Medrano v. State

• Decision Date: 08 September 1983
• Docket Number: 01-82-0416-CR,Nos. 01-82-0378-C,s. 01-82-0378-C
• Citation: 658 S.W.2d 787
• Parties: Ronald MEDRANO and Roland John Medrano, Appellants, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. (1st Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 787

658 S.W.2d 787

Ronald MEDRANO and Roland John Medrano, Appellants, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Nos. 01-82-0378-CR, 01-82-0416-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas Houston (1st Dist.).

Sept. 8, 1983.

Randy Schaffer, Houston, for appellants.

Timothy G. Taft, Houston, for appellee.

Before JACK SMITH, LEVY and DUGGAN, JJ.

OPINION

DUGGAN, Justice.

After a joint trial, appellants Ronald Medrano and Roland Medrano were found guilty by a jury of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft. The court assessed the punishment of each at five years confinement.

Complainant Richard Garcia's home was burglarized between 7:45 a.m. and 5:15 p.m. on June 11, 1981, by someone breaking the deadbolt lock on the front door. Garcia testified at trial that a 30-30 Winchester rifle, a portable television, costume jewelry, sheets and pillowcases were taken without his consent. One of the sheets was "rainbow-colored."

A State's witness, Mark Polk, testified that around 4:30 p.m. that day, he observed Roland Medrano in the front yard of the complainant's house, walking toward the road and carrying what looked like a rifle, wrapped in a rainbow-colored sheet. Polk passed within two feet of Roland and said "Hi," to which Roland replied, "Mind your own business." Polk then noticed the front door of the complainant's house was open and damaged. He first ran across the street to tell Isaac Marez, and then ran two doors up the street to inform Ronald Parr.

Parr testified that he had a clear, unobstructed view of Roland, about twenty-five feet away, walking alone on the sidewalk with either a rifle or a small caliber shotgun wrapped in a multi-colored sheet or blanket. Parr could see several inches of the butt of the gun protruding from the wrapping. Roland walked past a fence and through a car wash area next door just as Polk ran up to Parr to report the burglary.

Polk, Marez and Parr jumped into an automobile and circled the block, looking for the burglar. On the next street, they saw Roland and his brother, Ronald Medrano, standing behind a 1978 blue Camaro parked at the Medrano family's restaurant. Parr testified that he saw Roland put the gun in the car's trunk and then slap hands with Ronald in a self-congratulatory fashion. The two climbed into the Camaro with a third person and drove off. Parr, Polk, and Marez followed, copied the license number of the car, and returned to Marez's home to phone the police.

Houston Police Department Officer Curtis E. Roark, Jr., arrived at the Marez house, radioed to determine the registered address for the license number, and drove to the address given, the Medrano residence, where he found the blue Camaro with the reported license number parked in front. Back-up units continued surveillance of the Camaro while Officer Roark went to pick up the witnesses Parr and Polk, who accompanied him to a store near the Medrano house and there identified Ronald. They then went to the Medrano house, where they recognized Roland as the person carrying the rifle, although he had changed clothes.

The brothers were arrested, but the trunk of the Camaro was apparently not searched. Both appellants testified that they had worked in the family cafe that day from 12:00 p.m. until 5:15 p.m., and both denied ever leaving the premises. Their brother, their mother, and a customer corroborated their alibi. No fingerprints were found in the burglarized house, and the stolen items were not recovered.

Appellant's first ground of error challenges the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to prove that Roland Medrano burglarized the Garcia residence. In particular, Roland asserts the failure of the evidence to establish that he entered the habitation.

Guilt of the offense of burglary can be established circumstantially by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances, Phipps v. State, 630 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), but proof of guilt by accompanying circumstances is subject to the same rigorous standard required of direct evidence, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (en banc opinion on rehearing). In deciding whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, each case must necessarily be tested by its own facts. Robinson v. State, 570 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Ysasaga v. State, 444 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).

A person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, without the effective consent of the owner, he enters a habitation with intent to commit a felony or theft. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1) (1974).

The record reflects that the burglary of the complainant's house by a forceful breaking and entering and the theft of certain items occurred during daylight hours on June 11, 1981. Roland Medrano was seen by one witness leaving the yard of the burglarized residence and by another walking down a sidewalk away from the scene. He was carrying an object that looked like a rifle, wrapped in a sheet resembling one stolen from the same house. The same witness saw him placing these items in the trunk of a car, after which he slapped his brother's hand in a celebrative manner and drove away. Evidence that a house has been burglarized, together with the accused's unexplained possession of some of the property recently stolen from the house, is sufficient to support a conviction for burglary. Thompson v. State, 615 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Ward v. State, 581 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).

The conviction here does not rest upon later possession of stolen goods, Reyes v. State, 468 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), nor does it rest solely upon the accused's proximity to the scene of the crime, Robinson v. State, 570 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Drager v. State, 555 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). The appellant, Roland Medrano, was observed within a few feet of the damaged entry and seen holding goods stolen from the house immediately after discovery of the loss.

This is also not a case where the State failed to establish the identity of goods recovered from a suspect with those stolen, as in Nichols v. State, 479 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The complainant's property was never found, but the description of property seen in the possession of appellant Roland Medrano matched the description of goods taken from the victim's house.

Also distinguishable is Moreland v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 367, 72 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Cr.App.1934), wherein the evidence was insufficient to show the accused had possession of any stolen property. In Moreland, a witness observed the accused near a burglarized store from a distance of half a block or more, just as it was getting daylight, carrying something that looked like a pasteboard box about as long as one which was stolen. In the case before us, the appellant was seen at close range in broad daylight coming from the yard of the burglarized residence, carrying a rifle wrapped in a rainbow-colored sheet.

Roland Medrano did not try to explain his possession of a rifle wrapped in a rainbow-colored sheet at the scene of the burglary; he denied the possession altogether. It is not reasonable to assume he acquired the items in some lawful manner when he denied ever having them. The jury had its opportunity to evaluate his alibi testimony and rejected it. Considering the entire record in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, Kuykendall v. State, 609 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), and viewing the evidence in the light of the presumption of innocence, we conclude that the evidence supports the jury's finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Roland Medrano is guilty of the burglary for which he was convicted. Appellant's first ground of error (pertaining only to Roland Medrano) is overruled.

As their second ground of error, the appellants urge the insufficiency of the evidence to convict Ronald Medrano of burglary, either alone or as a party.

No evidence was adduced that Ronald was present at the scene of the burglary. The State's theory is that Ronald and Roland were partners in the burglary, that Ronald knew the rifle and sheet placed in the trunk were stolen, and that he helped Roland by providing the means of secreting the stolen property and leaving the scene.

The court properly charged the jury on the law of parties as found in Section 7.02(a)(2) of the Penal Code.

The incriminating evidence elicited by the State against Ronald is as follows: Ronald Parr testified that he saw Ronald Medrano standing next to Roland behind the blue Camaro while Roland was putting the gun in the trunk. He then saw the brothers slap each other's hands like football players do on TV after a touchdown, get into the car, and drive away. Mark Polk testified that he saw the two brothers at the back of the car beside the restaurant. He saw Roland place a long object wrapped in a sheet in the trunk, shut it, and slap hands with Ronald, after which the two drove off together.

Ronald Medrano testified, on the other hand, that he, like his brother, spent the entire afternoon inside the family's cafe. He denied ever standing near the open trunk of the Camaro and slapping hands with Roland, and stated that he and his brother drove away in separate cars. He claimed there were two other cars in the neighborhood similar to his, and he swore that police opened his trunk and searched both the interior and trunk of the car without his consent. An older brother, the boys' mother, and a customer each testified that the boys were in the cafe all afternoon until closing at 5:15 p.m.

Agreement of parties to act together in committing an offense may be established by circumstantial evidence, Fantroy v. State, 474 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), but a conviction will not be sustained on appeal if the evidence does not sufficiently establish all material elements of the offense charged. Alvarado v. State, 632 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Drager v. State, su...