Mechanics' Sav. Bank v. Waite
| Decision Date | 27 November 1889 |
| Citation | 150 Mass. 234,22 N.E. 915 |
| Parties | MECHANICS' SAV. BANK v. WAITE et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
E.W. Chapin and Wells & Barnes, for Mechanics' National Bank.
George M. Stearns, for Chapin National Bank.
George D. Robinson and E.H. Lathrop, for trustee.
The Mechanics' Savings Bank summoned Mr. Robinson as trustee of the defendant Waite. Afterwards the Chapin National Bank served him with similar process. The defendant has been defaulted, and the question raised by the report is whether the trustee should be charged in either suit. If he is chargeable in the earlier one, he is chargeable in the second, unless he first exhausts the fund in his hands. When the first writ was served, the defendant Waite was entitled to a distributive share of one-fourth of the estate of Edward J. Vinton, a minor, deceased, when it should be settled. Mr Robinson had given bond, and had received letters of administration. But the guardian of Vinton still held his personal estate, a large part of which consisted of stocks and deposits in banks, both standing in the guardian's name, and the guardian's final account had not been filed or allowed. These are the only material facts, and the question more precisely stated is whether the guardian's relation to the property takes the case out of the ordinary rules. It is settled that the principal debtor's distributive share of an estate in the hands of an administrator may be attached by trustee process as soon as the administrator has given bond and has received letters of administration. The lien takes effect from the service of the process, and reaches the whole interest of the debtor in the personal estate that may eventually come into the hands of the administrator. Wheeler v. Bowen, 20 Pick 563; Bank v. Minot, 3 Metc. 507, 509, 510; Davis v. Davis, 2 Cush. 111, 114; Capen v. Duggan, 136 Mass. 501, 502. Since the lien is not confined to property in the administrator's possession at the time of service, it seems to follow that it would attach, even if no property were in his possession at that time. The reason given for the foregoing rules is that the interest of the distributee vests at the death of the testator. This reason points to the same result, since the vesting of the distributee's interest does not depend upon the question whether the administrator must bring actions or settle accounts before he is able to distribute.
In the matter before us the law does not look beyond the administrator in whose hands the estate, considered as a whole, is supposed to be, however the parts may be scattered. The estate for this purpose, may be regarded as a single res which comes to the administrator per universitatem, as representing the person of the testator; an illustration of the principle on which the estate is distributed according to the law of the intestate's domicile, wherever the chattels composing the estate may happen to be found at his death.
It should be remembered that it is at least questionable whether formerly residuary legatees or distributees had any interest in the specific funds in the hands of an executor or administrator, and whether they had any right except to call him to account, and to demand the balance, (Thorne v Watkins, 2 Ves.Sr. 35, 36;) and although now residuary legatees have an interest in the fund as it is, (Marvel v. Babbitt, 143 Mass. 226, 9 N.E. 566; Pierce v. Gould, 143 Mass. 234, 9 N.E. 568,) still it is subject to an account. An executor or administrator is not to be charged until the estate is so far settled as to render it certain that there is a balance to be distributed, and, if necessary, the case will be continued until that time. Hoar v. Marshall, 2 Gray, 251, 253; Wheeler v. Bowen, ubi supra; Vantine v. Morse, 104 Mass. 275, 276. The settling of the estate may make it necessary for the administrator to sell all the property in his hands, so that none of it will come in specie to the distributee; yet that, of course, does not affect the validity of the attachment. ...
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