Medina v. Woods, CASE NO. 2:11-CV-12340
| Decision Date | 30 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:11-CV-12340 |
| Parties | MARLO MEDINA, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan) |
HONORABLE GERALD E. ROSEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On September 26, 2013, this Court denied petitioner a writ of habeas corpus and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Petitioner has now filed a motion for rehearing, reconsideration, and for new trial. For the reasons that follow, the motion for rehearing, reconsideration, and for a new trial is DENIED.
U.S. Dist.Ct. Rules, E.D. Mich. 7.1 (h) allows a party to file a motion for reconsideration. However, a motion for reconsideration which presents the same issues already ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication, will not be granted. Id.; See also Flanagan v. Shamo, 111 F. Supp. 2d 892, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The movant shall not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the Court and the parties have been misled but also show that a different disposition of the case must result from a correction thereof. A palpable defect is a defect that is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain. Witzke v. Hiller, 972 F. Supp. 426, 427 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
Petitioner initially claims in his motion for reconsideration that this Court failed toaddress a dispositive issue, namely, his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea bargain offer of a twelve year cap on the minimum sentence to petitioner.
In his original petition, petitioner raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim pertaining to the failure to raise an entrapment defense prior to petitioner pleading guilty as charged. Petitioner's counsel also raised a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a sentencing entrapment claim at sentencing. In his original petition, petitioner did not raise a separate claim that trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to communicate a plea bargain offer to petitioner.
On August 14, 2012, petitioner's counsel filed a supplemental brief in support of petitioner's habeas petition along with an affidavit that had been signed by petitioner on July 26, 2012. In his supplemental brief, petitioner's counsel cited to the new Supreme Court case of Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), where the Supreme Court held that the failure to communicate a plea bargain offer to a client can amount to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent filed a motion to strike the supplemental brief on the ground that any claim arising out of the Supreme Court's decision in Lafler had yet to be exhausted in the state courts.
Petitioner's counsel filed a reply brief to the motion to strike, in which he argued that the arguments raised in the supplemental brief were not new claims but were simply additional case authority in support of the claims that he had raised in his original petition:
Here, the supplemental brief was not filed to raise new claims, but to cite to new authority - Supreme Court cases - decided after the petition was filed in this case but applicable to the petitioner's claims, given the new authority, but the claims the new authority is applicable to are not new.
Response to Respondent's Motion to Strike Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, p. 1. Petitioner's Counsel then states:
Second, the new authority cited to the court in the Supplemental Brief clearly address claims that were exhausted in the state court and raised in the petition pending before this court.
This Court denied the Motion to Strike the Supplemental Brief by adopting petitioner's counsel's argument that the supplemental brief was merely additional case law in support of the claims found in petitioner's original habeas petition, being that counsel represented that there were no new issues. Petitioner raised in his habeas petition a number of sentencing issues in addition to a claim that the prosecutor was vindictive at sentencing. Petitioner also raised a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for pleading petitioner guilty without raising an entrapment defense and for failing to raise a sentencing entrapment claim at sentencing. The supplemental brief was allowed in support of these claims. Being that a claim pertaining to the failure to communicate a plea agreement had not been briefed before this Court, or any court, the supplemental brief was allowed solely for additional legal support of the claims raised by petitioner in his original habeas petition. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, and not briefs or other documents, provides the basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus. See Scott v. Hopkins, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1050 (D. Neb. 1999). Because petitioner's counsel never raised a specific claim in hisoriginal petition that counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea bargain offer to petitioner, any such claim was never properly before this Court.
Moreover, having reviewed the state appellate court briefs filed by petitioner's counsel, it does not appear that any claim that counsel had failed to communicate a plea bargain offer to petitioner has been properly exhausted with the state courts. Petitioner's counsel raised in the Michigan appellate courts a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to run an entrapment defense prior to advising petitioner to plead guilty as charged and for failing to raise a sentencing entrapment issue. Although within the appellate brief counsel did a throwaway line about petitioner not being advised of the twelve year offer, he did not raise this claim in the heading of his appellate briefs. 1 In addition, petitioner did not present any affidavit or other evidence in support of this claim in the state courts, first signing an affidavit in July of 2012 and attaching it to his supplemental brief that he filed with this Court. M.C.R. 7.212(C)(5) requires a statement of the questions involved, with each issue for appeal separately numbered. See Dando v. Yukins, 461 F. 3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2006). By failing to include a specific claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise petitioner of a plea bargain offer in the headings in his appellate court briefs, petitioner did not fairly present this ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the state courts for purposes of properly exhausting this claim. Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 415-16 (6th Cir. 2009). Petitioner's brief reference to this claim within his state appellate court briefs would be insufficient to exhaust this claim for habeas purposes. A habeas petitioner's "sporadic and undeveloped allusions" to a claim do not satisfy the exhaustionrequirement. See Vasquez v. Jones, 496 F. 3d 564, 568 (6th Cir. 2007). Federal courts do not have jurisdiction to consider a claim in a habeas petition that was not fairly presented to the state courts, and a claim may be considered "fairly presented" only if the petitioner asserted both the factual and legal basis for his claim to the state courts. McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F. 3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000).
A habeas petitioner's failure to exhaust his state court remedies does not deprive a federal court of its jurisdiction to consider the merits of the habeas petition. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987). An unexhausted claim may be addressed if the unexhausted claim is without merit, such that addressing the claim would be efficient and would not offend the interest of federal-state comity. Prather v. Rees, 822 F. 2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir. 1987); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (). In these circumstances, a federal court should dismiss a non-federal or frivolous claim on the merits to save the state courts the useless review of meritless constitutional claims. Cain v. Redman, 947 F. 2d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1991). Because petitioner's claim lacks merit, in the interests of efficiency and justice, the Court need not dismiss the petition on exhaustion grounds.
Having reviewed the record, not only has there never been a separate and independent claim raised by petitioner in either the state or federal courts pertaining to the failure to communicate a plea, there is no record support for such a claim. Furthermore, the record is clear from statements made by both petitioner's current counsel and the prosecutor that a 12 year plea was offered and rejected by petitioner after communicating with his trial counsel.
A review of petitioner's original habeas petition shows that in his statement of facts,in support of his prosecutorial vindictiveness claim, petitioner states that the prosecutor tried to increase the sentence beyond the minimum sentence that was "[offered by the prosecution and rejected by the defendant[.]" See Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, p. 14. Furthermore, in the fact pattern provided by petitioner's current counsel, he cites to the April 17, 2009 transcript stating that "[M]edina rejected the plea bargain and chose to seek a more lenient sentence than what the prosecutor offered." Id. (citing PC [Tr. 4/17/09], pp. 32-35). In a footnote, counsel mentions the post conviction hearing and states that "the defense rejected that offer because they (emphasis added) believed that was too harsh of a sentence." Id., fn. 8 (citing PC 36-37). Additionally, a review of the actual post-conviction hearing from April 17, 2009 shows that it is replete with comments by both petitioner's current counsel and the prosecutor pertaining to petitioner's rejection of the plea and argument regarding whether the resulting higher sentence constituted...
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