Mechler v. McMahon

• Decision Date: 20 November 1931
• Docket Number: No. 28517.,28517.
• Citation: 239 N.W. 605,184 Minn. 476
• Parties: MECHLER v. McMAHON et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

239 N.W. 605

184 Minn. 476

MECHLER v. McMAHON et al.

No. 28517.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 20, 1931.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Kenneth G. Brill, Judge.

Action by John J. Mechler against Thomas J. McMahon, doing business as the McMahon Produce Company, and another. Verdict for the plaintiff. From an order denying their motion for a new trial, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

S. S. Larson, of Minneapolis, and Denegre, McDermott, Stearns, Stone & Mackey, of St. Paul, for appellants.

Bundlie & Kelley and Ernest Torinus, all of St. Paul, for respondent.

WILSON, C. J.

Defendants appealed from an order denying their motion for a new trial.

The case has been here before 180 Minn. 252, 230 N. W. 776. Plaintiff drove his automobile, a roadster, on a wet and slippery paved trunk highway at night at a speed of about 35 miles per hour. Ahead of plaintiff was a truck, owned by defendant McMahon, loaded with apples and covered with khaki colored tarpaulin and operated by his employee, defendant Bogoty. The front and rear lights on the truck went out. The truck was stopped in its line of travel. The night was dark and drizzly. Plaintiff did not discover the presence of the unlighted standing truck until he was so near that he could not, under the conditions, pull to the left and pass, but he applied his brakes to stop his car, which skidded into the rear of the truck, resulting in alleged personal injuries and damage to his roadster.

Bogoty claims that, when his lights went out, he and his helper attempted to move the truck forward, so as to get it on the shoulder of the road to the right, and that, before they accomplished this, plaintiff's roadster struck the truck in the rear. In the answer of the defendant McMahon, he sets up a counterclaim for damages to the truck.

The jury returned a $1,800 verdict for plaintiff.

1. Prompted by the memorandum of the trial court and the argument of counsel, we have reconsidered some of our cases wherein we have stated that in certain cases the violation of an imposed statutory duty by plaintiff is not conclusive evidence of contributory negligence—but merely a circumstance for the consideration of the jury.

We have held in many cases that defendant's violation of a duty imposed by a statute or ordinance proximately resulting in injury to one for whose benefit such law was enacted results in liability, irrespective of such conduct as would constitute negligence, in the absence of such law. Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 23 N. W. 237, 53 Am. Rep. 47; Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N. W. 543, 12 Am. St. Rep. 698; Ericson v. Duluth & Iron Range Ry. Co., 57 Minn. 26, 58 N. W. 822; Judson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 63 Minn. 248, 65 N. W. 447; Oddie v. Mendenhall, 84 Minn. 58, 86 N. W. 881; Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N. W. 428, 131 Am. St. Rep. 441; Day v. Duluth Street Ry. Co., 121 Minn. 445, 141 N. W. 795; Schaar v. Conforth, 128 Minn. 460, 151 N. W. 275; Benson v. Larson, 133 Minn. 346, 158 N. W. 426; Hillstrom v. Mannheimer Bros., 146 Minn. 202, 178 N. W. 881; Thomas v. Stevenson, 146 Minn. 272, 178 N. W. 1021; Unmacht v. Whitney, 146 Minn. 327, 178 N. W. 886; Farrell v. G. O. Miller Co., 147 Minn. 52, 179 N. W. 566; Cohen v. Silverman 153 Minn. 391, 190 N. W. 795; Frederick v. McRae, 157 Minn. 366, 196 N. W. 270; Kennedy v. Hedberg, 159 Minn. 76, 198 N. W. 302; Dohm v. R. N. Cardozo & Brother, 165 Minn. 193, 206 N. W. 377; Sandhofner v. Calmenson, 170 Minn. 69, 212 N. W. 11; Christopherson v. Custom Laundry Co., 179 Minn. 325, 229 N. W. 136; Suess v. Arrowhead Steel Products Co., 180 Minn. 21, 230 N. W. 125; Saunders v. Yellow Cab Corp. of Minnesota, 182 Minn. 62, 233 N. W. 599; Peterson v. Miller, 182 Minn. 532, 235 N. W. 15; Wicker v. North States Const. Co., 183 Minn. 79, 235 N. W. 630.

Violation of such duty may be excusable or justifiable, but the burden to show that is upon the party who violated the statute.

The same rule should logically be as applicable to a plaintiff as to a defendant. The test is, not whether the injured party is a plaintiff or defendant, but rather whether the statute was passed for the protection of the injured party.

If a plaintiff's violation of a statute or ordinance proximately results in injury to a defendant who is one for whose protection such law was enacted, liability follows, and it is said that such plaintiff is guilty of negligence per se. Armstead v. Lounsberry, 129 Minn. 34, 151 N. W. 542, L. R. A. 1915D, 628; Benson v. Larson, 133 Minn. 346, 158 N. W. 426; Elvidge v. Stronge & Warner, 148 Minn. 185, 181 N. W. 346; Suess v. Arrowhead Steel Products Co., 180 Minn. 21, 230 N. W. 125; Saunders v. Yellow Cab Corp. of Minnesota, 182 Minn. 62, 233 N. W. 599; Peterson v. Miller, 182 Minn. 532, 235 N. W. 15. The principle involved in these cases is of course also supported by all the authorities cited above.

This court has held in substance that, where a plaintiff, at the time of the accident, has violated a statute or ordinance which was not enacted for the benefit of the injured defendant, such violation of duty does not constitute negligence per se, but is merely a circumstance for the consideration of the jury. Ericson v. Duluth & Iron Range Ry. Co., 57 Minn. 26, 58 N. W. 822, and cases therein cited; Armstead v. Lounsberry, 129 Minn. 34, 151 N. W. 542, L. R. A. 1915D, 628; Hackert v. Prescott, 165 Minn. 134, 205 N. W. 893; Fraser v. Great Northern Railway Co., 166 Minn. 308, 207 N. W. 644; Weber v. Barr Packing Corporation, 182 Minn. 486, 234 N. W. 682; Flaaten v. Lyons, 157 Minn 362, 196 N. W. 478; Fitzgerald v. Village of Bovey, 174 Minn. 450, 219 N. W. 774; Hollander v. Dietrich, 181 Minn. 376, 232 N. W. 630; Saunders v. Yellow Cab Corporation of Minnesota, 182 Minn. 62, 233 N. W. 599; Peterson v. Miller, 182 Minn. 532, 235 N. W. 15.

We have not always observed, nor had our attention called to the distinction above noted, as to when a plaintiff's violation of such imposed duty was to be considered negligence per se or merely a circumstance for the consideration of the jury, or as we now hereinafter hold, wholly immaterial; hence we have inadvertently fallen into the error of stating that the violation of a statute or ordinance by plaintiff is not negligence per se, but a mere circumstance for the consideration of the jury, bringing all such cases within the rule announced in the cases last above cited. Oddie v. Mendenhall, 84 Minn. 58, 86 N. W. 881; Day v. Duluth Street Ry. Co., 121 Minn. 445, 141 N. W. 795; Schaar v. Conforth, 128 Minn. 460, 151 N. W. 275; Dohm v. R. N. Cardozo & Brother, 165 Minn. 193, 206 N. W. 377; McGovern v. Snyder, 165 Minn. 208, 206 N. W. 379; Carlson v. Martoccio Co., 179 Minn. 332, 229 N. W. 341; Mechler v. McMahon, 180 Minn. 252, 230 N. W. 776; Wicker v. North States Construction Co., 183 Minn. 79, 235 N. W. 630. Fortunately, this inapt language, much of which has been dicta, so used in these decisions was seldom, if ever, controlling. Seemingly, the primary or fundamental error was in the case of Day v. Duluth Street Railway Co., supra, wherein the statement was not supported by the cases cited. The misstated and misapplied rule has been repeated as indicated.

We now state the rule to be that, in the absence of valid excuse or justification, the violation by the injured person of a statute or ordinance enacted for the benefit of the other party is conclusive evidence of contributory negligence, if such violation proximately contributes to the injury. The rule in this state has always been that the unjustified violation by the defendant of a statute or ordinance enacted for the benefit of the injured party is negligence per se, if it proximately results in injury.

If the statute or ordinance was not enacted for the benefit of the party invoking it, the general rule is that it is wholly immaterial although the acts which constitute its violation may be admissible on the question of common-law negligence. In other words, the general rule is that the violation of such statute or ordinance is not even a circumstance to be considered on the question of negligence or contributory negligence. Whether such statute or ordinance was enacted for the benefit of a particular person is a question of law.

2. Consistently with the language of this court in the cases last above cited, the trial court, properly construing the foregoing authorities, conceived it to be his duty to charge the jury as he did as follows:

"Now, in plaintiff's claim against the defendants, a violation of any of those statutes by the defendants, was negligence, and the violation of any of those statutes by the plaintiff, is a circumstance which you will consider in passing upon his contributory negligence.

"In considering the claim of defendant McMahon against the plaintiff, his counterclaim, a violation of any such statute by the plaintiff, was negligence, and any violation by McMahon, through his agents, is a circumstance which you will take into consideration in determining the contributory negligence of McMahon or his agents."

The statutes included in the charge and to which the above quotation was applied by the jury are Mason's Minn. St. 1927, §§ 2720-3 (a), 2720-4 (a), 2720-24 (a), 2720-45 and 2720-54.

Of these statutes only two were applicable to plaintiff's conduct, and they are as follows:

"2720-3. (a) No person shall operate or halt any vehicle upon a highway carelessly or heedlessly in disregard of the rights or safety of others or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property."

"2720-4. (a) Any person driving a vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a speed not greater than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, the surface and width of the highway, and of any other conditions then existing."

Under the rule as hereinbefore stated, the instruction to the jury was erroneous, but in what way...