Mebane v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 07 January 1932 |
| Docket Number | 13320. |
| Citation | 162 S.E. 65,164 S.C. 87 |
| Parties | MEBANE v. TAYLOR. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Greenville County; John S Wilson, Judge.
Action by R. S. Mebane against W. H. Taylor. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
W. G Sirrine and Bowen & Bryson, all of Greenville, for appellant.
C. G Wyche, of Greenville, and Gaston, Hamilton & Gaston, of Chester, for respondent.
Plaintiff, respondent here, brings this action seeking to recover of the defendant, appellant, the sum of $2,698.92, for which he alleges defendant became indebted to him in this wise: He lent to the defendant 150 shares of the capital stock of the Republic Cotton Mills, situated at Great Falls, S. C., to be used by defendant as collateral to a note which he gave for the purchase price of another 150 shares of the capital stock of the same mills. That, at the time the loan was made, on or about February 19, 1924, defendant gave to plaintiff a written agreement by which he stipulated and agreed as follows: "My understanding is that I in no way acquire any rights or ownership in the 150 shares of stock above referred to, which is simply loaned to me for the purpose of collateral on this note, and is to be returned to you free of all obligations on demand." That, notwithstanding the written agreement, defendant did incumber the stock by pledging it as collateral to the Bank of Great Falls as security for his individual note in the sum of $2,698.92. That about July 15, 1927, plaintiff sold his stock, and in order to get possession of it he was obliged to pay to the bank the sum of $2,698.92 for which defendant had pledged it. For this amount and interest, he asked judgment.
The defendant, in his answer to the complaint, went into minute details of the transactions out of which this litigation arose. So much of the answer as is necessary to the determination of the issues made by this appeal is condensed in the following statement: Defendant alleges: That he was approached by plaintiff with a proposition that defendant purchase 150 shares of the stock of Dever Little, in Republic Cotton Mills, who was severing his connection with the mills; plaintiff was then president of these mills and defendant was superintendent of one of them. When defendant replied to the proposition that he was not financially able to make the purchase, the plaintiff offered to lend him 150 shares of his stock to be used along with the 150 shares to be purchased, as collateral security to a note for the purchase price of the stock, which note plaintiff would negotiate in New York. This arrangement was consummated, and the note was executed in the sum of $22,125, at the National Bank of Commerce of New York. As an inducement to purchase the stock, plaintiff assured defendant that he could pay for it out of the dividends, bonuses, and salary which he would get. That defendant did not then know that plaintiff had used of the money of the mills, for his own purposes, large sums, and that an audit of the books was threatened to be made by Dever Little, and that plaintiff desired to get Little out of the mills. That defendant carried the note till July, 1927, when plaintiff severed his connection with the mills, at which time the note was in the Bank of Great Falls of which plaintiff was president. That he paid large sums in interest on the note; that he received no bonuses, and only $225 in one dividend. That in July, 1927, when plaintiff was compelled to settle with the Duke interests, the virtual owners of the mills, and turn over to them all of his stock in the mills, Hal Mebane, the brother and agent of plaintiff, came to defendant and asked that he release the 150 shares of stock of R. S. Mebane and also the 150 shares which he held in his own name; that defendant told him that the price at which R. S. Mebane was forced to sell would not let defendant out. Thereupon, it was agreed by Hal Mebane as agent for R. S. Mebane that the latter would, in addition to paying the stock note, pay defendant's note for $2,698.92 for which the stock was also pledged.
Plaintiff denied that Hal Mebane was his agent, or that he was authorized to make such agreement.
At the conclusion of all the evidence the presiding judge directed a verdict for plaintiff on the ground that there was no proof that the written agreement by which defendant was bound to return R. S. Mebane's stock on demand, free of obligations, had been waived.
Ancillary to this question was the issue whether there was any evidence to go to the jury to show that Hal Mebane was the agent of plaintiff in the negotiations with defendant for the return of the stock.
It is conceded that defendant signed the written agreement by which he bound himself to return to plaintiff on demand the stock lent him, free of obligations. If there is satisfactory evidence then that plaintiff made demand for his stock, with which demand defendant was unable to comply because he had incumbered the stock with an obligation of his own, and that in order to secure the stock plaintiff was compelled to pay off this personal obligation of defendant, then, if nothing else appeared, it would seem that plaintiff would be entitled to recover of the defendant the sum so paid by him.
But defendant sets up in his answer that this situation was changed when, in July, 1927, Hal Mebane, as the agent of R. S. Mebane, made demand on him for the stock. He avers, and offers testimony tending to support the contention, that Hal Mebane agreed with him that, if he would also release to R. S. Mebane the 150 shares of stock standing in the defendant's name, R. S. Mebane would pay the personal note of defendant held by the Bank of Great Falls and secured by the pledge of this stock as well as that lent to defendant by R. S. Mebane. This presents three questions for our determination: Was Hal Mebane, in his dealings with defendant, acting as agent of R. S. Mebane? If he was not the agent of R. S. Mebane, did the latter accept and ratify his acts? Did the parties modify the written agreement, and substitute another in its stead?
More properly speaking, our inquiry should be, is there any competent evidence to support these contentions of defendant?
When defendant was on the stand he testified that Hal Mebane came to him and made demand for the stock which R. S. Mebane had lent to defendant, and also requested him to...
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Lee v. Thermal Engineering Corp.
...make the writing part, and evidence thereof." Evatt v. Campbell, 234 S.C. 1, 6, 106 S.E.2d 447, 450 (1959) (quoting Mebane v. Taylor, 164 S.C. 87, 94, 162 S.E. 65, 67 (1932)). "Nevertheless, by the rules of the common law it is competent for the parties to a simple contract in writing befor......