Medina v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 83-1696
Decision Date | 26 June 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83-1696,83-1696 |
Citation | 737 F.2d 140 |
Parties | Angel L. MEDINA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. The CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A., Defendant, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
David Efron, Hato Rey, P.R., for plaintiff, appellant.
Jay A. Garcia Gregory, San Juan, P.R., with whom Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, P.R., was on brief, for defendant, appellee.
Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, WISDOM, * Senior Circuit Judge, and BREYER, Circuit Judge.
Angel Medina appeals from the district court's order dismissing his lawsuit on the ground of res judicata. We affirm and award double costs to the defendant.
On January 8, 1982, Medina filed a wrongful discharge suit against his former employer, the Chase Manhattan Bank (Bank), in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico. The Bank answered the complaint on February 11 and deposed Medina on April 7. On July 9, Medina filed a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, presumably under Rule 39.1 of the 1979 Rules of Civil Procedure of Puerto Rico. The Bank opposed the motion and asked the court to dismiss with prejudice. On July 13 the court issued an order stating (our translation):
On August 5 Medina filed a motion to withdraw his previous request for voluntary dismissal. In this motion Medina emphasized that the previous motion had asked for dismissal without prejudice, and he argued that dismissal with prejudice was inappropriate. On August 16 the court denied the withdrawal motion without comment. Medina petitioned for review by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, but this was denied on September 15; reconsideration was denied on October 7.
Medina moved to Florida and filed the present lawsuit in federal court on December 20, 1982. In all material respects the complaint is identical with that in the previous case, except for the allegation of diversity jurisdiction. The Bank raised the defense of res judicata in its answer, filed on January 27, 1983. The case was referred to the magistrate, who recommended that the case be dismissed on res judicata grounds. On July 29, 1983 the district court approved the magistrate's report and granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment.
This Court must give full faith and credit to the judgments of the courts of Puerto Rico. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738 (1982). "Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged." Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (footnote omitted). We therefore look to Puerto Rican law to determine if the Superior Court's dismissal constitutes res judicata. General Foods v. Massachusetts Department of Health, 648 F.2d 784, 786-87 (1st Cir.1981); Rodriguez v. Baldrich, 628 F.2d 691, 693 (1st Cir.1980). Article 1204 of the Civil Code, 31 L.R.P.A. Sec. 3343, requires "the most perfect identity between the things, causes, and persons of the litigants, and their capacity as such." See Pagan Hernandez v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 107 D.P.R. 720, 731-732 (1978); Bolker v. Superior Court, 82 P.R.R. 785, 792 (1961). There is no dispute that the suits are identical, however; rather the dispute is whether the Superior Court's dismissal constitutes a judgment from which a presumption of res judicata can arise.
92 P.R.R. at 92. There is therefore no doubt that the Superior Court had the power to order prejudicial dismissal of Medina's action. Since the order explicitly specified that dismissal was with prejudice, the presumption embodied in the last sentence of Rule 39.1(b) was overridden.
Medina argues that prejudicial dismissal was erroneous under the Rule, and was a "miscarriage of justice". Medina has misstated the facts. Contrary to the assertions in Medina's brief, the Bank had filed an answer and had deposed Medina before Medina moved for dismissal. Dismissal could therefore be obtained only with court approval. The court could reasonably have concluded that if Medina were allowed to start again, the Bank would be prejudiced. The Court clearly had the power to make this decision. Whether the court ought to have done so is not a matter for collateral review. A final judgment does not lose its res judicata effect simply because another court might consider the decision erroneous. Bolker, 82 P.R.R. at 800. " '[T]he res judicata is not grounded in the judge's claim of infallibility, and much less on the intention of hiding his errors', since the rule of res judicata is one of fundamental and substantial justice, attended by public interest and directed to maintain private peace, ... and to avoid the perpetuation of judicial controversies, and it is grounded on the convenience of recognizing the dignity to which the judgments of courts are entitled." Id. (citations omitted), quoting Manresa y Novarro, Codigo Civil Espanol, Tome 8, Vol. 2 at 225 (5th ed. 1950); accord Rodriguez v. Baldrich, 508 F.Supp. at 617; Pagan Hernandez, 107 D.P.R. at 732. We have no reason to give credence to Medina's assertion that the Superior Court entered its order because of "an unintentional mistake by the Court, or a secretary's typo." The Bank had specifically asked for dismissal with prejudice. Medina filed a withdrawal motion before the Superior Court and two revision petitions before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court; these motions would have alerted the courts to any "unintentional mistake." It may seem surprising that the Superior Court ordered dismissal with prejudice, without affording Medina the option of proceeding with the lawsuit. But if this order was wrong, Medina's recourse was to file a timely petition for reconsideration. Under Rule 47 Medina had 15 days to do so; his withdrawal motion was filed 23 days after...
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