Meadows v. Mutter

• Decision Date: 06 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-0418,18-0418
• Citation: 842 S.E.2d 764
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: James R. MEADOWS, Petitioner Below, Petitioner v. R.S. MUTTER, Deputy Superintendent, McDowell County Corrections, Respondent Below, Respondent

842 S.E.2d 764

James R. MEADOWS, Petitioner Below, Petitioner

v.R.S. MUTTER, Deputy Superintendent, McDowell County Corrections, Respondent Below, Respondent

No. 18-0418

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: March 3, 2020

Filed: April 6, 2020

Joseph T. Harvey, Harvey & Janutolo, Blueflield, West Virginia, Paul R. Cassell, Cassell & Crewe, P.C., Wytheville, Virginia, Attorneys for the Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, Benjamin E. Fischer, Assistant Attorney General, Holly M. Flanigan, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for the Respondent

Jenkins, Justice:

Petitioner James R. Meadows ("Mr. Meadows") appeals the April 5, 2018 order of the Circuit Court of Monroe County, which denied his post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus.¹ In November of 2010, Mr. Meadows was convicted of second-degree murder, death of a child by a guardian or custodian, and child abuse resulting in injury. Mr. Meadows then filed a direct appeal to this Court, and in State v. Meadows , 231 W. Va. 10, 743 S.E.2d 318 (2013), we affirmed his convictions.² Mr. Meadows now raises multiple assignments of error in his habeas corpus petition, which was denied by the circuit court after an omnibus evidentiary hearing. Having considered the briefs submitted on appeal, the appendix record, the parties’ oral arguments, and the applicable legal authority, this Court affirms the Circuit Court of Monroe County's denial of Mr. Meadows’ habeas petition.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying facts of Mr. Meadows’ convictions are fully set forth in State v. Meadows , 231 W. Va. 10, 743 S.E.2d 318 (2013). For purposes of this matter, a summarized version will be presented.

In November of 2010, seventeen-month-old I.H.³ died as a result of repeated blows to her head and body. At trial, the case centered on whether Christen H., I.H.’s mother, or Mr. Meadows, Christen H.’s live-in boyfriend, inflicted the injuries that caused the child's death. At the time of the child's death, Mr. Meadows was living with Christen H. in a trailer with I.H. and Christen H.’s three-year-old son. On November 4, 2010, Christen H. and her son left the trailer to attend an appointment with the Department of Health and Human Resources ("DHHR"). Christen H. left I.H. with Mr. Meadows at their trailer, and gave her cell phone to Mr. Meadows "[j]ust in case anything would happen." Twenty minutes into her DHHR meeting, Christen H. received a call from Mr. Meadows informing her that I.H. was rushed to the hospital. A neighbor, Melissa Gill, testified at trial that she was awakened by Mr. Meadows who was carrying I.H. in his arms. Upon learning that Mr. Meadows had not called 911, Ms. Gill immediately placed the call.

Ms. Gill followed the ambulance to the local hospital; Meadows remained at Christen's trailer. The toddler was in the emergency room of the local hospital for about three hours when the attending doctor concluded that her extensive injuries could not be managed at the facility. The toddler was transported by ambulance to the more specialized care and treatment available at a Charleston medical facility. During the transport, the child's condition became very unstable and remained that way for the duration of the trip despite paramedic intervention. The toddler died in Charleston on November 6, 2010.

Meadows , 231 W. Va. at 15, 743 S.E.2d at 323. A few weeks later, Mr. Meadows was indicted "for one count of murder in the first degree, one count of a guardian or custodian causing the death of a child, and one count of child abuse resulting in bodily injury."⁴ Id.

In September of 2011, following a three-day jury trial in Monroe County, Mr. Meadows was convicted of one count of second-degree murder, one count of death of a child by a guardian or custodian, and one count of child abuse resulting in bodily injury. As a result, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration of forty years for his conviction of second-degree murder, forty years for his conviction of death of a child by a guardian or custodian, and one to five years for his conviction of child abuse resulting in bodily injury. Mr. Meadows then brought a direct appeal of his convictions and sentence to this Court. In his direct appeal, Mr. Meadows contended that the circuit court erred by: (1) granting a change in venue without a showing of good cause; (2) allowing testimony by a State's witness concerning polygraph test results without ordering a mistrial or providing a curative instruction; (3) allowing the introduction of hearsay evidence in the form of the testimony of a child psychologist about play therapy with I.H.’s brother without an adequate foundation; (4) deeming evidence of a child psychologist regarding the character of the accused to be admissible; and (5) permitting the introduction of gruesome photographs. Mr. Meadows argued that he was deprived of the right to a fair trial not only on these grounds but also because he had ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, this Court affirmed his conviction and sentences in May of 2013. See State v. Meadows , supra .

In October of 2013, Mr. Meadows filed a self-represented petition for writ of habeas corpus. After the circuit court appointed counsel, an amended petition was filed in May of 2014. On January 7, 2016, the circuit court held an omnibus evidentiary hearing, after which Mr. Meadows filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his petition. Ultimately, the circuit court denied Mr. Meadows’ habeas corpus petition by order entered April 5, 2018. This appeal followed. Additional facts specifically related to the assignments of error raised by Mr. Meadows will be set out in our discussion of the particular issues to which they pertain.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

Here, Mr. Meadows challenges the circuit court's order denying his habeas corpus petition. We review the circuit court's order under the following standard:

In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.

Syl. pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines , 219 W. Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006). Moreover, "[o]n an appeal to this Court the appellant bears the burden of showing that there was error in the proceedings below resulting in the judgment of which he complains, all presumptions being in favor of the correctness of the proceedings and judgment in and of the trial court." Syl. pt. 2, Perdue v. Coiner , 156 W. Va. 467, 194 S.E.2d 657 (1973). With these standards in mind, we now address the arguments presented.

III.DISCUSSION

In the case sub judice , Mr. Meadows has set out two assignments of error: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) cumulative error. We will review each assignment of error in turn.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mr. Meadows’ primary contention is that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. This Court has consistently held that

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be governed by the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) : (1) Counsel's performance was deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.

Syl. pt. 5, State v. Miller , 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). When examining counsel's performance under the Strickland / Miller two-prong standard, we have held as follows:

In reviewing counsel's performance, courts must apply an objective standard and determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the broad range of professionally competent assistance while at the same time refraining from engaging in hindsight or second-guessing of trial counsel's strategic decisions. Thus, a reviewing court asks whether a reasonable lawyer would have acted, under the circumstances, as defense counsel acted in the case at issue.

Syl. pt. 6, Miller , 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114. Put another way, "we always should presume strongly that counsel's performance was reasonable and adequate." Id. at 16, 459 S.E.2d at 127. The standard is demanding, and defendants have "a difficult burden because constitutionally acceptable performance is not defined narrowly and encompasses a ‘wide range.’ The test of ineffectiveness has little or nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done." Id. This Court "is not interested in grading lawyers’ performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at the time, in fact, worked adequately." Id.

When a defendant makes a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to satisfy the first Strickland / Miller prong, he or she must identify the specific "act or omissions" of counsel believed to be "outside the broad range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 17, 459 S.E.2d at 128. See also State ex rel. Myers v. Painter , 213 W. Va. 32, 35, 576 S.E.2d 277, 290 (2002) ("The first prong of [the Strickland / Miller ] test requires that a petitioner identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.") (internal quotation marks omitted). The reviewing court is tasked with determining whether, "in light of all the circumstances," but without "engaging in hindsight," that conduct was so objectively unreasonable as to be constitutionally inadequate. Miller , 194 W. Va. at 17, 459 S.E.2d at 128. In particular,...