bill. St. Louis v. Meintz, 107 Mo. 611. (3) Attorneys' fees and expenses not allowed by statute as taxable costs may be recovered only in a separate action and on equitable grounds, or because of the provisions of the charter of the party attempting to exercise the right of condemnation, and such fees and expenses are only recoverable from a common carrier or corporation organized for private gain, and not from a purely municipal corporation. North Mo. Railroad Co. v. Lackland, 25 Mo. 515; Leisse v. Railroad Co., 2 Mo.App. 105; St. Louis v. Meintz, 107 Mo. 611; Lohse & Miller v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 44 Mo.App. 645; Sterrett v. Ry. Co., 108 Mo.App. 650; Kirn v. Railroad Co., 124 Mo.App. 271; St. Louis & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Cape Girardeau Ry. Co., 126 Mo.App. 272; St. Louis Ry. Co. v. So. Ry. Co., 138 Mo. 591. (4) Where condemnation proceedings have been instituted and later abandoned by a municipality or public corporation created solely for public service, the municipality or corporation is not liable for damages sustained by property owners on account of such condemnation proceedings unless it appears that the proceedings were unnecessarily, wrongfully and vexatiously delayed and continued. St. Louis v. Meintz, 107 Mo. 611; Simpson v. Kansas City, 111 Mo. 237; St. Louis Brewing Assn. v. St. Louis, 168 Mo. 37; Lester Real Estate Co. v. St. Louis, 170 Mo. 31; Nauman v. Big Tarkio Drain. Dist., 113 Mo.App. 575. (5) A school district is not liable in an action of this nature because school funds are collected from the public and held in trust for educational purposes only, and cannot be diverted to pay damages such as are sought to be recovered in this action. Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210.
The essential issue in this case is sharply definable. The question is whether the School District of Kansas City, which instituted a proceeding to condemn land of the appellant for school purposes, and, after prosecuting that proceeding for several months, dismissed it, is liable for the attorney's fees and other attendant expenses incurred by appellant in its defense, in that proceeding.
The appellant sued for the sum of $ 9107.66, the amount which it had paid out, or had become legally liable to pay, by reason of the institution of the proceeding to condemn, and set forth a schedule of the items thereof. The school district filed a general demurrer to the petition, which was sustained by the trial court. Appellant stood upon its petition, and from the resultant judgment the case is here on appeal. The petition is long, but need not be set forth, nor is extensive reference to the facts therein stated necessary; and only so much will be attempted as suffices to make plain the nature of the question to be decided, and the circumstances under which it arose.
The appellant is an incorporated company and the original owner of a large number of lots constituting a platted addition to Kansas City, known as Meadow Park Addition, comprising a tract of about eighty acres. The addition was established with the purpose, the petition states, of making it "a comfortable, agreeable and first class residential district;" and, in the conveyances made by the company to purchasers of lots certain restrictive covenants and agreements were imposed upon the grantees, and their assigns, as to the character of building and occupancy permitted. These covenants may be found fully set forth in the opinion of this court, in Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618.
On the 11th day of December, 1920, the school district instituted its suit in the circuit court to condemn Blocks 3 and 4 of this addition, owned by appellant, as a site for a public school house. The suit was against appellant and against all other owners of lots in said addition, and the object sought was to condemn the site, and also to condemn the rights or easements of appellan...
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