Meduna v. Holder, No. 03-06-00484-CV (Tex. App. 4/30/2008)
| Decision Date | 30 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-06-00484-CV.,03-06-00484-CV. |
| Parties | AUGUST MEDUNA, JR. AND GARY MEDUNA, SR., Appellants v. RUTH HOLDER, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the County Court at Law of Bastrop County, No. G33A and 8747, Honorable Benton Eskew, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed in part; Reversed and Rendered in part.
Before Chief Justice LAW, Justices PEMBERTON and WALDROP.
This appeal arises from a probate dispute among siblings concerning their respective interests in certain real property owned by their late parents. Appellants, brothers August ("Gus") Meduna, Jr. and Gary Meduna, Sr. appeal a judgment voiding a 1997 gift deed under which they claimed interests in the property and awarding damages to their sister, appellee Ruth Holder, based on jury findings that the brothers tortiously interfered with her inheritance. Appellants bring forward three issues on appeal. They first contend that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment that their father did not effect a valid delivery of the deed. Relatedly, appellants urge that the trial court abused its discretion at trial in excluding their evidence relating to their father's delivery of the deed, which they sought to offer in defense of Ruth's tortious interference claims, and in refusing to submit the delivery issue to the jury. Appellants also contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the award of damages for tortious interference. We will affirm the trial court's judgment that the father did not deliver the deed and that the deed is void in its entirety. However, because we conclude there was legally insufficient evidence to support the award of damages, we must reverse and render judgment that Ruth take nothing on her tortious interference claims.
The parties are the three children of the late August Meduna, Sr., who died in November 1998, and Minnie Rosanky Meduna, who died in 2003. The present proceeding is the third appeal to this Court that has arisen from an ongoing series of disputes among the parties that originated in events following August's death.1 The nature and history of these disputes are detailed in the Court's prior opinions.2 To summarize, after August died, the parties located, in August's locked car, a notebook containing various documents that included a gift deed and a joint will, both of which August and Minnie had executed before a notary on June 17, 1997. Under the terms of the gift deed, August Sr. and Minnie, reserving life estates for themselves, granted life estates in separate, equal-sized tracts of their 200-acre Bastrop County farm to each of their three children, with the remainders ultimately passing to Gary's heirs.3 The record reflects that both Gary and Ruth, but not Gus, had children and potential heirs.4 The joint will devised to Gus and Gary each an undivided one-half interest "in all of our farm equipment, tractors and tools," with "any of said property still remaining" being divided into three equal shares that were each devised to a child in fee simple.5 Litigation soon arose between appellants and Ruth concerning the validity of the gift deed, with appellants seeking a declaration of the deed's validity and Ruth contending that it was invalid.
Although appellants apparently filed suit first seeking a determination of the deed's validity, this proceeding arises from relief Ruth—who was appointed Minnie's guardian in 2001—sought in the guardianship proceeding. Ruth alleged, among other things, that "Grantors never delivered the Deed of Gift to the purported donees and the gift is therefore incomplete and the deed void," that Minnie was incompetent to execute the deed, and that the deed was void "as a patently unreasonable restraint on alienation." Following a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the deed was void under the rule against perpetuities and as an unreasonable restraint on alienation that was incapable of reformation. Gus appealed. This Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the deed violated the rule against perpetuities and imposed an unreasonable restraint against alienation, but reversed its holding that the deed could not be reformed and was void in its entirety.6 The Court remanded "for a full hearing on all issues challenging the deed's validity" and further directed that "if the trial court determines that the deed is valid, the court must then strike the unreasonable restraint and reform the deed to comply with the rule against perpetuities in light of the grantor's intentions."7
On remand, Ruth sought summary judgment under civil procedure rule 166a(i), contending there was no evidence that the deed was delivered or accepted.8 The trial court granted Ruth's motion "in all things germane to August Meduna, Sr." but denied it "in respect to Minnie Meduna." The case proceeded to trial. The parties litigated several disputed factual matters that are reflected in the jury charge. The trial court submitted issues regarding Minnie's capacity at the time she executed the deed and, conditioned on a finding that Minnie did not lack capacity, whether Minnie had delivered the deed, whether Minnie had lacked mental capacity at the time she delivered it, and whether Gus or Gary had exercised undue influence on Minnie to deliver the deed. The court also submitted issues on whether Gus or Gary had tortiously interfered with Ruth's inheritance— "by undue influence, fraud, or other wrongful means, intentionally prevent[ing] another from receiving an inheritance or gift that she would otherwise have received." Predicated on an affirmative finding as to Gus, Gary, or both, the jury was asked to award damages for such tortious interference and to determine whether the tortious interference of Gus, Gary, or both had been done with malice. Finally, the trial court submitted an issue as to whether the 1997 gift deed found in August's car had included a property description attachment. The jury found that Minnie had lacked mental capacity at the time she executed the deed and, thus, did not reach the other issues bearing on the validity of her conveyance. It found that both Gus and Gary had tortiously interfered with Ruth's inheritance, awarded Ruth $20,000 in actual damages from each, but also found that neither brother had acted with malice. The jury also found that the deed found in the car had included a property description attachment. The trial court rendered judgment based on its prior partial summary judgment9 and the jury's verdict, declaring the gift deed entirely void and awarding Ruth the damages found by the jury. Gus and Gary subsequently filed this appeal.
In their first issue, Gus and Gary urge that the district court erred in granting the partial summary judgment as to August's delivery of the June 17, 1997 gift deed. They seek a reversal and remand of the issue for trial. Appellants acknowledge that, because they are not challenging the trial court's judgment that the gift deed was void as a conveyance of Minnie's interests, the reversal they seek would potentially impact only the siblings' respective interests in the undivided ½ share in the property that August could have conveyed through the deed. Conversely, if we affirm the partial summary judgment, appellants concede that such disposition would also foreclose their second issue, in which they complain of the trial court's exclusion of evidence and refusal to submit a jury issue concerning whether August delivered the deed.
We review the trial court's partial summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Ruth sought summary judgment under the "no evidence" standard in civil procedure rule 166a(i). A no-evidence motion for summary judgment must be granted if, after an adequate time for discovery, (1) the moving party asserts that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial, and (2) the nonmovant fails to produce more than a scintilla of summary-judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on those elements. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a directed verdict granted before trial, to which we apply a legal-sufficiency standard of review. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003); Perdue v. Patten Corp., 142 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.). A no-evidence summary judgment will be sustained when: (1) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Id. (citing Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)). More than a scintilla of supporting evidence exists if the evidence would allow reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Id. "Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is `so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion' of a fact." Id. (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)).
For a conveyance by deed to be valid, there must be "delivery" of the deed. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5.021 (West 2003); Steffian v. Milmo Nat'l Bank, 6 S.W. 823, 824 (Tex. 1888) (). "While the question of whether there has in fact been a delivery of a deed is one for the trier of facts; the question of what...
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