Meadows v. United States, 5247.

• Decision Date: 24 July 1944
• Docket Number: No. 5247.,5247.
• Citation: 144 F.2d 751
• Parties: MEADOWS et al. v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

144 F.2d 751 (1944)

MEADOWS et al. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 5247.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

July 24, 1944.

W. B. R. Guion, of New Bern, N. C., for appellants.

R. Brookes Peters, Jr., Sp. Asst. to U. S. Atty., of Tarboro, N. C., and Vernon L. Wilkinson, Atty., Dept. of Justice, of Washington, D. C. (Norman M. Littell, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kelsey M. Mott, Atty., Dept. of Justice, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.

Before PARKER, DOBIE, and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges.

NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judge.

On September 26, 1941, the United States instituted condemnation proceedings, in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of North Carolina, accompanied by a declaration of taking, to acquire for a Marine Corps Air Base 7,582.2 acres of land in Craven County, North Carolina. Embraced therein was a 145.4 acre tract owned by appellant Sara Meadows, and specifically referred to in the amended petition filed by the Government August 20, 1942, as Tract 540. The timber rights included in Tract 540 were designated "Tract 540 a." A deposit of $6,655 was made by the United States for the land and improvements, including the timber, of which $3,500 was for the land and improvements, $3,155 for the timber.

The appellant Sara Meadows filed an answer in November 1941 averring, among other things, that she was seized of the fee simple title to the tract, subject to a deed to appellant Carlton J. Taylor for the timber on said tract of and above the size of ten inches in diameter measured twelve inches above the ground; that there were some encumbrances against said tract which were set out in the answer; that the money deposited was not just compensation for her property; that the pecan grove on the property was very valuable and that $7,000 would be a fair value for her land and improvements exclusive of the timber. Appellant Taylor, the owner of the timber deed, also filed an answer averring that the deposit of $3,155 for the timber was not adequate compensation.

In February 1943, commissioners appointed by the court made a report awarding $5,664 for said tract and all appurtenances thereto and $3,760 for the timber interest claimed by appellant Taylor. Both appellants and the Government excepted to the report of the Commissioners.

The cause came on for trial before a jury in January 1944 and there seems to be considerable confusion as to whether the court had ruled that the case should be tried as one case, to find the value of the tract including the timber, or as two cases to find the value of the land and improvements separately from the timber, and after much argument the court entered the following order: "The Government insisted that the case should be tried as one case; the Defendants insisted that it should be tried as two cases. The Court held that the case should be tried as one case and that the jury should find the value of the land with the value of the timber included."

At the trial the petitioner asked the court to submit to the jury, separately, issues as to the value of the land and improvements and of the timber. This was objected to by counsel for the defendants, which objection the court sustained.

At the request of defendants' counsel (the two being represented by the same attorney) the court recalled the jury, which had gone to its rooms, and announced to them that since there seemed to have been a misunderstanding on the part of defendants counsel as to how the case should be tried he was going to reopen the case and allow the defendant Taylor to put in his evidence as to the value of the timber and told the jury to disregard the charge already given.

Evidence was then offered on behalf of defendant Taylor as to the value of the timber and after the court again charged the jury, to which charge there was no exception, the case was submitted and the jury returned a verdict finding the value of the land and improvements including the timber to be $7,500. Judgment was entered for the defendants upon the verdict of the jury from which judgment this appeal was brought.

The principal statute involved is section 40-23 of the General Statutes of North Carolina (1943):

"Rights of claimants of fund determined. — If there are adverse and conflicting claimants to the money, or any part of it, to be paid as compensation for the real estate taken, the court may direct the money to be paid into the said court by the corporation, and may determine who is entitled to the same and direct to whom the same shall be paid, and may in its discretion order a reference to ascertain the facts on which such determination and order are to be made (Rev., s. 2591; Code, s. 1947; 1871-2, c. 138, s. 19; C.S. 1727)."

Two main questions are presented on this appeal: (1) Whether the defendants were entitled to separate trials as to the value of their holdings and (2) whether there was error in the charge of the judge to the jury.

As to the first question we are of the opinion that the judge below was correct in holding that in this proceeding the Government was entitled to have the value of the property, as a whole, fixed by the jury. The Government was seeking to take the property for a lawful use and was not interested in the conflicting claims of owners as to the value of their respective interests. The taking was not of the rights of designated persons in the property but of the property itself. "* * * an unqualified taking in fee by eminent domain takes all interests and as it takes the res is not called upon to specify the interests that happen to exist." Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149, 45 S.Ct. 38, 69 L.Ed. 216.

The value of the property once being determined in a proper proceeding, the sum so determined stands in the place of the property and can be distributed upon the adjudication of the value of the respective interests. United States v. Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338, 13 S.Ct. 79, 36 L.Ed. 996; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 13 S.Ct. 622, 37 L.Ed. 463.

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