Meadows v. State
| Decision Date | 15 September 1938 |
| Docket Number | 12428. |
| Citation | 199 S.E. 133,186 Ga. 592 |
| Parties | MEADOWS v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Error from Superior Court, Greene County; James B. Park, Judge.
Clyde Meadows was convicted of murder with a recommendation, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The evidence, although it did not so demand, was sufficient to justify the jury in finding that the homicide occurred in the commission of an unlawful act which in its consequences naturally tended to destroy the life of a human being.
2. Drunkenness, like any other fact, may be proved by indirect or circumstantial evidence, as well as by direct evidence.
3. The sole exception being to the refusal to grant a new trial, the motion therefor being based on the general grounds that the verdict was without evidence to support it and was therefore contrary to law, and the finding of the jury, which was not without evidence to support it, having been approved by the presiding judge, the judgment will be affirmed.
J. A Beazley, of Crawfordville, for plaintiff in error.
C. S Baldwin, Jr., Sol. Gen., of Madison, M. J. Yeomans, Atty Gen., Ellis G. Arnall, Asst. Atty. Gen., and E. J. Clower, of Atlanta, for the State.
Clyde Meadows was convicted of the offense of murder, with a recommendation. The indictment charged that he 'with force and arms and with malice aforethought, wantonly and with reckless disregard for human life, drove an automobile on and over the public road running through the City of Union Point, Ga., known as State Route No. 12, while under the influence of intoxicating liquors and drugs, and at a rate of speed greater than allowed by law, and while so operating said automobile over said road did approach and overtake on Theldred Chapman, a human being in the peace of the State, who was walking down said road, said accused not then and there having said automobile under immediate control as provided by law, so that as a result of said unlawful, wanton, and reckless operation of said automobile by accused said automobile was driven on, over, and into said Theldred Chapman, thereby killing and murdering said Theldred Chapman,' etc. He made a motion for new trial on the general grounds only, which was overruled, and he excepted.
1. The uncontradicted evidence shows that Chapman, a pedestrian on a public highway within the limits of the City of Union Point, Georgia, was run over and killed by the accused while driving an automobile at a higher rate of speed than that permitted by an ordinance of the city. Were the facts cuch as to justify the jury in finding the defendant guilty of murder? His counsel takes the position that the killing was an accident, which the accused did his best to prevent, but could not. So far as it appears from the record, the accused and the deceased were strangers to each other. There is no suggestion of ill will and no proof of express malice. Witnesses testified to the good character of the prisoner, and no evidence was offered as to his general bad character. The killing occurred at about six-thirty o'clock on a Saturday evening, near the centre of the corporate limits of a municipality, on a public road, unpaved, but sixty feet wide, with no ditch on either side. The automobile that ran over the deceased was at the time being driven at about forty miles an hour on a highway frequently traveled. By an ordinance of Union Point it was unlawful to drive an automobile on any street, road, or highway therein at a speed greater than twenty-five miles per hour. The accused did not stop after his car hit the deceased, but, though told by Roger Harden, who was traveling with him, that he had hit and killed a man, the accused continued on his way. Harden testified: There was evidence to show that the accused was driving on the extreme right of the road, and that the deceased was walking on the same side of the road. Several witnesses testified to seeing him driving his car that afternoon in a manner they regarded as reckless. Other testimony was sufficient to justify the inference that earlier in the afternoon he was under the influence of liquor. When arrested at about midnight, So testified one of the arresting officers. Cecil Cary swore he was drunk that afternoon.
We think the facts and circumstances of the killing, as disclosed by the testimony of the State's witnesses sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder. See Butler v. State, 178 Ga. 700, 173 S.E. 856; Jones v. State, 185 Ga. 68, 194 S.E. 216. There was only one actual eye-witness to the killing, Roger Harden, who was sworn by the defendant. It is earnestly insisted by his counsel, that, regardless of what other witnesses swore as to his conduct immediately before and after, the evidence of this witness shows that the death of the deceased resulted from his own conduct in suddenly stepping in front of the automobile, and therefore that the homicide was directly due to an independent and intervening cause for which the accused was not responsible. His position is that there can be no conviction, even of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act by a drunken speeding driver, when the conduct of the pedestrian would have brought about his own death on that occasion, even if the driver of the car had not been drunk and had not been driving at a greater rate of speed than that allowed by law. The portions of the testimony of Roger Harden in point are: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial