Meadows v. Patterson, 12.
| Citation | 109 S.W.2d 417 |
| Decision Date | 03 July 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 12.,12. |
| Parties | MEADOWS v. PATTERSON. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
Silas Williams, of Chattanooga, for plaintiff in error.
Lynch, Bachman, Phillips & Lynch, of Chattanooga, for defendant in error.
Harry D. Meadows, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, has appealed in error from the action of the court in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant below, Dr. A. M. Patterson, herein referred to as defendant. The action is for damages resulting from the loss of an eye which was injured in some manner while plaintiff was under the influence of an anesthetic during or following an operation for appendicitis performed by defendant.
The declaration charges that defendant, in the performance of the operation, and in the handling, treatment, and care of plaintiff during and after the operation, negligently failed to extend proper care and protection to plaintiff, with the result that, while under the influence of an anesthetic and while still unconscious, plaintiff's right eye was severely cut and the sight thereof destroyed.
No negligence is charged in the performance of the operation and it is admitted that the operation itself was skilfully performed and that good results were obtained. The charge is that defendant, or some one acting under his direction and control, was guilty of some ulterior act or omission, not immediately connected with the operation, which resulted in the injury to plaintiff's eye while he was unconscious. It is satisfactorily shown that plaintiff's eye was injured, as charged, while he was under the influence of an anesthetic, but there is no proof as to how it was injured or whether it was injured while plaintiff was still in the operating room or after the operation had been completed and he had been removed to his private room in the hospital. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked to overcome the absence of proof in these particulars.
It appears without any substantial conflict in the proof that defendant was called to the home of plaintiff on October 16, 1935, and that he found plaintiff suffering from acute appendicitis. An immediate operation was recommended and, by the consent of plaintiff, but without express authority to do so, defendant engaged the services of Dr. Gilbert to administer the anesthetic and also arranged for a room in the hospital for plaintiff's use following the operation. Miss Nipper, a graduate and experienced nurse, was selected by defendant from a nurse's register maintained by the hospital to wait upon plaintiff in his private room at the hospital following the operation.
The operation was performed about 6 o'clock p. m. Defendant was the surgeon in charge of the operation. He was assisted by Dr. Gilbert, who administered the anesthetic, and, we infer, by a hospital nurse. Immediately following the completion of the operation plaintiff was wheeled by a hospital attendant to his room. As soon as defendant had removed his operating gown, he examined plaintiff in his room, found his condition satisfactory, and, in the presence of members of plaintiff's family, announced his intention of leaving the hospital and that the patient would be left in the care of Miss Nipper. Plaintiff was again visited by defendant between 10 and 11 o'clock and, his condition appearing to be satisfactory, defendant went to his home and retired. Plaintiff regained consciousness at 4 o'clock the following morning and it was discovered that his eye had been injured. A specialist was called and expressed the opinion that plaintiff's eye had been cut by a sharp instrument, most probably by a finger nail.
Plaintiff testified that his first sensation, upon regaining consciousness, was a severe burning pain in his right eye. It is definitely shown that plaintiff's eye was free from injury when the anesthetic was administered, and it follows necessarily that his eye must have been injured while he was in the operating room under the immediate control of defendant, as he was being wheeled from the operating room to his private room in the hospital, or while in charge of Miss Nipper during the night.
"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur asserts that, whenever a thing which produced an injury is shown to have been under the control and management of the defendant, and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if due care has been exercised, the fact of injury itself will be deemed to afford sufficient evidence to support a recovery, in the absence of any explanation by the defendant tending to show that the injury was not due to his want of care." Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187, 7 S.W.(2d) 808, 60 A.L.R. 254.
It is generally held that this doctrine has no application to the ordinary malpractice case (Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 194 P. 488, 12 A.L.R. 1487; 48 C.J. 1142), the reason for denying its application being that a physician or surgeon does not undertake to insure a recovery and that the result of medical treatment and surgery is, ordinarily, so uncertain that no inference of negligence attends a failure to effect a cure. However, where, as in this case, the liability of the physician or surgeon is predicated upon alleged negligence for want of reasonable care of the patient while unconscious and not upon an alleged want of skill in diagnosis or treatment, we think a practical administration of justice dictates the application of the doctrine when it appears that a sound and unaffected member of the body is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physician. In no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, could the patient obtain redress for such an injury, and it is no hardship upon the defendant to explain, as he alone can, how the injury occurred. If innocent of any wrong, the door of escape is left open. The...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mayor v. Dowsett
...248 Iowa 294, 79 N.W.2d 306; Sanders v. Smith, 200 Miss. 551, 27 So.2d 889; Dawson v. Allen, 191 Ill.App. 399; Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn.App. 283, 109 S.W.2d 417.3 Some of the cases consider this a material factor in applying the rule of res ipsa loquitur. See Annotations, 162 A.L.R. 12......
-
Voss v. Bridwell
...Hospital, 1956, 119 Vt. 336, 125 A.2d 796; Ybarra v. Spangard, 1944, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258; Meadows v. Patterson, 1937, 21 Tenn.App. 283, 109 S.W.2d 417; Heimlich v. Harvey, 1949, 255 Wis. 471, 39 N.W.2d 394; Simons v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. et al., 1933, 94 Mont. 355,......
-
Seavers v Oak Ridge Methodist Med. Ctr.
...See Nichopoulos, 577 S.W.2d at 203 (citing Harrison v. Wilkerson, 56 Tenn. App. 188, 405 S.W.2d 649 (1966); Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283, 109 S.W.2d 417 (1937)). Jurors in those cases are permitted to infer negligence based upon a common-sense understanding that such injuries do ......
-
Morris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
...fault from tort liability and does not comport with the rule laid down by the Tennessee courts. 3. In Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn.App. 283, 109 S.W.2d 417, 420 (1937), the plaintiff's eye was injured in the course of surgery. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to establish the......