Meadows v. State
| Decision Date | 13 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-241, No. 01-242. |
| Citation | 65 P.3d 33,2003 WY 37 |
| Parties | Jennifer Lynn MEADOWS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). Charles David Furman, Appellant (Defendant), v. The State of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Mary Guthrie, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellant Jennifer Lynn Meadows.
Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, Director, Defender Aid Program; and Tracy Lynn Stewart, Student Intern., Representing Appellant Charles David Furman. Argument presented by Ms. Courselle.
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee. Argument presented by Mr. Elrod.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] Charles David Furman (Furman) and Jennifer Lynn Meadows (Meadows) (collectively Appellants) each entered conditional guilty pleas pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) to one count of knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled substance in excess of three grams in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (LexisNexis 2001), a felony pursuant to § 35-7-1031(c)(ii). Appellants' guilty pleas were conditioned on this appeal of the district court's denial of their motions to suppress.
[¶ 2] We affirm.
[¶ 3] In Case Number 01-242, Furman presents a single issue for review:
The continued detention of Charles Furman exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry stop which tainted the subsequent consent to search; hence, any evidence recovered was the "fruit of a poisonous tree" and should have been suppressed.
In Case Number 01-241, Meadows offers two issues for consideration:
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Meadows' motion to suppress inculpatory evidence which was seized when the lawful scope of the traffic stop was exceeded.
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Meadows' motion to suppress inculpatory evidence because consent to search the automobile was not voluntarily given.
The State's statement of the issue is substantially identical in each case:
Did the district court properly deny Appellant's motion to suppress evidence resulting from the consensual search of the vehicle he (she) was driving (riding)?
[¶ 4] On July 25, 2001, Wyoming Highway Patrolman Earl Gill stopped a vehicle on Interstate 90 near Moorcroft, Wyoming for going 100 M.P.H. in a 75 M.P.H. zone. Furman was driving and Meadows was a passenger in the vehicle. Furman identified himself as Peter Benjamin Maxwell but could not produce a driver's license or any other form of identification, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance. Initially, Furman told the trooper he had identification in the back of the vehicle. After the trooper told Furman that he could wait while the identification was retrieved, Furman claimed he had left his wallet in Montana at his girlfriend's sister's home. Later, Furman indicated that the Montana police had taken his license after issuing him a speeding citation. Indeed, the only information regarding his identity that Furman provided to the trooper was a Montana speeding citation in the name of Peter Benjamin Maxwell, issued four days earlier.
[¶ 5] Furman told the trooper that the car belonged to his brother, Philip Albright. Dispatch was able to confirm that the car was registered to a Philip Albright in Goldbar, Washington.2
[¶ 6] After dispatch could not confirm the existence of a driver's license in Montana for a Peter Benjamin Maxwell, the trooper had Furman write his name, date of birth, and address on a piece of paper as it appeared on his license. On the paper, Furman indicated an Auburn, Washington address. Dispatch initially was unable to locate a Washington license with the information provided by Furman. Trooper Gill informed him that without computer verification of his identity, Furman would have to provide a $200 cash bond for his speeding ticket. Furman indicated that he did not have that much cash and did not have an ATM card so he could not access any cash either.
[¶ 7] By this time, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Hunt had arrived on the scene and after obtaining identification from Meadows, the troopers retired to Gill's patrol car. The officers concluded that Meadows had provided false identification because the photograph bore no resemblance to her at all.
[¶ 8] Dispatch was ultimately able to locate the record of a Peter Benjamin Maxwell whose license, however, listed a Seattle, not an Auburn, address. When Trooper Gill approached him about the address discrepancy, Furman stated that he had lived in Seattle but now resided in Auburn and indicated that he did not know which address was actually on his license. However, when asked about his former residence in Seattle, Furman gave a different street address than that appearing on the Washington license.
[¶ 9] The two troopers then separately questioned Furman and Meadows about their travel plans. Furman indicated that they were on their way from Washington to his father's funeral in Ohio after stopping in Montana to see Meadows' sister. Meadows confirmed that they were going to Ohio for a funeral and also said that they planned to stop in Oshkosh3 on the way. When asked if they planned to stop anywhere on the way to Ohio, Furman replied, "No." The troopers had dispatch attempt to contact the sister in Montana through a telephone number given by Appellants. No one was present at the number but an answering machine stated that the number was for a pawnshop.
[¶ 10] Trooper Gill proceeded to issue Furman three citations. He asked if there were any drugs, weapons, or large sums of currency in the car. Furman denied the presence of any of those items. Trooper Gill then asked if he could search the vehicle. Furman asked if he would be taken to jail if he refused. Trooper Gill said, "No," and Furman then denied permission. In response, Trooper Gill informed Furman that before he could leave, a canine unit was going to be brought to the scene. While the trooper returned to his patrol vehicle, Furman leaned into his car and appeared to have a brief conversation with the passenger. Furman then approached Trooper Gill and gave his consent for a search of the vehicle. The search disclosed the presence of various items in the vehicle's trunk consistent with the manufacturing of methamphetamine. Accordingly, Furman and Meadows were arrested.
[¶ 11] Separate Informations were filed against Furman and Meadows charging each of them with one count of misdemeanor interference with a peace officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 2001) and one count of either knowingly possessing a List I or II controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(i) (Lexis-Nexis 2001) or conspiring with or aiding another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation in violation of § 35-7-1059(a)(iv).
[¶ 12] Furman and Meadows each filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in their vehicle. They contended that Trooper Gill did not have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity or probable cause to detain them after the traffic citations were issued, and that Furman's consent to search the vehicle was not voluntary. After a hearing on the motions, the district court issued an order denying them. The court concluded that there were reasonable, articulable suspicions for the continued detention of the Appellants after the completion of the traffic citation process. The district court cited the complete lack of identification by the driver, and for the vehicle, coupled with the obvious heavy load in the trunk, Furman's inability to provide a coherent account of where he lived, Furman's nervousness, and the conflicting statements from Furman and Meadows about their destination.
[¶ 13] The Appellants subsequently entered into a plea agreement whereby they pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled substance in excess of three grams in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii) in exchange for the State dropping the other charges against them. Appellants' guilty pleas were conditioned on this appeal of the district court's denial of their motions to suppress.
[¶ 14] We have reiterated our standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress numerous times:
We generally do not disturb evidentiary rulings made by a trial court unless the trial court abused its discretion. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo.1994). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 361 (Wyo.1998). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess "the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions." Id. The constitutionality of a particular search or seizure is, however, a question of law that we review de novo. Id., Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo.1995)
.
Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo.1998)).
[¶ 15] Prior to our discussion of Appellants' claims, we must address an issue raised by Furman relating to our standard for reviewing the videotape of the traffic stop. In addition to the testimony of Trooper Gill at the suppression hearing, the district court also reviewed the videotape of the stop, which was recorded from a camera inside the trooper's patrol vehicle. The district court's ultimate decision denying the motions to suppress was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rideout v. State
...are two of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, ¶ 29 (Wyo.2004); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 29, 65 P.3d 33, ¶ 29 Id. [¶ 17] Initially, the Defendants claim that the odor of burnt marijuana, standing alone, is not sufficient to establ......
-
O'Boyle v. State
...State, 994 P.2d 315, 320 (Wyo.1999); Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 640 (Wyo.2000); Bailey v. State, 12 P.3d 173, 177 (Wyo.2000); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 21, 65 P.3d 33, ¶ 21 (Wyo.2003). As in most of the cases before Vasquez, therefore, our analysis since Vasquez has focused on the......
-
McGarvey v. State
...the subjective thought process of the officer. Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 25, 146 P.3d 492, 500 (Wyo.2006) (probable cause); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 17, 65 P.3d 33, 37 (Wyo.2003) (investigative detention). Probable cause to search exists "where the known facts and circumstances......
-
Brown v. State
...giving rise to reasonable suspicion that another crime has been or is being committed to justify a continued detention." Meadows v. State , 2003 WY 37, ¶ 18, 65 P.3d 33, 38 (Wyo. 2003) (citing United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir. 1996) ); see also O’Boyle v. State , 2005 WY......