Mecier v. Branon, Civil No. 1:96-CV-17.

• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. District of Vermont
• Writing for the Court: MURTHA
• Citation: 930 F. Supp. 165
• Parties: Adolph V. MECIER v. Shaun BRANON and General Electric Co.
• Decision Date: 20 February 1996
• Docket Number: Civil No. 1:96-CV-17.

930 F. Supp. 165

Adolph V. MECIER
v.
Shaun BRANON and General Electric Co.

Civil No. 1:96-CV-17.

United States District Court, D. Vermont.

February 20, 1996.

930 F. Supp. 166

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

930 F. Supp. 167

Leslie C. Pratt, Montpelier, VT, for Plaintiff

Robert B. Hemley, Burlington, VT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Paper 14)

MURTHA, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Adolph Mecier brought an action in Rutland County Superior Court against defendants General Electric Corporation (hereinafter "GE") and Shaun Branon. Plaintiff's claims against GE are for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violation of Vermont's Fair Employment Practice Act (hereinafter "FEPA"), 21 V.S.A. §§ 495-495g. Plaintiff's claim against defendant Branon is for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment of these claims. See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (paper 14). Plaintiff has consented to the entry of summary judgment dismissing defendant Branon. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (paper 15) (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Memo.") at 1. As to the remaining claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violation of FEPA, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A motion for summary judgment must be granted if, through examination of the moving party's "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," the court finds "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Only disputes over those facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law preclude entry of summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

As the party moving for summary judgment, GE bears the burden of informing this Court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those parts of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Latimer v. Smithkline and French Laboratories, 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir.1990) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). In determining whether the movant has met its burden, the Court must resolve all ambiguities in favor of the non-moving party. See Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir.1988).

Because GE's motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavits and documentary evidence, plaintiff Mecier must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine, material issue for trial. See King Service, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 834 F.2d 290, 295 (2d Cir.1987). Plaintiff must present enough evidence to support a verdict in his favor and cannot defeat defendant's motion by presenting

930 F. Supp. 168

a metaphysical doubt, conjecture, or surmise concerning the facts. See Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Borthwick v. First Georgetown Securities, Inc., 892 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir.1989)

For the purpose of deciding the instant motion, the Court finds the following facts: Plaintiff Adolph Mecier was hired by GE in 1980 to work in its Rutland plant. See Deposition of Adolph Mecier (Exhibit 1 attached to paper 14) (Exhibit A attached to paper 15) (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Dep.") at 9. When GE hired Mecier it gave him an employee handbook which sets out GE's policies for its employees. See Plaintiff's Dep. at 9; Employee Handbook (Exhibit 3 attached to paper 14).

In February, 1992, plaintiff took a medical leave due to a back problem. See Complaint (paper 3) at ¶ 4. During his leave, plaintiff reported to GE's staff nurse Karen Ellison about his medical condition. See Plaintiff's Dep. at 19-20.

Some time prior to February 1993, Ellison informed Mecier his leave was approaching one year, and he could lose his job should he remain out of work beyond that time. See Plaintiff's Dep. at 19-23, 62. Plaintiff claims this was the first time he became aware of GE's policy that a workers' "continuity of service" is broken if he or she is absent from work for more than one year without a leave of absence. See id. at 19, 23.

Nurse Ellison told Mecier to speak with his foreman. See id. at 19, 23, 62. In response to Mecier's inquiries, foreman Jim Massey said he would "check into it." Id. at 63.

Mecier also spoke to his shop manager, Pete Muscatello. Plaintiff states: "I told him just what I told Jim Massey, that I was coming up to a year out of work, and I was wondering if there was going to be any problems in my coming back to work." Id. at 65. Muscatello asked how many years plaintiff "had in" with the company, to which Mecier replied "twelve." Id. Plaintiff claims Muscatello then stated: "I don't see any problem, I don't see no problem at all" and said "don't worry about it, your job will be secure." Id. at 65, 66.

Plaintiff states Muscatello told him GE subtracts the amount of days a worker is out beyond one year from the worker's in-service time. See id. at 65. Other than affecting pension and severance, plaintiff claims the length of his in-service time was important to him because he was aware the company was laying off workers with five or six years of service with the company. See id. at 66.

Plaintiff also claims he told Muscatello he hoped to return to work in March. See id. Plaintiff inquired about working half-days, but Muscatello said "there's not much work in our area right now, just sit back, take your time, let your back recuperate, I want your back a hundred percent instead of hurting yourself and having to go back out." Id.

In April 1993, plaintiff met with Jim Massey to inquire as to whether his job remained safe after recent layoffs. Massey stated "if Pete Muscatello said your job was safe, then I guess it would be safe." Id. at 54. Plaintiff claims he was ready to return to work at this point but could not get clearance from his doctor. See id.

On May 5, 1993, plaintiff reported to work with a medical release from physician Leon Grobler. See id. at 58; Consultation Summary (Exhibit 7 attached to paper 14). By May, however, GE was in the midst of layoffs of up to 500 employees which had significantly reduced the size of the area in which Mr. Mecier worked. See Deposition of Shaun M. Branon (Exhibit 2 attached to paper 14) (Exhibit 3 attached to paper 15) at 26, 33.

When the company is experiencing layoffs, GE has a policy of refusing to return employees to work who have been absent...