Williams v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 4:18-CV-63-D

• Citation: 364 F.Supp.3d 596
• Decision Date: 04 December 2018
• Docket Number: No. 4:18-CV-63-D,4:18-CV-63-D
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Josephine Cole WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. N.C. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, et al., Defendants.

364 F.Supp.3d 596

Josephine Cole WILLIAMS, Plaintiff,
v.
N.C. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:18-CV-63-D

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Eastern Division.

Signed December 4, 2018

364 F.Supp.3d 599

Josephine Cole Williams, Winterville, NC, pro se.

Kathryn H. Shields, NC Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III, United States District Judge

On April 2, 2018, Josephine Cole Williams ("Williams" or "plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts ("NCAOC") and Sara Beth Fulford Rhodes ("Rhodes", collectively "defendants"), the Pitt County Clerk of Superior Court, seeking relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. [D.E. 1]. On April 27, 2018, defendants moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [D.E. 10] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 11]. On June 22, 2018, Williams responded in opposition [D.E. 16]. On July 6, 2018, defendants replied [D.E. 17]. As explained below, the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss [D.E. 10].

I.

On January 31 2007, Williams began working in the Pitt County Clerk of Superior Court Office as a deputy clerk [D.E. 1] ¶ 9. In 2007, Williams hurt her back in a car accident. See id. ¶ 13. In 2010, Williams received a new job assignment and started to have back pain due to her job duties, which required her to stand, bend, stoop, lift, push, and pull. See id. ¶¶ 14–15, 18–19. Williams obtained a letter from an assistant nurse practitioner advising Williams's employer to move Williams to a more sedentary job (e.g., to not perform heavy lifting), to wear athletic shoes to work, and to use an ergonomic chair. See id. ¶ 20; [D.E. 1-4]. Williams provided the letter to Rhodes and requested the listed accommodations. See [D.E. 1] ¶ 21. Upon request from Rhodes, see [D.E. 1-5], Williams also obtained a note from a physician that discussed Williams's back pain. See [D.E. 1] ¶¶ 21-22. After presenting the physician's note, Rhodes told Williams that, to obtain any accommodation, Williams would need a letter from a specialist. See id. ¶ 23. Williams's employer never gave her the requested accommodations. See id. ¶ 24. On July 21, 2010, Williams informed Katheryn Watson ("Watson"), her supervisor, that her workstation at the public counter "was still causing her problems" and that she would like to move to another position in the office. See id. ¶ 26. Watson denied the request. See id. On July 30, 2010, Ford Heath Jr. ("Heath"), a Judicial Branch Risk Manager for the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts, evaluated Williams at her workstation "for no more than 10 minutes." See id. ¶ 27. On November 16, 2010, Williams informed Heath that she wanted to file a workers' compensation claim, and Williams was moved to a different workstation and permitted to sit for three hours per day. See id. ¶ 30; [D.E. 1-8].

On October 17, 2011, Williams met with Rhodes and Watson, and they told her not to speak about her back issues in the office anymore because her comments were causing a negative or hostile work environment. See id. ¶ 32; [D.E. 1-9]. On December 7, 2011, Williams filed a grievance with the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts for workplace harassment

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and a hostile work environment under Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See [D.E. 1] ¶ 33; [D.E. 1-10]. The grievance did not allege disability discrimination. See [D.E. 1-10].

On June 5, 2013, Williams had foot surgery and was placed on "light duty" for two to three weeks. See [D.E. 1] ¶ 36. On July 3, 2014, pursuant to her doctor's instructions, Williams took leave for lower back pain. See id. ¶ 37; [D.E. 1-13]. On July 21, 2014, Williams returned to work. See [D.E. 1] ¶ 37; [D.E. 1-13]. On September 15, 2014, pursuant to her doctor's instructions, Williams took leave for lower back pain, and she was scheduled to return on October 29, 2014. See [D.E. 1] ¶ 41; [D.E. 1-15]. Williams did not, however, return to work on October 29, 2014. See [D.E. 1] ¶ 41. Instead, Williams scheduled back surgery for November 18, 2014. See id.; [D.E. 1-16]. After the November 18, 2014 surgery, Williams was "confined to the house" for six months. [D.E. 1] ¶ 42. Williams did not return to work during 2015, and on November 20, 2015, she had a second back surgery. See id. ¶ 44; [D.E. 1-18]. This surgery, as before, left Williams confined to her house for six months. See [D.E. 1] ¶ 44. On June 9, 2016, defendants terminated Williams's employment because she was unable to return to work. See id. ¶ 45; [D.E. 1-19]. On August 22, 2016, Williams filed an EEOC charge alleging that defendants fired her "in retaliation for requesting a reasonable accommodation and filing a complaint against management in violation of Title I of The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990." [D.E. 11-2]; see [D.E. 1] ¶ 47.

On April 28, 2017, Williams filed a complaint alleging that defendants' failure to accommodate violated the ADA. See Compl., Williams v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, No. 4:17-CV-54-D, [D.E. 1] (E.D.N.C. Apr. 28, 2017). On December 29, 2017, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed the action without prejudice for failure to effect service of process. See Williams v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, No. 4:17-CV-54-D, 2017 WL 6762199 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 29, 2017) (unpublished). On April 2, 2018, Williams filed this complaint. Construing Williams's pro se complaint liberally, Williams alleges three violations of the ADA: failure to accommodate, harassment, and retaliation. On April 27, 2018, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction [D.E. 10].

II.

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the court's "statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (emphasis omitted); see Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood. Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 453 (4th Cir. 2012). "[T]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence." Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 104, 118 S.Ct. 1003 ; see Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See, e.g., Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). A federal court "must determine that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case before it can pass on the merits of that case." Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 479–80 (4th Cir. 2005). A court should grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) only if "the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a

364 F.Supp.3d 601

matter of law." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 945 F.2d at 768 ; see Iskander v. Dep't of the Navy, 7 F.Supp.3d 590, 593 (E.D.N.C. 2014).

A.

The ADA incorporates the administrative enforcement provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including the requirement that a person exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC concerning the alleged discrimination before filing suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 12117(a) ; Sydnor v. Fairfax Cty., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012) ; Thiessen v. Stewart–Haas Racing, LLC, 311 F.Supp.3d 739, 743 (E.D.N.C. 2018) ; cf. Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Title VII). Accordingly, a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an ADA claim only if the plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies by filing an EEOC charge concerning the alleged discrimination before filing suit. See, e.g., Jones, 551 F.3d at 300 ; Tagirova v. Elizabeth City State Univ., No. 2:16-CV-70-D, 2017 WL 4019516, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 11, 2017) (unpublished); Webb v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 658 F.Supp.2d 700, 707–09 (E.D.N.C. 2009).¹ Requiring a plaintiff to file a charge with the EEOC concerning the alleged discrimination before filing suit is an "integral part of the [ADA] enforcement scheme." Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 593 (quotation omitted); see Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 406–07 (4th Cir. 2013). The requirement to file a charge with the EEOC serves "two principle purposes." Balas, 711 F.3d at 407. "First, it notifies the charged party of the asserted violation." Id. (quotation omitted). Second, "it brings the charged party before the EEOC and permits effectuation of the [ADA]'s primary goal, the securing of voluntary compliance with the law." Id. (quotation omitted).

Williams had to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of each alleged ADA violation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(l), 12117(a) ; Jones, 551 F.3d at 300. The 180-day time requirement is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. See Zipes...