Meadows v. State

Decision Date14 April 1903
PartiesMEADOWS v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Colbert County; Ed B. Almon, Judge.

George Meadows was convicted of killing and disabling certain mules belonging to prosecutor, and he appeals. Reversed.

The second count of the indictment, under which defendant was convicted, was as follows: "And the grand jury of said county further charge that George Meadows did unlawfully or wantonly kill, disable, disfigure, destroy, or injure two mules, personal property of David Walker, of the value of one hundred and sixty dollars, against the peace and dignity of the state of Alabama."

The facts of the case necessary to an understanding of the decision on the present appeal are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

The court gave the general affirmative charge in favor of defendant as to first count. The court, in its general charge to the jury, among other things, instructed them as follows "Gentlemen of the jury, if you are satisfied by the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the defendant shot one of the mules, you should find him guilty, though you may not be satisfied from the evidence that he injured the other mule. If you find him guilty of injury to one mule, and not guilty of injury to the other, you should ascertain the extent of the injury committed by him to the one mule, and assess a fine against him, according to the instructions already given you." To the giving of this portion of the general charge the defendant separately excepted, and also separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of the following charges requested by him: "(1) If the evidence shows a separate and distinct injury to each animal then the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. (2) If the evidence satisfies the jury that the mules were separately injured, the defendant should be acquitted. (3) If the jury believe the evidence, they will find the defendant not guilty. (4) Unless the state has proven to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant shot both mules, as charged in the indictment, the jury must find the defendant not guilty. (5) Gentlemen of the jury, I charge you, unless you find from the evidence that the two mules were injured at the same time and by the same act, you must find the defendant not guilty. (6) If the jury believe from the evidence that defendant shot one mule in the lane, and the mules went off in the woods, and further that the defendant went to work picking cotton for about half an hour, and further believe that the mules came back to another part of the field, and defendant shot the other, then you will find the defendant not guilty as charged. (7) If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that one mule was shot in the lane, and half an hour afterward the mules came into the field again at a different place, and defendant shot the other, then you will find defendant not guilty as charged. (8) Unless the state has satisfied the jury that the defendant shot both mules at the same time, and by one act then the defendant is entitled to acquittal. (9) If the jury believe from the evidence that defendant shot one of the mules at one time and place, and half an hour afterwards shot the other, then you will find the defendant not guilty." The court, at the request of the defendant, gave to the jury the following written charges: "(10) The court charges the jury that if the state has failed to prove that the two mules were injured or shot at the same time, or so near to each other as to constitute the same offense, then the defendant is not guilty as charged in the indictment. (11) I charge you that, if you find that there were two distinct offenses in the killing or injuring the two mules, you should find the defendant not guilty as charged in the indictment. (12) Gentlemen, if you believe from the evidence that one mule was shot at one time, and the other at another time, and the shooting of the mules were separate and distinct acts, then the jury should acquit the defendant."

Jackson & Alexander, for appellant.

Massey Wilson, Atty. Gen., for the State.

McCLELLAN C.J.

The indictment charges that Meadows, the defendant, unlawfully or wantonly killed, disabled, disfigured, destroyed, or injured two mules, the property of David Walker, etc. The evidence showed that each of the mules was shot, and that one died from its wounds, and the other was so injured by its wound as to lessen its value to the extent of $25. In a conversation between Walker and Meadows, the latter, in general terms denied his guilt and protested his innocence; saying that he was not guilty; that he had not shot the mules, and he did not know who had shot them. He, however, went on further, in immediate connection, to say that he had shot at the mules four times while they were in his field a few days before one of them was found dead and the other wounded, but shot to scare them. In this conversation Walker called on Meadows to pay him the damages he had sustained by the shooting of his mules, and Meadows asked for time to see about the matter. First he asked Walker to wait till the next evening, and then he wanted a week, and finally told Walker that he wanted time to see if he could not get a lawyer cheaper than he could settle with him, and that certain parties in the neighborhood would swear against him and fix the shooting upon him. That part of this statement of Meadows which is to the effect that he shot at the mules, etc., is in the nature of a confession, and its admissibility is to be determined upon the same considerations that obtain in respect of a direct confession of guilt. Wilson v. State, 84 Ala. 426, 4 So. 383. Bearing upon the question whether this statement was voluntarily made by the defendant, the testimony of Walker was to this effect: That he went to see Meadows a few days after his mules were shot, and told him that he had been informed that he (Meadows) had shot them; that in fact he had a chain of...

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14 cases
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 1, 1916
    ...154; Durrett v. State, 62 Ala. 434; Pentecost v. State, 107 Ala. 81, 18 So. 146; Love v. State, 124 Ala. 82, 27 So. 217; Meadows v. State, 136 Ala. 67, 34 So. 183; McGehee v. State, 171 Ala. 19, 55 So. 159; v. State, 177 Ala. 24, 59 So. 270; Macon v. State, 179 Ala. 6, 60 So. 312. 2. The lo......
  • Fincher v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • May 29, 1924
    ... ... etc., such evidence was admissible. It follows that a mere ... promise of secrecy, which does not amount to a promise not to ... prosecute if a confession is made ( Porter v. State, ... 55 Ala. 95; Murphy v. State, 63 Ala. 1; Meadows ... v. State, 136 Ala. 67, 34 So. 183; note, ... Warickshall's Case, No. 127, 1 Leach's Crown Cases ... 299), does not render the confession involuntary ... This is ... in accord with the rule of the textbooks. Mr. Wharton says ... that a mere promise of secrecy cannot be held an ... ...
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    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • May 13, 1912
  • Ware v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • December 17, 1914
    ... ... 133, 18 So. 206; Stone v. State, 115 Ala. 121, 22 ... So. 275; Gilmore v. State, 99 Ala. 154, 13 So. 536 ... A ... variance between allegation and proof which does not go to ... the extent of showing that the offense proved is not the ... offense charged is immaterial. Meadows v. State, 136 ... Ala. 67, 34 So. 183 ... Here ... the evidence for the state, as developed in the testimony of ... the witness mentioned, showed, as stated, that there was ... taken from him, on the occasion of the alleged robbery, ... property corresponding in description with ... ...
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