Meadows v. Blue Ridge Cmty. Coll.
| Decision Date | 05 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1:19 CV 251 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | JANET E. MEADOWS Plaintiff, v. BLUE RIDGE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10), which has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having carefully considered the parties' arguments, the record, and applicable authority, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Motion be granted in part.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. 9) alleges as follows:
Defendant Blue Ridge Community College ("Defendant") is a community college located in Henderson County that conducts educational and job training activities in Transylvania County and Henderson County. Pl's Am. Compl. (Doc. 9) at ¶ 7.
Between 2014 and 2018, Plaintiff Janet E. Meadows ("Plaintiff") worked for Defendant as a part-time instructor in the fields of business and business computing technology. Id. at ¶ 9.
Plaintiff suffers from Anthrogryposis, a disabling condition affecting her spine and extremities, and from severe and chronic Crohn's disease. Id. at ¶ 11. These conditions adversely affect Plaintiff's mobility, dexterity, strength, and energy levels, and substantially limit one or more life activities. Id. at ¶ 12.
Defendant provided Plaintiff with some accommodations for these disabilities.1 Id. at ¶ 14.
In the fall of 2016, Defendant assigned Plaintiff to teach classes that began at 8:00am at one of Defendant's satellite campuses located approximately fifty miles from Plaintiff's residence. Id. at ¶ 16. Though Defendant's practice was to consult instructors on class assignments, Defendant did not consult Plaintiff before making these assignments to her. Id. at ¶ 17.
Due to her disabilities, Plaintiff had difficulty arriving on time for these classes and was often absent or tardy. Id. at ¶ 18.
On an unspecified date, Plaintiff complained to her Dean about the early morning class assignments and requested that her assignments be changed. Id. at ¶ 19. In response, Plaintiff was told that her "request for accommodation on this issue would likely result in her receiving less classes to teach in the future." Id. Following this exchange, Plaintiff was assigned to the same class schedule. Also, an online class that Plaintiff had been scheduled to teach was removed from her schedule. Id. at ¶ 20.
In the fall of 2017, Plaintiff applied for the position of Lead Instructor in her department. This position carried increased compensation and benefits and "would have represented a significant advancement for her career." Id. at ¶ 21.
On November 6, 2017, Plaintiff was interviewed by a committee for this position. Id. at ¶ 22. At the beginning of the interview, Plaintiff was repeatedly questioned about her ability and willingness to work at a satellite campus and to teach 8:00am classes. Plaintiff was upset by this questioning and found it difficult to concentrate for the remainder of the interview. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 25.
Plaintiff attempted to file a grievance with Defendant's Human Resources Department immediately following the interview but was denied the right to do so.2 Id. at ¶ 27.
Plaintiff was not selected for the position of Lead Instructor. Id. at ¶ 28. The individual who was hired was not disabled and was not required to teach 8:00am classes. Id. at ¶¶ 29 & 31.
On March 9, 2018, Plaintiff inadvertently received a copy of an email from her Department Chair to the Dean requesting that Plaintiff be removed from her classes in the future and not be awarded any contracts for work in the future. The email cited Plaintiff's absenteeism and teaching availability. Id. at ¶¶ 32-33.
On March 20, 2018, Defendant notified Plaintiff that her teaching contracts would not be renewed for the upcoming academic year. Id. at ¶ 34.
Defendant also attempted to cancel a contract for Plaintiff to teach during the summer of 2018.3 Id. at ¶ 35.
Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a complaint and grievance with Defendant's President concerning the nonrenewal of her teaching contracts.4 Id. at ¶ 37.
Plaintiff's summer teaching contract was later reinstated, but Defendant did not offer Plaintiff the opportunity to teach in the fall of 2018. Id.
On September 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") ("September 2018 Charge"), based on the March 9, 2018 email and the non-renewal of her teaching contracts for the fall of 2018. Id. at ¶ 41.
On October 10, 2018, the EEOC dismissed the September 2018 Charge as untimely because it was filed more than 180 days after the last act of discrimination alleged by Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 42.
Plaintiff also attempted to file additional internal grievances with Defendant, all of which were denied. Id. at ¶¶ 43-44. Plaintiff alleges that the final denial occurred on October 17, 2018, when Defendant's President denied a grievance that Plaintiff had attempted to file with Defendant's Board of Trustees. Id. at ¶ 47.
On March 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed a second charge with the EEOC ("March 2019 Charge"). Id. at ¶ 3. The March 2019 Charge was dismissed as untimely by the EEOC in April of 2019.5
On July 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Superior Court of Henderson County, North Carolina. (Doc. 1-1).
Defendant removed the case on August 28, 2019. (Doc. 1).
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint and a supporting brief on September 11, 2019. (Docs. 5 & 6). Plaintiff responded on September 25, 2019 and filed her Amended Complaint on October 2, 2019. (Docs. 7 & 9).
Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and a supporting brief on October 16, 2019. (Docs. 10 & 11). Plaintiff subsequently responded and Defendant replied. (Docs. 12 & 13).
In a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the central issue is whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 189 (4th Cir. 2009). In that context, the court accepts the allegationsin the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009); Giacomelli, 588 F.3d at 192. The court, however, is not required to accept "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255; see Giacomelli, 588 F.3d at 192.
Plaintiff asserts a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 42 U.S.C. §12101 as well as state law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and breach of contract.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated both the anti-discrimination provisions and the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADA. Pl.'s Am. Compl. (Doc. 9) at ¶¶ 54-55.
In the Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's ADA claim is barred because the September 2018 Charge and the March 2019 Charge were untimely.
Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that the September 2018 Charge was untimely but contends that the March 2019 Charge was timely because the last act of discrimination by Defendant occurred on October 17, 2018, when Defendant's President denied her internal grievance.
The Fourth Circuit previously held that "a failure by the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies concerning a Title VII claim deprives the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim." Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 204 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2019)). The exhaustion of administrative remedies in the context of an ADA claim was also considered to be a jurisdictional issue by some courts. See Williams v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 364 F. Supp. 3d 596, 601 (E.D.N.C. 2018)("[A] district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an ADA claim only if the plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies by filing an EEOC charge concerning the alleged discrimination before filing suit.").
The Supreme Court recently determined, though, that "Title VII's charge-filing requirement is not of jurisdictional cast." Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 204 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2019). This finding, however, "did not soften the administrative procedural requirements of Title VII," Abadi v. Mecklenburg Cty. Gov't, No. 3:17-CV-00435-FDW-DCK, 2019 WL 2546732, at *3 (W.D.N.C. June 20, 2019)(citing Fort Bend Cty., 139 S. Ct. at 1851)); courts still enforce the charge-filing requirement as a claim-processing rule if the defense is raised properly. Fort Bend Cty., 139 S. Ct. at 1849)(citing Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19, (2005) (per curiam)).
While Ford Bend Cty. involved a Title VII claim, the rule announced there also applies to Plaintiff's ADA claim. See Stewart v. Jones Util. & Contracting Co. Inc., No. 19-14115, 2020 WL 1313636, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 19, 2020) (citing Fort Bend Cty., 139 S. Ct. at 1846, 1849, 1851 (2019)) (requirement that plaintiff exhaust her administrative remedies with the EEOC before filing a complaint under Title VII or the ADA "is a mandatory claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional prerequisite[.]"); Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc., No. CV ADC-19-2565, 2020 WL 551913, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2020) ().
"The ADA requires a plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged adverse employment action." Sexton v. Skyline Membership Corp., No....
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