Mee v. Sprague

• Decision Date: 05 September 1989
• Citation: 545 N.Y.S.2d 268,144 Misc.2d 1057
• Parties: J.A. MEE and Thomas D. Tarpley, Plaintiffs, v. Paul SPRAGUE, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 268

545 N.Y.S.2d 268

144 Misc.2d 1057

J.A. MEE and Thomas D. Tarpley, Plaintiffs, v. Paul SPRAGUE, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Westchester County.

Sept. 5, 1989.

Eaton & Van Winkle, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, White Plains, for defendant.

W. DENIS DONOVAN, Judge.

The defendant, a judgment-debtor, moves for renewal of a previous motion resulting in a Decision and Order by this Court dated January 12th, 1989. In that Decision and Order, this Court denied his request to vacate a 1980 money judgment rendered against him in this action in New York. This action and the resulting judgment was based on an earlier foreign money judgment entered against defendant in the State of Oklahoma. A more detailed chronology is necessary to resolve the legal issues presented revolving around conflicts of law and full faith and credit requirements.

In March 1979, plaintiffs obtained a default money judgment in the District Court of Oklahoma County against the defendant based on his guarantee of a debt. As defendant had returned to New York, the plaintiffs instituted this plenary action on the Oklahoma judgment here in New York in 1980. Again, the defendant defaulted and money judgment was entered in this action on December 24th, 1980 for a sum reflective of the Oklahoma judgment plus further interests and costs, etc. It should be noted that no question of proper service with respect to either action has been raised by defendant.

Thereafter, plaintiffs did not seek to enforce either of the judgments for several years. In 1986, by unopposed motion in Oklahoma, defendant obtained relief from the Oklahoma judgment based on that State's five year dormancy statute precluding enforcement of judgments. In that Order, the Oklahoma judgment was declared ".... no longer enforceable, has no effect, is void and no longer operates as a lien on the real estate of the Judgment debtor and is released of record" (Oklahoma Docket 79-211).

With this order in hand, defendant succeeded in having the County Clerk's office in Westchester County strike the New York judgment from its judgment role upon mere presentation of a certified copy of that Oklahoma order. Later learning of this, plaintiffs commenced a proceeding against the Clerk for an order directing the Clerk to restore the New York judgment to the roll. By Order of September 1st, 1988, under Index No. 11353/88, this Court allowed for such relief and the judgment was restored.

Defendant then made a formal motion on notice under the original index before this court to vacate the New York judgment by virtue of the foreign dormancy order. By Decision and Order of January 12th, 1989, this Court refused such relief finding that short of actual vacatur or reversal of judgment in Oklahoma, the later dormancy declaration did not affect New York's judgment certainly not when that judgment was obtained during a period when the Oklahoma judgment was fully vital and a totally proper basis for rendition of the New York judgment on full faith and credit grounds. This Court further held that the New York judgment, entitled as such to a much longer period of enforceability in this State [CPLR 211(b) ] was a distinct entity and hence not subject to the five year dormancy ruling of the Oklahoma Court on its own judgment. This Court then lifted the temporary stay of enforcement it had allowed during the pendency of the motion and directed defendant to appear for examination as a judgment debtor.

On April 7th, 1989, following lengthy or delayed proceedings back in Oklahoma, the District Court there issued a consolidated order denying the plaintiffs' request to vacate the dormancy order (Docket 86-12141) and granting defendant's request to quash and vacate the filing of the New York judgment in Oklahoma (Docket 86-351). On the strength of certain verbiage used by the Oklahoma Court in this latest order defendant here requests renewal of his earlier motion and the decision of this Court denying vacatur of the New York judgment.

The wording of the Oklahoma Court in its April order upon which defendant most heavily relies is as follows:

"The Court further finds that as among the parties to these cases, J.A. Mee, Thomas D. Tarpley, and R. Paul Sprague, the New York judgment did not obtain a life of its own and became void when the Oklahoma judgment in Case No. CJ-79-211 (which judgment was entered March 16th, 1979) became void. The Court further finds that the foreign New York judgment filed in Case No. CJ-86-351 should be quashed and vacated."

The motion to renew upon papers numbered 1, 2, 3A, is hereby granted and upon renewal, the Court adheres to its previous determination denying vacatur of the New York money judgment (Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 48 S.Ct. 142, 72 L.Ed. 365).

Common comity would have the decisions and orders of both the Oklahoma and New York Courts read in as harmonious a manner as possible. Thus viewed, the verbiage above allows that the Oklahoma Court confined its holdings to ".... the parties to these cases ..." i.e. the Oklahoma actions, and did not mean or intend to lend its holding extraterritorial effect reaching into New York and passing on the validity here of New York's own judgment.

Similarly, this Court will not pass on the intent or validity of the foreign court's declaration that "... the New York judgment did not obtain a life of its own and became void when the Oklahoma judgment ... became void" as that is most properly a matter for review in Oklahoma regarding that court's failure to recognize the filing of the New York judgment there. Nevertheless, it is profitable for the present holding of this Court and should be of interest to the District Court of Oklahoma County regarding its latest holding to note that the issue(s) presented to both Courts have been addressed numerous times by highest judicial authority.

In Roche v. McDonald, supra, the Supreme Court dealt with the situation where a Washington resident obtained money judgment against another Washington resident in 1918. Almost 6 years later, the judgment-creditor's assignee located the judgment-debtor temporarily residing in Oregon and sued him there on the Washington judgment. Obtaining a default judgment--now more than six years after the Washington judgment, the assignee-judgment-creditor followed the debtor back to Washington and sued there on the Oregon judgment. The judgment-debtor argued that Washington's own six year dormancy statute precluded any suit that would have the effect to extending the duration or continuing the lien effect of the original Washington judgment beyond its own six year rule. The creditor simply relied on the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. All of the Washington courts disallowed the action but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed holding that the full faith and credit requirement applied. The Supreme Court held:

"This rule is applicable where a judgment in one State is based upon a cause of action which arose in the State in which it is sought to be enforced, as well as in other cases; and the judgment, if...