Meekins, Matter of, 48659
| Decision Date | 01 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 48659,No. 2,48659,2 |
| Citation | 1976 OK CIV APP 32,554 P.2d 872 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Tauras MEEKINS and Kevin Meekins, children under 18 years of age. Delores MEEKINS, Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Appellee |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
James H. Hiatt, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
Donald L. Ritter, Oklahoma City, for appellee.
Pursuant to 10 O.S.1971 § 1101 and following sections, the two children of appellant, Delores Meekins, were declared dependent and neglected and made wards of the court. That adjudication is not here contested.
Subsequently, however, a supplemental petition was filed by the Department of Institutions, Social and Rehabilitative Services, seeking to terminate the parental rights of appellant mother. A copy of the petition with 'summons and notice' was personally served on appellant, directing her to appear with the children on May 27, 1975, at 3:00 p.m. before the District Court of Oklahoma County at the County Courthouse at Oklahoma City. 1 Appellant failed to appear and in her absence the trial court terminated her parental rights. On June 19, 1975, within the time allowed by law, she filed a Petition to Vacate Judgment pursuant to 12 O.S.1971 § 1031 et seq.
The trial court issued an Order Denying Hearing on Petition to Vacate Judgment and overruled the petition to vacate, therein making the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
'I.
'That the allegations of the petition to vacate judgment are true, and that the mother of the above-named children was prevented by unavoidable casualty and misfortune from appearing in Court and contesting the termination of her parental rights on the 27th of May, 1975.
'II.
'That in accordance with the terms and provisions of Title 12, Oklahoma Statutes, Section 1031 and following sections, and the cases construing same, the order terminating the parental rights of Delores Meekins should be vacated.
'III.
From the order denying hearing and overruling the petition to vacate, the mother appeals.
Since the filing of the appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued an Order staying the portion of the trial court order which authorized the Department to consent to adoption of the children.
Section 1118 of the juvenile code states:
'Any decree or order made under the provisions of this Act may be modified by the court at any time; provided, however, that an order terminating parental rights, and an order committing a child adjudicated to be delinquent to the Department, may not be modified.'
Appellant first urges that the trial court misconstrued and misapplied § 1118. Because we agree with appellant's primary premise, it is not necessary that we consider her alternative assignment of error that the statute violates the state and federal constitutions.
Preliminarily, it is appropriate that we recognize that the clear purpose of § 1118 is to accord to orders terminating parental rights some significant stability and finality. This will serve the best interests of everyone involved, particularly of the children, who would be adversely affected if continuing litigation were permitted with the result that they might be bounced back and forth between different sets of parents.
We also recognize that the general tenor and intent of the juvenile code, as expressed in § 1129, is to serve the best interests of the children. A presumption exists that the best interests of children ordinarily are served by leaving them in the custody of the natural parents, the persons who are usually expected to have the strongest bond of love and affection and to be best able to provide them these needed qualities. York v. Halley, Okl., 534 P.2d 363 (1975). The presumption can be and often is rebutted, but a meaningful hearing should be a prerequisite to such rebuttal; and certainly, children should not be permanently removed from their parents by an order terminating parental rights without such a meaningful hearing. In re Wright, Okl., 524 P.2d 790 (1974).
We think that the interpretation which the trial court put upon § 1118 is inconsistent with the general purposes of the juvenile code and with the tenor of the language of the high court cases above cited. The trial court's interpretation of § 1118 would prevent new trials or vacations of orders in all cases concerning all children and would interfere with the rights of parents prevented by accident, misfortune, fraud, or any other statutorily appropriate reason to obtain a new trial. We think the construction put upon the statute is erroneous, and we are unable to discover anything in its terms compelling the result reached by the trial court.
The text of the section is that 'an order terminating parental rights . . . may not be modified.' The trial court held that the word 'modified' necessarily included the 'vacation' of an order. There is a substantial difference in the meaning of the two terms. The legislature confirms the difference in the text of 12 O.S.1971 § 1031, where it is stated that 'The district court shall have power to vacate Or modify its own judgments or orders . . ..' (emphasis ours) 'Vacate' means 'To annul; to set aside; to cancel or rescind; to render an act void'; while 'modification' is defined as 'A change; an alteration which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter intact.' 'Modify' is similarly described as 'To alter; to change in incidental or subordinate features; enlarge, extend; limit, reduce.' Black's Law Dictionary 1155, 1717 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
To vacate something is to destroy it, to eliminate it, to render it a nullity. Modification, on the other hand, could be described as a small change, adjusting of details, rather than dealing with the heart of the matter and eliminating it, as is done by vacating an order. The relief sought in court actions follows the meanings above stated. Modification is sought when a change of condition requires revision of an order. Vacation, however, is a remedy usually employed when some error or accident makes the continued existence of that order undesirable. When § 1118 says, 'may not be modified,' it means that and no more; it seeks to eliminate changes in the details of an order based upon changes of condition but does not purport to prevent a court from...
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