Means v. State

• Decision Date: 01 February 2023
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CR-26
• Citation: 201 N.E.3d 1158
• Parties: Richard A. MEANS, II, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

201 N.E.3d 1158

Richard A. MEANS, II, Appellant (Defendant below),

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CR-26

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Filed February 1, 2023

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Lisa Diane Manning, Manning Law Office, Plainfield, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Caroline G. Templeton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANAPOLIS BAR ASSOCIATION APPELLATE PRACTICE SECTION: Christopher Bayh, Lucy Dollens, Libby Yin Goodknight, Josh S. Tatum, Joel M. Schumm, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 21A-CR-2570

Molter, Justice.

After a juvenile court entered an order in a child in need of services ("CHINS") proceeding which concluded Richard A. Means, II was likely not responsible for the abuse of his girlfriend's son—E.H.—the State of Indiana investigated further and charged Means with Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to E.H., a child under fourteen years old, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1) and -1(g)(5)(B). The criminal court entered an order in limine excluding from evidence the juvenile court's CHINS order and then certified the order in limine for a discretionary interlocutory appeal under Appellate Rule 14(B). A Court of Appeals motions panel accepted jurisdiction over the appeal, but then a different Court of Appeals panel assigned to consider the merits dismissed the appeal sua sponte, reasoning that orders in limine are only tentative rulings, so the appealed order was not ripe for appellate review.

Means requests we grant transfer and reverse the trial court's order in limine. Amicus Indianapolis Bar Association Appellate Practice Section takes no position on the admissibility of the CHINS order, but it requests we grant transfer to provide guidance for procedural issues the Court of Appeals’ opinion presents in discretionary interlocutory appeals. We grant transfer to provide that guidance, concluding: (1) after the Court of Appeals accepts a discretionary interlocutory appeal, it may later dismiss the appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds, although its general reluctance to do so is appropriate; and (2) orders in limine are eligible for discretionary interlocutory review. As for the merits of Means’ appeal, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the CHINS order because the dangers of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury substantially outweigh the order's probative value.

Facts and Procedural History

A daycare worker changing E.H.’s diaper discovered severe bruising on his body, which led the daycare to report E.H.’s injuries to the Department of Child Services ("DCS"). DCS then filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging E.H. was a CHINS, but after a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition. The court's written order explained that while the agency proved E.H. was battered, it failed to investigate whether daycare staff caused the injuries, which the court believed was most likely what happened based on the evidence presented.

A month later, after further investigation, the prosecutor reached a different conclusion, and the State charged Means—the boyfriend of E.H.’s mother—with Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to E.H., who was less than fourteen years old, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1) and -1(g)(5)(B). After defense counsel conveyed at a pretrial hearing that Means would introduce the CHINS order as evidence that someone else likely injured E.H., the State moved to exclude that evidence in limine. The trial court granted the State's motion, concluding the CHINS order's "finding that someone at the daycare likely battered [E.H. was] a legal conclusion that invade[d] the jury's duty to determine the outcome of this case on the facts presented to them at a trial held in their presence." App. Vol. 2 at 83.

After the trial court certified its order for discretionary interlocutory review, the Court of Appeals motions panel accepted jurisdiction over the appeal. Consistent with the Court of Appeals’ established internal procedures, a different three-judge panel was then assigned to consider the merits of the appeal, and that panel issued a published opinion dismissing the appeal as insufficiently ripe because orders in limine are only tentative rulings subject to reconsideration. Means v. State , 193 N.E.3d 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh'g denied (Aug. 29, 2022). Means then sought transfer, which we now grant, vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

Whether our Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure (1) allow a Court of Appeals panel to dismiss an interlocutory appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds after a different panel already accepted jurisdiction over the case and (2) categorically exclude orders in limine from discretionary interlocutory review are purely legal questions, which we review de novo. See Horton v. State , 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016) (recognizing that we review legal questions de novo). We review the trial court's decision to exclude the CHINS order for an abuse of discretion. Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., Inc. , 73 N.E.3d 663, 666 (Ind. 2017) ("We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion."). And we may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record. Ramirez v. State , 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021).

Discussion and Decision

To resolve this appeal, we begin by considering whether a Court of Appeals panel may dismiss on non-jurisdictional grounds a discretionary interlocutory appeal which an earlier panel properly accepted. Concluding that it may, we turn next to whether orders in limine are categorically excluded from discretionary interlocutory appeals, explaining that they are not. Finally, we consider Means’ evidentiary argument, affirming the trial court because it did not abuse its discretion by excluding the CHINS order and remanding to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. The Court of Appeals may dismiss a discretionary interlocutory appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds.

Before we reach Means’ evidentiary argument, the Appellate Practice Section argues there is a threshold procedural problem, contending that once the Court of Appeals exercises its discretion to accept a discretionary interlocutory appeal, it may not later dismiss the appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds. We disagree. For as long as it has jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals retains the inherent authority to reconsider its decision to accept a discretionary interlocutory appeal, and it makes no difference whether it is the court's motions panel or writing panel exercising that authority.

Understanding the procedure for interlocutory appeals begins with understanding Indiana's final judgment rule. Under that rule, our appellate courts generally have jurisdiction only over appeals from judgments either disposing of all claims as to all parties, or which the trial court certifies as lacking any just reason to delay entering judgment as to fewer than all the issues, claims, or parties under Trial Rule 54(B) or Trial Rule 56(C). Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ind. 2012). Efficiency inspires the final judgment rule. Thompson v. Thompson , 259 Ind. 266, 286 N.E.2d 657, 659 (1972). Without it, there would be needless delays and increased expense from limitless interlocutory appeals of garden variety rulings, and those rulings may not even make a difference because the complaining party may win the case despite them.

But the final judgment rule does not always chart the most efficient or sensible path, so there are exceptions, including discretionary interlocutory appeals under Appellate Rule 14(B). Under that exception, a party may obtain appellate review before a final judgment if a trial court first certifies its order for an interlocutory appeal and the Court of Appeals then exercises its discretion to accept the appeal. Common grounds for discretionary interlocutory appeals are that the appellant will suffer substantial expense, damage, or injury from having to wait until after a final judgment to correct an error; an early determination of a substantial question of law will lead to a more orderly disposition of the case; or an appeal from a final judgment is otherwise inadequate. App. R. 14(B)(1)(c).

Our Court of Appeals has long used a "motions panel" to decide whether it will exercise its discretion to accept a discretionary interlocutory appeal that a trial court has certified for early appellate review. See, e.g. , In re A.Q. , 104 N.E.3d 628, 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

Comprised of three judges from among the court's fifteen active judges and additional senior judges, the panel meets regularly to rule on motions, and its composition rotates at regular intervals so that the work is spread evenly. Frequently Asked Questions , Court of Appeals of Indiana, https://www.in.gov/courts/appeals/about/faqs [https://perma.cc/P2EV-93KH].

If the motions panel declines to accept a discretionary interlocutory appeal, then appellate review must await a final judgment, and an order declining to accept a discretionary interlocutory appeal is not reviewable in our Court through a transfer petition. App. R. 57(B). But if the motions panel accepts an interlocutory appeal, the appeal is then assigned to another three-judge panel to decide the case. In Indiana, the second panel is sometimes called the "writing panel," and in other jurisdictions it is called the "merits panel." See, e.g. , In re Adoption of O.R. , 16 N.E.3d 965, 968 (Ind. 2014) ("writing panel"); Rezzonico v. H & R Block, Inc. , 182 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1999) ("merits panel"). This is a common way for intermediate appellate courts to screen interlocutory appeals. See, e.g. , Johnson v. Burken , 930 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining the court's use of a motions panel for screening...