Meeker v. Kautz

• Decision Date: 17 November 1931
• Docket Number: No. 40773.,40773.
• Citation: 213 Iowa 370,239 N.W. 27
• Parties: MEEKER v. KAUTZ ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

213 Iowa 370

239 N.W. 27

MEEKER

v.KAUTZ ET AL.

No. 40773.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 17, 1931.

Appeal from District Court, Muscatine County; A. P. Barker, Judge.

Action to quiet title. From a decree in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.C. R. Stafford and J. G. Kammerer, both of Muscatine, for appellants.

G. Allbee and Nichols, Tipton & Tipton, all of Muscatine, for appellee.

ALBERT, J.

The real estate in controversy herein consists of two small islands in the Mississippi river on the Iowa side of the thread of the stream. Plaintiff asserted title thereto by reason of a patent issued by the state of Iowa to one Burmeister, who later conveyed title to the plaintiff.

The defense is a general denial, and a cross-petition in which defendants assert title to these two small islands by reason of accretion to a larger island to which latter larger island the defendants had undisputed title. The defendants also asserted that plaintiff's patent was void and contrary to law and procured through fraud in contravention of the statutes of Iowa.

[1] In the case of Stone v. United States, 2 Wall. 525, 17 L. Ed. 765, the Supreme Court of the United States says: “A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive as against the government and all claiming under junior patents or titles, until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal.” See, also, Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 20 L. Ed. 485;Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 24 L. Ed. 848;St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 26 L. Ed. 875. These cases are all to the point that a patent, regular on its face, cannot be collaterally attacked. To the same effect see McCarter v. Sooy Oyster Co., 78 N. J. Law, 394, 75 A. 211;Sooy Oyster Co. v. Gaskill (N. J. Ch.) 69 A. 1084;Horton v. Bauer, 129 N. Y. 148, 29 N. E. 1, loc. cit. 4; Malloy v. Benway, 34 Wash. 315, 75 P. 869;Baker v. Newland, 25 Kan. 25;Palmer v. Boorn, 80 Mo. 99;Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah, 521, 7 P. 712, 11 P. 571;McKinney v. Bode, 33 Minn. 450, 23 N. W. 851;State ex rel. Marsh v. State Board of Land Com'rs, 7 Wyo. 478, 53 P. 292; see also 45 C. J. 554, § 238.

[2][3] It is apparent, therefore, under this line of authorities that the defendant cannot collaterally attack the patent title derived from the state of Iowa in this case. Also, under the above cases, the issuance of a patent by the state is an assertion of the existence of the property there conveyed. The objections made to the patent title of the plaintiff are not available to the defendants in this case.

The fact situation, so far as we are able to determine it from the record, is that at all times in controversy herein the defendants were the owners of the legal title to what is known as “Island No. 3” in the Mississippi river on the Iowa side. This island originally, according to the government survey, contained over 29 1/2 acres, and is known in the record as “Hog Island.” By reason of certain accretions, said island extended in a southwesterly direction, and at the time of the trial contained about 62.25 acres. The two tracts of land in dispute lie in a northwesterly direction from the lower end of said island, and according to one plat contain respectively 0.62 and 0.99 acres of land. According to plaintiff's contention, they contain respectively 1.04 and 0.57 acres.

[4] This case, being in equity, is triable de novo in this court, and we are not favored in the abstract, by way of certification of exhibits, with the three different plats introduced in the lower court. Without them we cannot get a very intelligent idea of the situation of the relations of these pieces of property to each other.

[5][6] It is apparent, by reason of the defendants' cross-petition, that the burden is upon them to establish that these two small islands are their property by reason of the doctrine of accretion, and, if they have failed so to do, they are not entitled to any relief under said cross-petition. The record consistently shows that the normal state of water in the Mississippi river at the times in controversy was about 8 feet. The record also consistently shows that, when the water in the river was at a height of 6.8 feet, these two small islands were separated from each other, and from Hog Island, by different stretches of water of different depths ranging from 3.8 to 6.4 feet. We reach the same conclusion, as did the district court, that under this record these two small islands are not a part of island No. 3 by accretion, but are still a part of the river bed, and therefore were the property of the state. See Holman v. Hodges, 112 Iowa, 714, 84 N. W. 950, 58 L. R. A. 673, 84 Am. St. Rep. 367;Payne v. Hall, 192 Iowa, 780, 185 N. W. 912.

[7][8] The doctrine of accretion is quite well established and recognized in this state. To constitute an accretion, there must be a gradual and imperceptible addition of soil to the shore line by the action of the water to which the land is contiguous. Bigelow v. Herrink, 200 Iowa, 830, 205 N. W. 531, and Holman v. Hodges, supra. This rule applies to land added to islands as well as to the mainland. Bigelow v. Hoover, 85 Iowa, 161, 52 N. W. 124, 39 Am. St. Rep. 296; Tiffany's Real Property (2d Ed.) vol. 2, § 542.

[9] The title to accreted lands does not vest in the riparian owner of the land bordering on a navigable...