Meders v. Chatman
| Decision Date | 14 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | CV 207-90 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
| Parties | JIMMY FLETCHER MEDERS, Petitioner, v. BRUCE CHATMAN, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, Respondent |
Presently before the Court is Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. Nos. 34; 35. In October of 1987, Petitioner spent the afternoon drinking with his boss, Randy Harris, and two acquaintances, Bill Arnold and Greg Creel. The group left Harris behind while they continued to drink into the night and early morning of October 14, 1987. At approximately 2:30 in the morning, the trio stopped at a convenience store where Don Anderson was working as a cashier. As Creel was heating a sausage biscuit in the microwave, Petitioner shot Anderson in the chest and head. Petitioner took $38.00 and some food stamps. The money and food stamps were found on Petitioner's person, and the murder weapon was stashedunder Petitioner's waterbed. A jury of Petitioner's peers convicted him for Anderson's slaying and sentenced him to death. Upon due consideration, his petition for relief from this conviction and sentence is DENIED.
The lengthy and complicated history of this case dates back 27 years. Petitioner, Jimmy Fletcher Meders, was indicted in the Superior Court of Glynn County, Georgia on December 16, 1987, for the aforementioned murder and armed robbery. Dkt. No. 12-2, Ex. 1, at 3-5. Petitioner was also indicted for the offenses of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, burglary, and felony murder. Id.
At trial, Meders was represented by Glynn County Public Defender John W. Davis. E.g., id. at 35. Davis was an experienced member of the State Bar of Georgia. Dkt. No. 12-204, Ex. 65, at 23-24. Prior to his defense work, he had served as a solicitor general, superior court judge, and United States congressman. Id.
On April 7, 1989, following a four-day jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of malice murder and armed robbery. Dkt. No. 12-2, Ex. 1, at 86. Following the sentencing phase of trial, the jury found the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) that the offense of murder was committedwhile Petitioner was engaged in the commission of armed robbery and (2) that Petitioner committed the offense of murder for himself or another for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value. Dkt. Nos. 2-4, Ex. 1, at 87; 12-51, Ex. 16, at 4; 12-52, Ex. 16, at 17. Petitioner received the death sentence for the offense of malice murder and a consecutive life sentence for the offense of armed robbery. Dkt. No. 12-2, Ex. 1, at 88-91. On June 8, 1989, Petitioner's motion for new trial was denied. Id. at 97.
Petitioner appealed his convictions and death sentence to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Initially, Davis also represented Meders on appeal, although Meders's current counsel eventually substituted for Davis and filed an additional brief as part of the direct appeal. Dkt. No. 12-67, Ex. 22, at 1. On February 28, 1990, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled on various enumerations of error and affirmed Meders's convictions, Meders v. State, 260 Ga. 49 (1990) [hereinafter Meders I], but remanded Petitioner's case to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of whether Petitioner received effective assistance of trial counsel. Dkt. No. 12-75, Ex. 27. The court delayed consideration of the proportionality of Meders's death sentence until after the remand hearing.
On March 26, 1991, a hearing was conducted in the trial court on whether Davis rendered effective assistance of counsel. Dkt. Nos. 12-78 to -107, Exs. 30-32. At the remand hearing, Petitioner was represented by new counsel. Because the remand hearing occurred as part of the direct appeal, Meders claims that he was not entitled to access records under the Georgia Open Records Act. Dkt. No. 48, at 2.
During the remand hearing, extensive documentary evidence was presented, which included: the complete file of the District Attorney; the complete file of Davis; and documents from the Glynn County Police Department. Dkt. Nos. 12-78 to -107, Exs. 30-32. Meders sought funds to retain experts to assist him in the fields of psychology, criminal law, and jury composition, and appended affidavits from proposed experts describing their expertise and likely forms of assistance. Dkt. Nos. 47-13, Ex. 13; 47-14, Ex. 14. The remand court denied all requests for funds without written explanation. Dkt. No. 47-17, Ex. 17. The remand court refused to consider the affidavits and only allowed them to be made part of the record for appellate purposes. Dkt. No. 12-84, Ex. 30, at 244-247.
Davis was hospitalized immediately before the remand hearing to undergo a partial amputation of his leg. Mederssought a continuance. Dkt. Nos. 47-16, Ex. 16; 47-17, Ex. 17. Meders was unable to call Davis, who later died before the state habeas hearing, as a witness. Dkt. No. 12-204, Ex. 65, at 5.
On July 10, 1991, following the hearing, the remand court entered a nine-page order finding that Petitioner had failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Dkt. No. 12-108, Ex. 33, at 2, 9. The remand court found that Petitioner's "most persuasive argument" as to ineffective assistance of counsel was his claim that trial counsel failed "to produce independent evidence tending to corroborate testimony of the defendant which was inconsistent with the testimony of the State's key witnesses and the failure to use prior inconsistent statements of such key witnesses for impeachment purposes." Id. at 7. Petitioner, however, failed to show prejudice:
While attacking the credibility of the State's key witnesses in the manner suggested by defendant may well have been an effective and proper course of action, the fact remains that there is overwhelming evidence supporting the conviction of the defendant and tending to undermine his own credibility. Therefore, after carefully considering the defendant's contentions and the record, the Court finds that the defendant has not carried his burden of showing that there exists a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's alleged deficiencies the result of the trial would have been different.
On appeal following the remand, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the remand court's denial of relief and completed its proportionality review of the death sentence. Meders v. State, 261 Ga. 806 (1992) [hereinafter Meders II]; Dkt. No. 12-113, Ex. 37. The Supreme Court of Georgia specifically affirmed the trial court's denial of relief as to Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel by finding that Meders II, 261 Ga. at 807(2).
The Supreme Court of Georgia also rejected, on its merits, the contention made by Petitioner that he was improperly denied expert assistance during the remand proceeding:
Meders argues the trial court should have appointed to assist him at the remand hearing a mental health expert, a jury composition expert, and a criminal defense attorney to testify as an expert witness on the issue of ineffectiveness. Meders was represented by two attorneys in the remand proceedings. He was not entitled to the appointment of a third attorney to testify as an expert witness about how properly to try a death penalty case. Nor was expert assistance necessary to determine whether or not the jury lists fairly represented the population of Glynn County. SeeSpivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187(7a), 319 S.E.2d 420 (1984). Finally, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Meders' motion forindependent psychological assistance. SeeChristenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80(2), 402 S.E.2d 41 (1991).
Meders II, 261 Ga. at 806-807(1).
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, which was denied on October 5, 1992. Meders v. Georgia, 506 U.S. 837 (1992); Dkt. Nos. 12-115 to -116, Ex. 38; 12-119, Ex. 41.
On April 2, 1993, Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia. Dkt. No. 12-122, Ex. 44. In his original petition, Meders again alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 8-10. On August 30, 1995, Meders amended his petition and alleged additional claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ultimately submitting 35 grounds for relief. Dkt. No. 12-127, Ex. 48. Evidentiary hearings were conducted in November and December 1995. Dkt. No. 12-131 to -198, Exs. 52-61.
On September 22, 2005, the state court granted Meders's petition in part by finding that Meders had established that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Dkt. No. 12-204 to -205, Ex. 65. The State appealed the granting of the new trial, Dkt. No. 12-206, Ex. 66, and Meders cross-appealed certain portions of the habeas order that denied relief, Dkt. No. 12-207, Ex. 67.
The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the habeas corpus court's order and reinstated Petitioner's convictions and sentences. Schofield v. Meders, 280 Ga. 865 (2006) [hereinafter Meders III]; Ex. 12-219, Ex. 74. The court found that claims of ineffective assistance "were procedurally barred because actually litigated and [the habeas court] incorrectly found cause and prejudice to excuse petitioner's procedural default in failing to raise permutations of those claims on direct appeal." Meders III, 280 Ga. at 865(1). The court also denied Meders's cross appeal by finding, inter alia, that...
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