Meehan v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 67--558

• Decision Date: 21 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 67--558,67--558
• Parties: Helen C. MEEHAN, Appellant, v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY and James B. Hensley, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 476

210 So.2d 476

Helen C. MEEHAN, Appellant, v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY and James B. Hensley, Appellees.

No. 67--558.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

May 21, 1968.

Smathers & Thompson and Earl D. Waldin, Jr., Miami, for appellees.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C.J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

PEARSON, Judge.

The appellant's husband was killed in a collision between appellee Seaboard's train and an automobile in which the deceased was a passenger. The appellant sued Seaboard and the engineer of the train. The jury found for the defendant, and the court entered final judgment. This appeal is from that judgment. We affirm.

Three points on appeal are presented. The first point, questioning the propriety of the court's allowing, over objection, testimony concerning consumption of alcoholic beverages in the absence of any allegation or proof of impairment of driving ability. This point was raised by assignment of error number two:

'2. The Court erred in overruling Plaintiff's Motion made prior to impanelling the jury to suppress all evidence and testimony concerning the consumption of alcoholic beverages by Plaintiff's deceased husband and the other occupants of the vehicle in which he was a passenger, and in permitting testimony and evidence concerning the consumption of alcoholic beverages by such individuals during the course of trial.'

Appellant moved to suppress because while discovery proceedings revealed that the teenage operator of the automobile in which plaintiff's deceased was riding and some teenage passengers had consumed several cans of beer on the evening of the accident, they did not reveal that the operator's ability to drive was impaired.

Appellant based her motion and now relies for reversal upon the following paragraph from Le Fevre v. Bear, Fla.App.1959, 113 So.2d 390, 392:

'The subject of the quantity and time of indulgence by defendant and Commander Bear in drinking intoxicants was injected into the trial at considerable length over objection of the defendant. The complaint does not charge and the evidence does not show that defendant's indulgence in intoxicants affected his conduct or proximately contributed to the accident. Such evidence could have no effect other than to open the minds of the jurors to improper speculative excursions outside the issues developed by the pleadings and proofs. It is inevitable that many immaterial facts are developed on the trial of any cause. Harmful error does not result unless such evidence is pursued to the point that it is calculated to unduly excite the passions and prejudices of the jurors. Trial courts should exercise the utmost caution to prevent that result.'

The district court of appeal reversed judgment for the plaintiff in Le Fevre, holding that the verdict was based upon improperly admitted testimony of a presumed expert as to the speed of the defendant's vehicle. While we concur in the conclusion expressed in the quoted paragraph that trial courts should do their utmost to prevent the creation of jury prejudice, we do not understand the quoted paragraph to hold that in a civil action a trial judge must rule on the admissibility of evidence in advance of trial. In a civil action involving an automobile collision, a showing in discovery proceedings that driving capability was impaired is not a condition precedent...