Meehan v. Med. Info. Tech., Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-P-1412,19-P-1412
• Citation: 163 N.E.3d 436,99 Mass.App.Ct. 95
• Parties: Terence MEEHAN v. MEDICAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

99 Mass.App.Ct. 95

163 N.E.3d 436

Terence MEEHAN

v.MEDICAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC.¹

No. 19-P-1412

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk..

Argued May 11, 2020

Decided January 20, 2021²

James A. Kobe, Newton, for the plaintiff.

Scott J. Brewerton, for the defendant.

Present: Green, C.J., Vuono, Meade, Rubin, & Henry, JJ.

MEADE, J.

The plaintiff, Terence Meehan, who had been an employee at will of the defendant, Medical Information Technology, Inc. (Meditech), filed a one-count complaint in Norfolk Superior Court asserting wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Meehan claimed that he was discharged as a consequence of submitting a rebuttal, utilizing the mechanism outlined in G. L. c. 149, § 52C, to a performance improvement plan (PIP) on which he had been placed. Meditech moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and a Superior Court judge allowed the motion. The judge determined that the narrow public policy exception to the general rule that an employee at will may be terminated without cause does not include termination for filing a rebuttal to information in one's personnel file pursuant to § 52C. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts alleged in Meehan's complaint, which we accept as true. Meehan began working as a sales representative for Meditech in November of 2010. In April of 2017, Meditech reorganized its twelve sales representatives; nine persons remained in the representative role and three persons, including Meehan, were placed in the supporting role of "Sales Specialist." Meehan's job, his responsibilities, and his ability to earn commissions were all affected by this change. In July of 2018, Meditech placed Meehan and the other two sales specialists on a PIP. Approximately two weeks later, under the authority of G. L. c. 149, § 52C, Meehan wrote a lengthy rebuttal to the PIP, which he e-mailed to his supervisor.³ That same day, members of Meditech's management met to discuss the rebuttal. During that meeting, Meditech's chief executive officer and president, Howard Messing, decided that Meehan's employment should be terminated immediately. Meehan's employment was terminated the same day. The next month, Meehan's counsel protested his termination. The following year, Meehan filed the complaint at issue.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, and in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under rule 12 (b) (6), "[w]e take as true ‘the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff's favor.’ " Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45, 809 N.E.2d 1017 (2004), quoting Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 427 Mass. 46, 47, 691 N.E.2d 545 (1998). "What is required at the pleading stage are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief ...." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636, 888 N.E.2d 879 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

2. At-will employment doctrine. Typically, "employment at will can be terminated for any reason or for no reason." Harrison v. NetCentric Corp., 433 Mass. 465, 478, 744 N.E.2d 622 (2001). See King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 582, 638 N.E.2d 488 (1994), S.C., 424 Mass. 1, 673 N.E.2d 859 (1996). "We have recognized exceptions to that general rule, however, when employment is terminated contrary to a well-defined public policy." Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 412 Mass. 469, 472, 589 N.E.2d 1241 (1992). The Supreme Judicial Court "consistently has interpreted the public policy exception narrowly, reasoning that to do otherwise would ‘convert the general rule ... into a rule that requires just cause to terminate an at-will employee.’ " King, supra, quoting Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State Sch., 404 Mass. 145, 150, 533 N.E.2d 1368 (1989). To qualify as an exception to the general rule, "[t]he public policy must be well defined, important, and preferably embodied in a textual law source." Ryan v. Holie Donut, Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 636, 977 N.E.2d 64 (2012). See Mello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 402 Mass. 555, 557, 524 N.E.2d 105 (1988) (public policy must be "sufficiently important and clearly defined"). On the other hand, "the internal administration, policy, functioning, and other matters of an organization cannot be the basis for a public policy exception to the general rule that at-will employees are terminable at any time with or without cause." King, supra at 583, 638 N.E.2d 488. See Wright, supra at 474, 589 N.E.2d 1241 (where nurse reported internal problems at hospital to high-level officials within organization, reports were internal matter, which could not be basis for public policy exception). "The existence of a clearly defined public policy is a question of law for the court." Flynn v. Boston, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493, 796 N.E.2d 881 (2003).

3. Section 52C. Meehan claims that he was wrongfully discharged, in violation of public policy, for exercising his statutory right under G. L. c. 149, § 52C, when he submitted a rebuttal in his personnel file to the PIP on which he had been placed. Section 52C provides, in pertinent part:

"An employer shall notify an employee within 10 days of the employer placing in the employee's personnel record any information ... that ... negatively affect[s] the employee's qualification for employment, promotion, transfer, additional compensation or the possibility that the employee will be subject to disciplinary action.

...

"If there is a disagreement with any information contained in a personnel record, removal or correction of such information may be mutually agreed upon by the employer and the employee. If an agreement is not reached, the employee may submit a written statement explaining the employee's position which shall thereupon be contained therein and shall become a part of such employee's personnel record.

...

"Whoever violates the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than twenty-five hundred dollars. This section shall be enforced by the attorney general."

As the circumstances here present, the ultimate question is whether the right to rebuttal provided by § 52C is a public policy sufficiently well defined and important such that the exercise of that right brings an employee within the public policy exception to the general rule that an at-will employee may be terminated without cause. We conclude that, for several reasons, it does not.

Even though § 52C is embodied in a textual law source, not all statutes relating to an employee's rights are "pronouncement[s] of public policy that will protect, in every instance, an [at-will] employee from termination." King, 418 Mass. at 584, 638 N.E.2d 488. See Parker v. North Brookfield, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 235, 240-243, 861 N.E.2d 770 (2007) (public policy exception not applicable for at-will employee who claimed she was terminated solely for exercising statutory right to obtain town medical insurance benefits). Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court has "acknowledged very few statutory rights the exercise of which would warrant invocation of the public policy exception." King, supra at 584, 638 N.E.2d 488. The court has held that "[r]edress is available for employees who are terminated for asserting a legally guaranteed right (e.g., filing [a] workers' compensation claim), for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving on a jury), or for refusing to do that which the law forbids (e.g., committing perjury)." Smith–Pfeffer, 404 Mass. at 149-150, 533 N.E.2d 1368.

The right to rebut information placed in one's personnel file falls within none of the clearly defined categories. When the employer and the employee cannot agree on the correction or removal of negative information in the employee's personnel file, G. L. c. 149, § 52C, permits the employee to place in the file "a written statement explaining the employee's position." However, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that "the internal administration, policy, functioning, and other matters of an organization cannot be the basis for a public policy exception ...." King, 418 Mass. at 583, 638 N.E.2d 488. If it were otherwise, our courts would become super personnel departments. See Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 56, 825 N.E.2d 522 (2005), quoting Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992) ("Courts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits -- or even the rationality -- of employers' ... business decisions"). See also Shea v. Emmanuel College, 425 Mass. 761, 762, 682 N.E.2d 1348 (1997) (no liability for discharge stemming from employee's internal complaint regarding violation of company rules). Moreover, "[i]t is well established that Massachusetts law does not protect at-will employees who claim to be fired for their complaints about internal company policies or the violation of company rules, even though the employees' actions may be considered appropriate and ‘socially desirable.’ " Falcon v. Leger, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 352, 362, 816 N.E.2d 1010 (2004), quoting Smith-Pfeffer, 404 Mass. at 150-151, 533 N.E.2d 1368. See Wright, 412 Mass. at 474-475, 589 N.E.2d 1241.

Even if G. L. c. 149, § 52C, touches on a matter of public policy, it is one that is neither sufficiently important nor clearly defined, both of which are required to justify the exception. See Mello, 402 Mass. at 557, 524 N.E.2d 105. The lack of a clear definition for any public policy embodied in § 52C is illustrated by the fact that the content of an employee's rebuttal is in no way cabined. Indeed, the rebuttal may relate to a "disagreement with any information contained in a personnel record," and § 52C allows information to be...