White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, 80-5887
| Citation | 71 L.Ed.2d 325,455 U.S. 445,102 S.Ct. 1162 |
| Decision Date | 02 March 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-5887,80-5887 |
| Parties | Richard H. WHITE, Petitioner v. NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Petitioner filed an action in Federal District Court alleging that respondent New Hampshire Department of Employment Security failed to make timely determinations of certain entitlements to unemployment compensation, thereby violating a provision of the Social Security Act, the Due Process Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ultimately, the District Court approved the parties' consent decree and entered judgment accordingly. Approximately four and one-half months after the entry of the judgment, petitioner filed a motion requesting an award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which authorizes the award, in the court's discretion, of attorney's fees to the prevailing party "as part of the costs" in constitutional and civil rights litigation of various kinds. The District Court granted attorney's fees and denied respondents' subsequent motion to vacate the consent decree. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision to award attorney's fees under § 1988. It held that petitioner's motion for attorney's fees constituted a "motion to alter or amend the judgment" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and was governed by the Rule's requirement that such a motion be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Held: Rule 59(e) is not applicable to postjudgment requests for attorney's fees under § 1988. Pp. 450-454.
(a) The Rule has generally been invoked only to support reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits. Since § 1988 provides for awards of attorney's fees only to a "prevailing party," the decision of entitlement to fees requires an inquiry separate from the decision on the merits—an inquiry that cannot even commence until one party has "prevailed." Nor can attorney's fees fairly be characterized as an element of "relief" indistinguishable from other elements. Pp. 451-452.
(b) Application of Rule 59(e) to § 1988 fee requests is neither necessary nor desirable to promote finality, judicial economy, or fairness. Many orders may issue in the course of a civil rights action, but it may be unclear which orders are and which are not "final judgments." If Rule 59(e) were applicable, lawyers predictably would respond by entering fee motions in conjunction with nearly every interim ruling. No useful purpose would be served by encouragement of this practice, or by litigation over the "finality" of interim orders in connection with which fee requests were not filed within the 10-day period. The Rule's 10-day limit could also deprive counsel of the time necessary to negotiate private settlements of fee questions, thus generating increased litigation of fee questions. The discretion conferred on the court by § 1988 with regard to the award of attorney's fees will support a denial of fees in cases in which a postjudgment motion unfairly surprises or prejudices the affected party. Pp. 452-454.
629 F.2d 697, reversed and remanded.
E. Richard Larson, New York City, for petitioner.
Marc R. Scheer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Concord, N. H., for respondents.
The issue in this case arises from a postjudgment request for an award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The question is whether such a request is a "motion to alter or- amend the judgment," subject to the 10-day timeliness standard of Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1
This litigation began in March 1976, when the petitioner Richard White filed suit against respondent New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (NHDES) and its Commissioner. White claimed that the respondent failed to make timely determinations of certain entitlements to unemployment compensation, thereby violating an applicable provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1), the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Alleging federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, he sought declaratory and injunctive relief and "such other and further relief as may be equitable and just." App. 15. His complaint did not specifically request attorney's fees.
Following certification of the case as a class action, the District Court granted relief on petitioner's claim under the Social Security Act.2 Pending an appeal by NHDES to the Court of Appeals, however, the parties signed a settlement agreement. The case was then remanded to the District Court, which approved the consent decree and gave judgment accordingly on January 26, 1979.
Five days after the entry of judgment, counsel to White wrote to respondent's counsel, suggesting that they meet to discuss the petitioner's entitlement to attorney's fees as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. No meeting appears to have been held. On June 7, 1979, approximately four and one-half months after the entry of a final judgment, the petitioner White filed a motion in which an award of fees formally was requested.
In a hearing in the District Court, respondent's counsel claimed he had been surprised by petitioner's postjudgment requests for attorney's fees.3 He averred he understood that the consent decree, by its silence on the matter, implicitly had waived any claim to a fee award. White's counsel asserted a different understanding. Apparently determining that the settlement agreement had effected no waiver,4 the District Court granted attorney's fees in the sum of $16,644.40.
Shortly thereafter, respondent moved to vacate the consent decree. It argued, in effect, that it had thought its total liability fixed by the consent decree and that it would not have entered a settlement knowing that further liability might still be established. The District Court denied the motion to vacate.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the District Court's decision to award attorney's fees under § 1988. 629 F.2d 697 (1980). The court held that petitioner's postjudgment motion for attorney's fees constituted a motion to alter or amend the judgment, governed by Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its 10-day time limit. 629 F.2d, at 699.
In holding as it did, the Court of Appeals recognized that § 1988 provided for the award of attorney's fees "as part of the costs." 5 But it declined to follow a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 6 that treated a § 1988 fee request as a motion for "costs" under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) 7 and 58 8—Rules that contain no explicit time bars. Despite the language of § 1988, the Court of Appeals reasoned that attorney's fees could not be the kind of "costs" contemplated by Rules 54(d) and 58. It reached this conclusion by looking to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which specifies various "costs" that can be assessed by a clerk of court under Rule 54. The court found all to be "capable of routine computation" on a day's notice. 629 F.2d, at 702. By contrast, an award of attorney's fees must be made by a judge. Further, as in this case, a fee award could affect substantially the total liability of the parties.
The Court of Appeals found this case distinguishable from Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), in which this Court characterized attorney's fees, under the Fees Act, as "costs" taxable against a State. In Hutto, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the narrow question was whether the States have Eleventh Amendment immunity against liability for attorney's fees. The question was not whether attorney's fees are costs under Rule 54. The court also dismissed the argument that a request for attorney's fees is "a collateral and in- dependent claim" properly adjudicated separately from a claim on the merits.
Because other Courts of Appeals have reached different conclusions about the applicability of Rule 59(e) to postjudgment motions for the award of attorney's fees,9 we granted certiorari in this case to resolve the conflict.10 We now reverse.
Rule 59(e) was added to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1946. Its draftsmen had a clear and narrow aim. According to the accompanying Advisory Committee Report, the Rule was adopted to "mak[e] clear that the district court possesses the power" to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following the entry of judgment.11 The question of the court's authority to do so had arisen in Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 146 F.2d 321, 322 (CA8 1944). According to their report, the draftsmen intended Rule 59(e) specifically "to care for a situation such as that arising in Boaz." 12
Consistently with this original understanding, the federal courts generally have invoked Rule 59(e) only to support reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits. E.g., Browder v. Director, Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). By contrast, a request for attorney's fees under § 1988 raises legal issues collateral to the main cause of action 13—issues to which Rule 59(e) was never intended to apply.
Section 1988 provides for awards of attorney's fees only to a "prevailing party." Regardless of when attorney's fees are requested, the court's decision of entitlement to fees will therefore require an inquiry separate from the decision on the merits—an inquiry that cannot even commence until one party has "prevailed." Nor can attorney's fees fairly be characterized as an element of "relief" indistinguishable from other elements. Unlike other judicial relief, the attorney's fees allowed under § 1988 are not compensation for the injury giving rise to an action. Their award is uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at...
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