Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower
| Decision Date | 19 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 970080,970080 |
| Citation | 959 P.2d 115 |
| Parties | 343 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 MEADOWBROOK, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Edward FLOWER and Lauretta Pelton, Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Vernon C. Jolly, Riverside, Cal., for plaintiff.
Russell A. Cline, Michael Crippen, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Defendants Edward Flower and Lauretta Pelton appeal the trial court's denial of their post-trial motion for attorney fees that they filed five days after the jury returned a verdict in their favor but before entry of final judgment. We reverse.
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this appeal. Meadowbrook, LLC ("Meadowbrook"), which owns Meadowbrook Mobile Home Park, brought an action to evict defendants, alleging that they had failed to comply with certain mobile home park rules and that their lease should therefore be terminated. At trial, the jury found that defendants had complied with the mobile home park rules and rendered a verdict in their favor.
Under section 12 of defendants' lease and under the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act, 1 the prevailing party in an eviction suit such as the one brought by Meadowbrook is entitled to attorney fees. Although defendants in their answer pled for an award of costs and attorney fees for defending the lawsuit, they failed to raise their claim to, or offer evidence of, those fees during the trial. Instead, five days after trial but before entry of final judgment, defendants moved for attorney fees. 2 The trial court denied the motion, concluding that (1) defense counsel's failure to present evidence at trial as to attorney fees and counsel's failure to move the court to allow such evidence to be presented after trial resulted in a waiver of any claim to those fees, and (2) defense counsel could not move the court for attorney fees after trial unless the issue had been specifically reserved during trial.
On appeal, defendants argue that a request for attorney fees may be made for the first time by post-trial motion. Although Meadowbrook does not deny that defendants were entitled to attorney fees under the lease and under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, Meadowbrook argues that a claim for attorney fees must be supported by evidence that is introduced at trial and that failure to present evidence of such fees during trial constitutes a waiver of all rights to claim those fees any time in the future.
A trial court's conclusion that a request for attorney fees is waived if not made at trial is a legal conclusion. We review a trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting no deference to the trial judge's legal determinations. See State v Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah 1993).
The issue in this case is whether a prevailing party waives its right to attorney fees if it fails to present evidence of attorney fees or move the court during trial to allow evidence of such fees to be presented after trial.
The general rule in Utah is that, subject to certain exceptions, a party is entitled to attorney fees only if authorized by statute or by contract. See Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). However, the exact deadline as to when a party must raise a claim to attorney fees or be deemed to have waived any claim to such fees is subject to debate. Both defendants and Meadowbrook rely upon Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985). In Cabrera, this court held that a party who failed to request all attorney fees incurred for trial work during the "trial phase" of a case could not request such fees for the first time after the case had been remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of determining attorney fees incurred in defending the case on appeal. Id. at 624. We reasoned:
[A] party who is entitled to attorneys fees and costs and fails to ask for all of them in the trial phase of the case, or fails to adduce adequate evidence in support of a finding of reasonable attorneys fees, waives any right to claim those fees later.... It is not consistent with judicial economy to allow a party to apply for additional fees for trial work, whether in an independent hearing, in a separate suit, or at a hearing to determine an award of attorneys fees for necessary appellate work. Once the matter is litigated, or could have been litigated, a party may not later come into court to seek an additional award. Therefore, an attorney will have to estimate fees for work done on post-trial motions or ask the trial court to schedule a hearing on attorneys fees either after post-trial motions are disposed of or after the time for filing such motions has expired.
Id. at 624 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 3
Defendants argue that the "trial phase" of a case includes timely post-trial motions, while Meadowbrook argues that the "trial phase" ends with the rendering of the verdict and the dismissal of the jury. We did not clearly establish in Cabrera or in any other case when the "trial phase" ends. While that term may have different meanings in different contexts, the time is ripe for a clear rule with respect to the issue presented in this case. Thus, for reasons set forth below, and in the narrow context of determining when a prevailing party waives its right to attorney fees, the "trial phase" ends, not with the rendering of the jury's verdict, but with the signed entry of final judgment or order, at which time trial issues become ripe for appeal and a party may file a timely notice of appeal pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 4
Several policy reasons support such a rule. First, in most instances, requiring all parties to present evidence of attorney fees to a jury before resting their cases would contravene judicial economy. Where a contract or statute provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party, a party does not even become entitled to such fees until the jury has determined which party has prevailed in the case. Thus, a would-be losing party who submits evidence of its attorney fees to the jury increases costs to all parties and wastes judicial time and resources. This is especially apparent in complex litigation involving multiple parties.
Second, the determination of reasonable attorney fees is an issue generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court, not the jury. See Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 897 (Utah 1996) (Russon, J., dissenting); Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988; see also 47 Am.Jur.2d Jury § 59 (1995); 20 C.J.S. Costs § 125 (1990). Because the issue of attorney fees is generally ancillary to the underlying action, a trial court's decision regarding the award of such fees normally requires an inquiry separate from the main cause of action to be proved at trial--"an inquiry that cannot even commence until one party has 'prevailed.' " White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 452, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982); see also McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc., 1 F.3d 1306, 1314 (2d Cir.1993); Garcia v. Burlington Northern R.R., 818 F.2d 713, 721 (10th Cir.1987). The trial court's decision in this regard is wholly independent of the jury; therefore, the prevailing party should be entitled to move the court for attorney fees after the jury has rendered its verdict and been discharged.
Third, there must come a time of closure, or finality, in a case when a claim for attorney fees must be raised or waived. That time is the signed entry of final judgment. See Fair Housing Advocates Ass'n v. James, 114 Ohio App.3d 104, 682 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (1996) (). Defendants urge this court to adopt the "universal rule" in other jurisdictions, which permits a timely post-trial motion for attorney fees. Some of the jurisdictions defendants cite allow motions for such fees to be filed after entry of final judgment, while others allow motions to be filed after the time for filing an appeal has expired. 5 However, neither approach fosters the most sensible and expeditious appeals process.
To illustrate, a party who appeals the judgment on the underlying merits may also wish to appeal the attorney fee award. In jurisdictions that allow a motion for such fees to be brought after the time for filing an appeal on the original judgment has expired, the appellant would have to file a second appeal based upon the attorney fee award. Judicial economy during the appeals process would not be furthered in any way by requiring such piecemeal appeals. Moreover, a party's decision to appeal on the underlying merits may largely depend upon the size of the attorney fee award. See T & G Aviation, Inc. v. Footh, 792 P.2d 671, 672 (Alaska 1990) (Matthews, C.J., dissenting) (). 6
Similarly, in those jurisdictions which permit a motion for attorney fees to be brought within thirty days after entry of judgment (the time during which an appeal may be filed in many jurisdictions), the moving party could delay filing the motion until the time for filing an appeal has nearly expired. Thus, the appellant may have to move the court for an extension of time to appeal in order to adequately address the issue of the attorney fee award in the original appeal. 7 Or, as already mentioned, if the trial court cannot award attorney fees until after the time for filing the original appeal has expired, the appellant would have to file a second appeal if it...
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