Medina-Diaz v. Triple-S Vida Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 15-1347 (GAG) |
| Parties | MARGARITA MEDINA-DIAZ, Plaintiff, v. TRIPLE-S VIDA INC., BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
This case involves a claim for long term disability ("LTD") benefits governed by the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. brought by Margarita Medina Díaz ("Plaintiff") against Triple-S Inc., and Banco Popular ("Defendants"). (Docket No. 33-1.) Plaintiff's claims stem from Triple-S' decision to suspend her LTD benefits on August 6, 2013. Id.
Presently before the Court are Defendants Banco Popular and Triple-S' motions for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 56; 58.) Plaintiff replied and cross-moved for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 68; 69.) Banco Popular and Triple-S both filed consolidated memoranda in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and reply to Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 93; 94.) Plaintiff sur-replied. (Docket Nos. 108; 109; 111.) Lastly, Banco Popular sur-replied. (Docket No. 112-1.)
Banco Popular moves for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff's ERISA claims fails as a matter of law because Banco Popular is not the plan administrator of her retirement plan and the LTD policy; copies of both the Retirement Plan document and the LTD policy were furnished to Plaintiff in compliance with established law; Banco Popular had no bearing on Triple-S' decision regarding Plaintiff's LTD benefits; and Triple-S has exclusive discretionary powers to interpret the terms of the LTD Policy and make final and finding decisions pertaining to the benefits. (Docket No. 56.) Triple-S moves for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (Docket No. 58.) Plaintiff argues summary judgment should be entered in her favor and the Court should order Triple-S to restore her benefits, impose a penalty under ERISA against both Banco Popular and Triple-S, and grant attorneys' fees in her favor. (Docket No. 68.)
After reviewing the parties' submissions and pertinent law, the Court hereby GRANTS Banco Popular's Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket No. 56, DENIES Triple-S' Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket No. 58, DENIES Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 69, and finds as MOOT Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 68.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "An issue is genuine if 'it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party' at trial, . . . and material if it 'possess[es] the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.'" Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). The nonmovant may establish a fact is genuinely in dispute by citing particular evidence in the record or showing that either the materials cited by the movant "do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the Court finds that some genuine factual issue remains, the resolution of which could affect the outcome of the case, then the Court must deny summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of any and all reasonable inferences. Id. at 255. Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. Summary judgment may be appropriate, however, if the non-moving party's case rests merely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Forestier Fradera v. Mun. of Mayagüez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir. 2003)).
"Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the summary judgment standard, but instead simply require [the Court] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the facts that are not disputed." Wells Real Estate Inv. Trust II, Inc. v. Chardon/Hato Rey P'ship, S.E., 615 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Adria Int'l Group, Inc. v. Ferré Dev. Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although each motion for summary judgment must be decided on its own merits, each motion need not be considered in a vacuum. Wells Real Estate, 615 F.3d at 51 (quoting P.R. American Ins. Co. v.Rivera-Vázquez, 603 F.3d 125, 133 (1st Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mercado-Salinas v. Bart Enterprises Int'l, Ltd., 852 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213 (D.P.R. 2012) on reconsideration in part, 889 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.P.R. 2012). "Where, as here, cross-motions for summary judgment are filed simultaneously, or nearly so, the district court ordinarily should consider the two motions at the same time, applying the same standards to each motion." Wells Real Estate, 615 F.3d at 51 (quoting P.R. American Ins., 603 F.3d at 133) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under ERISA, a beneficiary may bring a civil suit to enforce her rights under the terms of the benefits plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The Court reviews an administrator's decision to deny benefits de novo "unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 49 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); see also Gross v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 734 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013). If the administrator has discretionary authority, the Court must apply an arbitrary and capricious standard. Firestone, 49 U.S. at 115. Under such analysis, the Court is not permitted to independently weigh the evidence. Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002).
A. Local Rule 56
As a threshold matter, the Court notes Plaintiff's failure to adhere to proper summary judgment practice in this District Court. Local Rule 56 governs summary judgment practice before the U.S. District Court of Puerto Rico. L. CV. R. 56. Local Rule 56 requires, in part, that "[u]nless a fact is admitted, the reply shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by subsection (e) of this rule." L. CV. R. 56(d). In addition, Local Rule 56 states: "[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citationsas required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted." L. CV. R. 56(e). The First Circuit has made it pellucidly clear that a party, who ignores any provision of Local Rule 56, does so "at their peril." Ruis Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000). This court and the First Circuit have both held the court will be justified from deeming admitted a party's submitted uncontested facts, where the other party fails to file an opposition admitting, qualifying, or denying such statements. Fontanez-Nunez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 447 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Gonzalez-Rodriguez v. Potter, 605 F. Supp. 2d 349, 357 (D.P.R. 2009).
Plaintiff had the obligation to properly qualify, deny or admit all of Banco Popular and Triple-S' statement of facts. In order to properly qualify or deny, Plaintiff had to provide specific references to the record that supported her statements. Plaintiff cannot simply controvert a fact by using inadmissible evidence, speculation, or legal arguments. Similarly, as to Plaintiff's own statement of uncontested facts, Plaintiff had the obligation to make reference to specific pages or paragraphs of identified record evidence to support her statements. Plaintiff failed to comply with the local rules in all of these aspects. In those rare cases where Plaintiff actually provides a citation to the record, there are many instances where the cited material does not support Plaintiff's proposition.
In accordance with Local Rule 56, the Court includes only facts properly supported by accurate record citations. See L. Cv. R. 56(e). "The court shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the records not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts." Id. The Court will also only entertain facts that are material to the issues at summary judgment.
Plaintiff worked as an Assistant Branch Manager at Banco Popular's branch in Las Piedras, from July 1989 until March 11, 2005. (Docket Nos. 56-1 ¶ 2; 69-12 ¶ 1.) Popular, Inc. is a publicly-owned financial holding company incorporated under the laws of Puerto Rico, and Banco Popular of Puerto Rico is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Popular, Inc. (Docket Nos. 56-1 ¶ 1; 69-12 ¶ 1.) During Plaintiff's employment, she received all relevant pension plan documents, including the Summary Plan Descriptions, the LTD policy, and the Employee handbook. (D...
To continue reading
Request your trial