Meek v. Briggs

• Decision Date: 03 February 1893
• Citation: 54 N.W. 456,87 Iowa 610
• Parties: MEEK v. BRIGGS ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

87 Iowa 610

54 N.W. 456

MEEK

v.BRIGGS ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 3, 1893.

Appeal from district court, Mahaska county; D. Ryan, Judge.

Motion for judgment against Bliss, garnishee, as trustee of property willed to Blanche A. Briggs. Motion overruled. Garnishee discharged. Plaintiff excepts, and appeals.Bolton & McCoy, for appellant.

F. M. Williams, for appellees.

KINNE, J.

1. The facts disclosed by this record are that plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendants H. L. Briggs and Blanche A. Briggs for nearly $2,000. Execution issued thereon, and defendant L. O. Bliss was garnished, as a supposed debtor of Blanche A. Briggs. The garnishee answered before the commissioner that he was not indebted to defendant, but disclosed that as one of the trustees appointed by the will of William Wilde, deceased, he held in his possession property of the value of over $16,000 in trust for Blanche A. Briggs, formerly Wilde. Blanche A. Briggs was a daughter of William Wilde, now deceased. That he held said property by virtue of the provisions of the will of deceased. After making certain devises to other members of his family, the testator's will provides: “Fourth. To my daughter Ada Blanche Wilde, I give, devise, and bequeath the undivided one fourth of the north thirty feet of lot 77, in the city of Dubuque, Iowa; also the sum of thirteen thousand three hundred dollars, in bills receivable and accounts, subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 of this will.” Paragraph 7 is as follows: “Seventh. I hereby name and appoint my brother Richard Wilde, my wife, Mary R. Wilde, and my friend L. O. Bliss, trustees, without bond, to receive, manage, and control the property and funds hereby bequeathed and devised to my said daughter Ada Blanche Wilde, hereby giving them full power to take possession of said property, both real and personal; to collect the rents from said real estate; to invest the moneys and credits in good, safe, interest-bearing securities; and in every way to care for and preserve the fund set apart to my said daughter in such manner as to them shall seem wise and prudent, applying the income and increase thereof to her support, comfort, and education, so far as shall be required for such purposes. The trust hereby created shall be held and construed as a limitation upon the title and interest vested in my said daughter by the fourth paragraph of this will, and the same shall continue until, in the judgment of said trustees, she shall have become fully competent and worthy to be intrusted with the sole care and power of control of said property and funds, or until she shall be married to some competent and worthy man. In either case, when they are satisfied that said devise and bequest will be safely and prudently cared for and preserved, they may surrender all trust funds and property to my said daughter, and the title shall then rest absolutely in her.” A copy of the will was attached to the answer. Plaintiff moved for judgment against the garnishee on his answer. The court overruled the motion, found that the garnishee was not indebted to either of the defendants, and discharged him; to which plaintiff excepted.

2. If, by the terms of the will of deceased, Ada Blanche Wilde took the legal title, as well as the beneficial use, of the property, both real and personal, then it necessarily follows that she had power to dispose of it, as the power to alienate is one of the incidents of an absolute gift, and of an estate in fee. If such an estate vested in her, her power to alienate it could not be limited, as such limitation would be inconsistent with the enjoyment of the estate granted. Plaintiff insists that such is the effect of the provisions of the will which we have quoted. If his contention is correct, then the property in the hands of Bliss was subject to plaintiff's garnishment. McCleary v. Ellis, 54 Iowa, 316, 6 N. W. Rep. 571;Machine Co. v. Gates, 75 Iowa, 344, 39 N. W. Rep. 657; 1 Perry, Trusts, §§ 386, 386a, 386b; Deering v. Tucker, 55 Me. 284; Keyser's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 236. It becomes important, then, to determine whether the will in question vests an absolute title to the property in Ada Blanche Wilde. The fourth provision expressly says that the gift and devise therein made are subject to the provisions of paragraph 7. That paragraph creates a trust, names the trustees, vests in them absolute authority to take possession of all the property, collect the rents, invest the moneys, and pay over to the daughter, not a sum certain, but the “income and increase,” so far as may be required for certain purposes. It then expressly provides that the trust created shall be held and construed as a limitation upon the title and interest vested in the daughter under the fourth clause of the will. It closes with a provision that when the trust fund and property are turned over to the daughter the title shall vest absolutely in her. Now, the cardinal rule of construction applied to wills is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the testator. If that intention can be gathered from the instrument, it will always be carried into effect, unless to do so would violate some rule of law. Construing the clauses of the will together, there can be no doubt as to the testator's intention. It is clear that he did not intend that the daughter should have the property in question, nor the control or management of it, until the trustees, in their discretion, should see fit to give it to her. The provisions for the daughter show that the testator did not intend to give her title or possession of the property. If she held title, she might convey or incumber the real estate, or dispose of the personalty, and thus put it out of the power of the trustees to execute the trust. The very fact that they were required to take possession of the property, collect rents, and invest the funds, and pay over, from time to time, to the daughter, so much of the income as was necessary for her support, comfort, and education, implies that the interest of the trustees in the estate should be something more than mere control of it, subject to the will of the daughter. If, as plaintiff contends, the will makes the daughter the absolute owner of the property, thereby vesting in her the absolute right of disposal of it at any time she sees fit, then is the intention of the testator set aside, and he might as well have given it all to her absolutely, without creating any trusteeship, because his provision therefor could be rendered ineffective at any moment the daughter saw fit to exercise her right of disposal of the property. In other words, the only way effect can be given to the manifest intent of the testator is to hold that the will creates a trust, and that the trustees take the legal title for the use and purposes provided in the will.

It is true that, in terms, the property in the case at bar is not bequeathed or devised to the trustees, nor need it be in order for them to take title. Where trustees are named in a will, the law looks to see what powers are conferred upon them, what duties are required of them, and presumes that it was the testator's intention to give them such an estate as will enable them to execute the powers given, and perform the duties required. Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 499. And it has been held “that, though no trust is declared, in express terms, nor even mentioned, still the intention of the donor to create the trust, and the existence of the trust itself, may be necessarily inferred from the powers and authoritygiven to the grantee; and in case of wills, even where no estate is directly devised to the executors, but the whole estate is apparently given to the beneficiaries, the trust may be necessarily inferred from the powers and authority conferred upon the executors, and thus, from a construction of the entire will, the intention may be shown that the executors are to take the legal title as trustees of an express active trust.” 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1011; Tobias v. Ketchum, 32 N. Y. 327. A well-known exception to the rule prohibiting...