Meagher's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 08 October 1962
• Docket Number: No. 35969,35969
• Citation: 60 Wn.2d 691,375 P.2d 148
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE of Marie A. MEAGHER, Deceased. The NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE OF SEATTLE, Washington, Madelon Scherer, Margaret O'Donnell, and Elizabeth Holcomb, Appellants, v. Hugh MIRACLE, Respondent.

Page 691

60 Wn.2d 691

375 P.2d 148

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Marie A. MEAGHER, Deceased.

The NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE OF SEATTLE, Washington,

Madelon Scherer, Margaret O'Donnell, and Elizabeth

Holcomb, Appellants, v. Hugh MIRACLE, Respondent.

No. 35969.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Oct. 8, 1962.

Martin, Shorts & Bever, George W. Martin, Seattle, for appellants.

McCutcheon, Soderland & Wells, Seattle, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Judge.

This is a will contest, initiated by the respondent, in which the trial court held invalid a will executed by Marie A. Meagher on October 1, 1957, and reinstated a will which she signed on July 18, 1940. This action of the trial court was grounded upon its finding that Mrs. Meagher was suffering from insane delusions at the time she executed the will, which rendered her incompetent to make testamentary disposition of her property.

The appellants contend that there was no evidence that the will was the product of delusions, and also that the evidence, as a matter of law, demonstrates a logical and rational disposition of the testatrix' property.

It is appropriate at this point to set forth the applicable principles of law which guide a decision in a case of this kind. The first of these is that the right to dispose of one's property by will is not only a valuable right, but is one assured by law and protected by statute. In re Gordon's Estate, 52 Wash.2d 470, 326 P.2d 340. Where a will, rational on its face, is shown to have been executed in legal form, the law presumes that the testator had testamentary capacity and that the will speaks his wishes. In re Mitchell's Estate, 41 Wash.2d 326, 249 P.2d 385. One who contests a will has the burden of establishing its invalidity by evidence which is clear, cogent, and convincing. In re Gordon's Estate, supra.

A will may be invalidated if it is shown, by evidence that is clear, cogent, and convincing, that at the time the will was executed, the testator was laboring under insane delusions that materially affected the disposition made in the will. In In re Klein's Estate, 28 Wash.2d 456, 183 P.2d 518, we quoted the following pertinent language from In re Shanks' Will, 172 Wis. 621, 179 N.W. 747:

"It is not a question whether testator had general testamentary capacity, for many persons laboring under insane delusions may be competent to make a will (In re Will of Cole, 49 Wis. 179, 5 N.W. 346), but whether the insane delusion under which the testator suffered materially affected the will he made. In other words, is it reasonably certain that but for the insane delusion his wife would have received a materially larger devise?"

Other facets of the rule are found in Jackman v. North, 398 Ill. 90, 75 N.E.2d 324, 175 A.L.R. 868:

'* * * The law is that a prejudice or dislike that a testator or testatrix might have for a relative is not ground for setting aside a will unless such prejudice and dislike can not be explained on any other ground than that of an insane delusion. Blackhurst v. James, 293 Ill. 11, 127 N.E. 226; Carnahan v. Hamilton, 265 Ill. 508, 107 N.E. 210, Ann.Cas.1916C, 21. * * *

'* * * In Owen v. Crumbaugh, 228 Ill. 380, 81 N.E. 1044, 1051, 119 Am.St.Rep. 442, 10 Ann.Cas. 606, after setting forth various definitions of what constitutes an insane delusion, it was said: 'Whatever form of words is chosen to express the legal meaning of an insane delusion, it is clear, under all the authorities, that it must be such an aberration as indicates an unsound or deranged condition of the mental faculties, as distinguished from a mere belief in the existence or nonexistence of certain supposed facts or phenomena based upon some sort of evidence. A belief which results from a process of reasoning from evidence, however imperfect the process may be or illogical the conclusion, is not an insane delusion. An insane delusion is not established when the court is able to understand how a person situated as the testator was might have believed all that the evidence shows that he did believe and still have been in full possession of his senses. Thus, where the testator has actual grounds for the suspicion of the existence of something in which he believes, though in fact not well founded and disbelieved by others, the misapprehension of the fact is not a matter of delusion which will invalidate his will."

A conviction which a testator arrives at by process of reasoning, however illogical, from existing facts, is not such an 'insane delusion' as would affect his capacity to make a will. Knight v. Edwards, 153 Texas 170, 264 S.W.2d 692.

As the rule is stated in an annotation in 175 A.L.R. 964, even if there is evidence of an insane delusion of such a nature as to affect the will, if there is also evidence of some other and rational motive for the disposition made, the burden is upon the contestant to rebut or overcome the legal presumption of validity, by showing that the delusion exclusive of rational motive, was the controlling cause.

In each of the cases cited by the respondent to sustain the trial court's conclusion that this will was invalid because it was induced by insane delusions, the contestant was disinherited. While we have found no recent cases on this point, it is said in Ann.Cas.1916C, 20 ¹ (and now in 57 Am.Jur. 91, § 81) that a will is not invalidated by a delusion of the testator with respect to a relative who is provided for with reasonable liberality by the will.

With these rules in mind, we have examined the evidence which shows that Marie O'Donnell Meagher was born March 27, 1876, in Ontario, Canada, one of a family of five boys and three girls. The family moved to Butte, Montana, where she married William Meagher. In 1909, the Meaghers moved to Seattle. One of Mrs. Meagher's sisters, Kathryn Miracle, came to Seattle at about the same time. Margaret Vucovich, another sister moved to California. Her brother Jack remained in Butte, and Michael moved to Denver, Colorado. The record is silent as to the other brothers.

The respondent was the only child of Kathryn Miracle. Jack O'Donnell, who died in the 1920's, had three daughters, who now are Madelon Scherer, Elizabeth Holcomb (both of Denver), and Margaret O'Donnell, of Butte. Neither Michael O'Donnell nor Mrs. Meagher had any children. Mrs. Meagher had a cousin in Tacoma, Mrs. Lee Taft, whose grandchildren were also remembered in her will, as were two of Mrs. Meagher's cousins, William and Aileen Collins, who were living in Ontario at the time of her death.

Over the years, Mrs. Meagher kept in touch, through correspondence and visits, with these relatives. The one to whom she was closest was the respondent, who was taken into the Meaghers' home when he was a young child and was reared by them.

Margaret Vucovich was committed to the state hospital at Napa, California, about 1922, and Kathryn Miracle was committed to Western State Hospital, in June 1935. For a short period thereafter, the respondent was guardian for his mother. Mrs. Meagher was later substituted in his place.

In July 1940, Mrs. Meagher, who was then a widow, executed a will in the respondent's law office, under the terms of which all of her property, after the payment of debts, funeral and burial expenses, and expenses of administration, was left to the respondent.

The following year she was called to Colorado by her brother, who had become ill. While she was there, he executed a will setting up a trust to take care of his three sisters, two of whom were then in mental hospitals. He also made specific bequests of $2,000 each to Madelon Scherer, Elizabeth Holcomb, Margaret O'Donnell, and the respondent. Mrs. Meagher was made a cotrustee of his will. She performed her duties as trustee after Michael O'Donnell's death in 1942 until she died in 1959.

On November 27, 1955, when Mrs. Meagher was 79 years of age, she sustained a hip fracture and was hospitalized in traction 80 days. She remained in the hospital an additional 30 days; and after being discharged, went to a nursing home. She remained there several months and then returned to her home, where she lived alone. All arrangements for hospital, doctor, medical care, and nursing home, were made by the respondent.

Shortly after Mrs. Meagher was admitted to the hospital, the respondent, without consulting her, caused to be filed a petition for the appointment of his law partner, Kenneth S. Treadwell, as guardian of her estate, and the appointment was secured. The respondent justified this action on the ground that when he visited Mrs. Meagher in the hospital, she was hostile, confused, and uncommunicative; and he concluded that she was not mentally capable of handling her affairs. In order to pay her doctor and hospital bills, the guardian cashed government bonds having a face value of $4,500.

After Mrs. Meagher had been admitted to the nursing home, she was examined by Dr. John B. Riley, a psychiatrist, who reported in a letter to the orthopedist who attended her in the hospital, Dr. Bernard A. Gray, that he had found her distinctly incompetent, psychotic and committable, but recommended that she remain in the nursing home if she could afford it.

Within a few months thereafter, in the summer of 1956, Mrs. Meagher was released from the nursing home and returned to her former residence. On August 22, 1956, she visited the office of Dr. Gray and was examined by him at the request of Mr. Treadwell. After that visit, the doctor wrote to Mr. Treadwell advising him:

'* * * She is quite alert mentally and there are no apparent signs of delusions or other mental abnormality * * *. In answer to your specific question I would say that there is no further need for a guardianship in this case.'

The guardianship was not terminated. The completion of the closing report was delayed during the months of September and October. The respondent and his law partners testified that the delay was caused by a casual handling induced by the...