Medlock v. Rumsfeld, CIV.A.DKC 2002-1093.

Decision Date04 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A.DKC 2002-1093.,CIV.A.DKC 2002-1093.
Citation336 F.Supp.2d 452
PartiesRickey MEDLOCK v. Donald H. RUMSFELD
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Dawn Valore Martin, Law Offices of Dawn V. Martin, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Kristine L. Sendek Smith, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. ("Title VII") and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 ("Rehabilitation Act"), is the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment of Defendant Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of the United States Department of Defense ("DOD"). The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the court shall grant the motion.

I. Background

The following facts are uncontroverted or set forth in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff Rickey Medlock is an African-American male with a chronic facial pain disorder. Plaintiff is currently employed by a private contractor, Chugash Administrative Services, Inc., as an Administrative Assistant IV at the Office of Information Services of the Department of Defense, National Imaging and Mapping Agency ("NIMA"). Plaintiff was previously employed directly by NIMA from January 23, 1997 to March 10, 2001. Plaintiff was initially employed at NIMA as a GS-6 security guard, but his facial condition and associated pain medication made his job as a security guard unworkable. In November 1998, NIMA accommodated Plaintiff pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act by transferring him to Human Resources as a Management and Program Assistant in Pay Band Level 1.1

On or about March 22, 1999, approximately six months after Workplace 21 took effect, Human Resources issued a vacancy announcement for two Human Resources Career Intern positions, one of which was a Band 1 position and the other a Band 2 position. Plaintiff applied and was selected for the Band 1 position effective December 5, 1999. Plaintiff alleges that the vacancy announcement for the position he accepted was phrased as a "GS" "career ladder" position as opposed to a Workforce 21 "band" position and did not indicate that promotions from the position were subject to Workforce 21. See Paper no. 9 at 3-4, ex. A. Plaintiff, therefore, believed he was accepting a career ladder position. On or about February 9, 2000, Plaintiff received his fiscal year 1999 performance evaluation, which covered the period from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 1999 during which Plaintiff held the position of HR Management and Program Assistant. He received an overall score of 460, which translated into an overall rating of "4" or "excellent."2

During the time Plaintiff worked as a Career Intern, he was never non-competitively promoted. He alleges that two female Career Interns without disabilities, one White and one African-American, were given non-competitive promotions during this time period. The date of hire of these female employees as Career Interns was February 1, 1998, prior to the start of Workforce 21 in October 1998. Another Career Intern, Patricia Briggs, a White female who, like Plaintiff, began after the start of Workforce 21, was not promoted under a career ladder; Plaintiff alleges, however, that she is not an appropriate comparator because she did not want to stay in the HR Department. See id. at 7-8.

In April of 2000, approximately four months after Plaintiff started as an HR Career Intern, HR began the annual fiscal year Workforce 21 competitive promotion process. On April 10, 2000, NIMA issued a Promotion Vacancy Announcement for Human Resources Pay Band 2. Twenty candidates, including Plaintiff, applied for this competitive position (four African-American, sixteen White; one male, nineteen female; five with disabilities, fifteen without disabilities). A promotion panel with nine members was formed to evaluate the competitiveness of the applicants for promotion, with skill narratives counting as 70 percent of the final score and performance counting as 30 percent. Plaintiff's scores ranked him last out of the twenty applicants, which was not sufficient for promotion. Instead, the panel chose the four highest-rated HR applicants for Band 2 promotion, all of whom were White females.3 The effective date on the Form SF-50 Notice of Personnel Action for the four selected applicants was August 27, 2000. Plaintiff learned of his non-selection on September 14, 2000.

Plaintiff alleges that he received the lowest score of all twenty candidates in part because his supervisor, Bobby Webster, a White male, gave him a very low rating based on discriminatory animus. Plaintiff alleges that the adverse effect of that animus was compounded because Webster sat on the promotion panel that ranked the candidates for promotion overall. Plaintiff alleges that the process used to choose candidates for promotion under Workforce 21 was arbitrary and capricious, rendering promotions subject to nepotism, discriminatory application and abuse. To support this allegation, Plaintiff refers to the fact that the overall numbers ascribed to him by the nine panel members ranged from four to twelve, out of a possible score of twenty. He argues that the wide range indicates that there could not possibly have been uniform or fair application of objective criteria. Plaintiff further alleges that the chair of the hiring panel, Judy Schiebel, a White female, assisted White female candidates in preparing their applications.

Plaintiff first contacted NIMA's EEO counselor on October 12, 2000, approximately one month after learning of his non-selection for a Band 2 position. At this meeting, Plaintiff alleged that he was discriminated against by NIMA based on race, sex, and disability because management refused to non-competitively promote him even though he was hired as a Career Intern. It does not appear that Plaintiff raised the issue of his non-selection for the competitive promotion during this contact. After no resolution was reached at the informal stage, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination on November 17, 2000. The EEO complaint, which was accepted for investigation, alleged that NIMA had discriminated against Plaintiff with regard to both non-competitive and competitive promotion. On December 21, 2000, Plaintiff received his performance evaluation for fiscal year 2000, which covered October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2000 and reviewed Plaintiff's performance as an HR Career Intern. Plaintiff received an overall score of 280 points, which translated into an overall rating of "3," or "successful."4

On or about April 12, 2001, a Report of Investigation (ROI) was sent to Plaintiff concerning his EEO complaint, recommending a finding of no discrimination. On December 26, 2001, NIMA issued a Final Agency Decision (FAD) denying all of Plaintiff's claims on the merits. Plaintiff then timely filed a complaint in this court on April 2, 2002. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that his non-selection for the competitive promotion to the Band 2 Human Resources position was due to discrimination based on race, sex, and disability. He asserts both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories for the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that NIMA discriminated against him by denying him a non-competitive promotion during the time he served as a Career Intern. Plaintiff also alleges that NIMA downgraded his performance rating from "excellent" to "successful" in retaliation for filing the EEO charge. Finally, Plaintiff brings a breach of contract claim against NIMA, arguing that NIMA breached its promise to him in the Vacancy Announcement for the Career Intern position to afford Plaintiff a fair opportunity to obtain promotions based on his work performance and skills. On July 1, 2002, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), or in the alternative for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ought not be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). All that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require of a complaint is that it contain "`a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99; Comet Enters. Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 860 (4th Cir.1997). "Given the Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading, `[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)).

In reviewing the complaint, the court accepts all well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir.1997). The court must disregard the contrary allegations of the opposing party. A.S. Abell Co. v. Chell, 412 F.2d 712, 715 (4th Cir.1969). The court need not, however, accept unsupported legal conclusions, Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir.1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papasan...

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