Mecier v. Broadfoot

Decision Date09 August 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-2832,90-2832
Citation584 So.2d 159
PartiesReverend Donagene MECIER, Appellant, v. A. Robert BROADFOOT, and the Stokes Group, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees. 584 So.2d 159, 16 Fla. L. Week. D2135
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

W. Gregg McCaulie of Mahon, Farley & McCaulie, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Kurt Andrew Simpson and Bruce R. Anderson of Kurt Andrew Simpson, P.A., Jacksonville Beach, for appellees.

CAWTHON, Senior Judge.

Reverend Donagene Mecier appeals from an order granting A. Robert Broadfoot's motion for summary judgment. Appellant contends that Broadfoot impliedly agreed with Mecier to supervise construction of a temple and that the court erred in granting his motion for summary judgment for Broadfoot. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Mecier is a licensed minister and the President of New Life Temple, Inc. Mecier alleged in her complaint that she entered into an agreement with Defendant Broadfoot, an architect, "to develop and supervise the architectural drawings for the construction of a facility to be known as the 'New Life Temple.' " She stipulated that her cause of action was based on breach of an implied contract with Broadfoot. Mecier maintained that Broadfoot failed to properly design and draw detail drawings for roof flashings; improperly designed the roof, thereby creating a leak; failed to provide for roof venting; failed to provide for adequate heat and air-conditioning duct work; and generally failed to produce professional architectural plans. Finally, she claimed that she performed all the conditions required of her under the contract, and that she was required to spend additional monies to repair the damage caused by Broadfoot's breach, for which she demands damages.

In her deposition, Mecier testified that she originally entered into a contract with architect Robert Platt, which "was given to Broadfoot to finish." She explained that Broadfoot "was supposed to have an agreement with Mr. Platt to continue that work and he was continuing it," although that agreement was never discussed with her and she indicated that she "didn't have any choice."

Mecier stated that she entered into a construction management contract with defendant The Stokes Group, Inc., at the urging of Broadfoot, although Broadfoot did not enter into the negotiations or receive compensation for the referral. 1 She added that she never paid monies to Broadfoot, and that Broadfoot instructed her to pay Platt. Later, counsel returned to the subject of the alleged contract, and asked:

Q. Did you ever engage my client to supervise the construction of the New Life Temple, hire him to supervise the construction?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Did you ever have an agreement, either a written or a verbal, with my client that he would supervise the construction of this facility?

A. The assumption is that--the assumption is that the architect does watch--

....

A. --watch over a process that he begins, that he should know.

....

Q. Did he make--did my client make any statement to you regarding him supervising or inspecting the construction?

A. I don't think so. I didn't enter any agreement with him to do it. However, I do think he assumed the responsibility with Mr. Stokes.

Although she denied asking Broadfoot to supervise or inspect Mr. Stokes's construction, she argued that their relationship "looked like they were working together."

On cross-examination Mecier testified that Broadfoot told her that he was going to finish the drawings for the church building. Her contract, she stated, was with Mr. Platt to draw the plans, for which he was paid. Mecier believed that Broadfoot had a fee arrangement with Mr. Platt, because "[h]e was certainly not doing it free."

Broadfoot filed a motion for final summary judgment, contending that the complaint failed to allege that Broadfoot agreed to supervise construction of the building, that Mecier specifically testified in her deposition that no such contract existed between the parties, and that the alleged building defects were corrected with Mecier's permission and without cost to her. Mecier then filed an affidavit, in which she averred:

Based on conversations and actions taken of Mr. Broadfoot it was my understanding that he was to complete the drawings and to assist in the supervision of the construction of our church, The New Life Temple.... 2

She added that she repaired the complained-of defects, which are as yet uncompensated. The trial court granted Broadfoot's motion after argument.

The supervision of construction can be separated from the completion of the plans. While appellant clearly did not have a contract with Broadfoot for supervision of construction, a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of whether there was an implied contract between Mecier and Broadfoot regarding completion of the plan. Where reasonable men might justifiably make different inferences and deductions to reach different conclusions as to whether a...

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5 cases
  • Commerce Partnership 8098 Ltd. Partnership v. Equity Contracting Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 26, 1997
    ...the possibility of the situation which has arisen, they had contracted expressly thereto." 12 Am.Jur. 766. See Mecier v. Broadfoot, 584 So.2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Common examples of contracts implied in fact are where a person performs services at another's request, or "where servi......
  • In re Standard Jury Instructions—Contract & Business Cases
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 6, 2013
    ...the possibility of the situation which has arisen, they had contracted expressly thereto.” 12 Am.Jur. 2d 766. See Mecier v. Broadfoot, 584 So.2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Common examples of contracts implied in fact are when a person performs services at another's request, or “where ser......
  • Fraud-Tech, Inc. v. Choicepoint, Inc.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • March 27, 2003
    ...if, having in mind the possibility of the situation which has arisen, they had contracted expressly thereto.'"); Mecier v. Broadfoot, 584 So.2d 159, 160 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (stating that the issue of whether a contract implied in fact existed should be submitted to a 70. See Ishin Speed ......
  • Eskra v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • October 27, 1997
    ...at 1110-1118, 1120-1134; Def. Exh UU.21 Tipper v. Great Lakes Chemical Company, 281 So.2d 10, 13 (Fla.1973).22 Mecier v. Broadfoot, 584 So.2d 159, 161 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991).23 Id. at 161, citing Rothman v. Gold Master Corp., 287 So.2d 735, 736 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974).24 Coastal Unilube, Inc......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Contract cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Florida Causes of Action
    • April 1, 2022
    ...in mind the possibility of the situation which has arisen, they had contracted expressly in reference thereto). 2. Mecier v. Broadfoot , 584 So.2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (Contracts implied in fact are inferred from facts and circumstances of case). §3:20.1.2 Elements of Cause of Actio......

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