Meekins v. St. John's Regional Health

• Decision Date: 21 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 26274.,26274.
• Citation: 149 S.W.3d 525
• Parties: Carol MEEKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. JOHN'S REGIONAL HEALTH CENTER, INC., Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

149 S.W.3d 525

Carol MEEKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. JOHN'S REGIONAL HEALTH CENTER, INC., Defendant-Respondent.

No. 26274.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One.

October 21, 2004.

Petition for Rehearing and Transfer Denied November 12, 2004.

Application for Transfer Denied December 21, 2004.

Carl E. Smith, Ava, MO, for Appellant.

Jason R. Brown, Lathrop & Gage, L.C., Springfield, MO, for Respondent.

JAMES K. PREWITT, Judge.

On March 19, 2003, Carol Meekins ("Meekins") filed a two-count lawsuit against St. John's Regional Health Center, Inc., ("St.John's"). The first count was for declaratory judgment, and the second count was labeled negligence/res ipsa loquitor. The trial court entered an order dismissing both counts, and Meekins appealed. This Court dismissed that appeal, however, for lack of appellate jurisdiction, finding there was no final judgment because the trial court's order dismissing Counts I and II of the petition had not been denominated as a judgment. Following that dismissal, the trial court entered a judgment finding in favor of St. John's on both counts. In the appeal before us now, with two points relied on, Meekins argues that the trial court erred in granting St. John's motion to dismiss.

Background

On October 31, 2000, a specimen was collected from Meekins. St. John's performed a drug screen test on that specimen, and in a toxicology report dated November 1, 2000, the specimen showed positive for amphetamine/methamphetamine. On November 2, 2000, Meekins provided another specimen to Cox Toxicology Laboratory ("Cox"). The drug-screen test performed that same day at Cox showed the specimen was negative for amphetamines.

On March 19, 2003, Meekins filed a lawsuit against St. John's. The suit contained two counts, the first of which was for declaratory judgment. Within Count I, Meekins alleged "[t]hat a controversy has arisen between [her and St. John's] in that [Meekins] has never taken any controlled substance in her lifetime including, but not limited to, methamphetamine." Meekins also alleged that St. John's drug screen was not correct and that "in opposition to its results [Meekins] immediately went to [Cox] and submitted to a superior certified toxicology screen." Meekins asked the trial court to declare "that the drug screen performed by [St. John's] ... is incorrect and falsely showed that [Meekins] had methamphetamine in her system[.]"

Count II of Meekins' petition was for negligence/res ipsa loquitor. Within Count II, Meekins alleged that St. John's "had a duty to properly perform and/or use a drug screen test process that was accurate and reliable." Meekins also alleged that St. John's breached that duty and "either improperly performed the drug screen test and/or used an unreliable testing procedure." According to Meekins, "the testing method and performance thereof were under the complete control and direction of [St. John's and] .... as a direct result and proximate result of [St. John's] negligence, [Meekins] has sustained actual damages ... for termination of employment, lost wages, reduced income, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and humiliation."

In its answer, St. John's asserted that both Count I and Count II failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and therefore, were subject to dismissal. On July 3, 2003, St. John's filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that, with respect to Count I, the court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction because the factors necessary for declaratory judgment were not present. With respect to Count II, St. John's argued that it was performing a health care service and, pursuant to § 538.225, RSMo 2000, Meekins was required to have filed a health care affidavit within ninety days of filing her petition. According to St. John's, since Meekins had not filed the affidavit within the requisite time period Count II should be dismissed. In the prayer of the motion, St. John's asked the court to "dismiss both Counts I and II, without prejudice[.]"

In Meekins' suggestions in opposition to St. John's motion to dismiss, filed August 25, 2003, Meekins argued that the requirements for declaratory judgment had been met. Meekins admitted, however, that St. John's was a health care provider under § 538.205, RSMo 2000, that the drug screen test was a health care service, and that Meekins should have filed a health care affidavit. Meekins acknowledged that Count II was, "in essence, a medical malpractice cause of action" and asked the court for additional time to file the health care affidavit.

On August 26, 2003, St. John's filed a motion and suggestions to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations. Within the motion, St. John's argued that Meekins' suit was time barred because the claim for medical malpractice was filed more than two years after the allegedly negligently performed drug screen test. St. John's asked that the trial court dismiss the action, with prejudice.

On November 5, 2003, the trial court entered an order which stated, "after having considered the pleadings and the arguments and briefs of counsel, [the court] does hereby Order Count I and Count II of [Meekins'] Petition dismissed." Meekins' attempted to appeal that order, but, as earlier mentioned herein, this Court dismissed her appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, finding there was no final judgment because the trial court's order dismissing Counts I and II of the petition had not been denominated as a judgment.

Following the dismissal of that appeal, the trial court, on April 8, 2004, entered a judgment which stated, "after having considered the pleadings and the arguments and briefs of counsel, [the court] does hereby find judgment in favor of [St. John's] on Count I and Count II of [Meekins'] Petition." On April 28, 2004, Meekins filed a motion for reconsideration indicating that her "causes of action do not sound in medical malpractice and the two year statute of limitation and [requirement for health care] affidavit do not apply." Meekins asked the court to reconsider and set aside its April 8, 2004, judgment and deny St. John's motion to dismiss. On May 17, 2004, the trial court entered an order overruling Meekins' motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.

Discussion

Meekins raises two points in this appeal. In Point I, Meekins argues that the trial court erred in granting St. John's motion to dismiss Count I of her petition, in which she sought declaratory judgment, because all of the necessary elements for declaratory judgment were met. In Point II, Meekins argues that the trial court erred in granting St. John's motion to dismiss Count II of her petition because the claim is not for medical malpractice, but rather is a claim for general negligence. Therefore, according to Meekins, a five-year statute of limitation applies, not the two-year for medical malpractice, and no health care affidavit is required.

We note that the points raised by Meekins here are the same two points she raised in the previous appeal that was dismissed. Her points reference the trial court's grant of St. John's motion to dismiss. In the earlier order of the trial court, it specified that Counts I and II of Meekins' petition were dismissed. However, in the April 8, 2004, judgment, which according to Meekins' notice of appeal is the judgment from which she is appealing here, the trial court stated that it found in favor of St. John's on Counts I and II. As there were no other motions before the trial court prior to its April 8, 2004, judgment, we assume that by using language in the judgment that the court found "in favor of [St. John's] on Count I and Count II of [Meekins'] Petition," the trial court was sustaining St. John's motion to dismiss the action with prejudice. In their briefs before this Court, both Meekins and St. John's have made that assumption as well.

PointI — Whether elements of declaratory judgment were met

In her first point, Meekins' argues that the trial court erred in granting St. John's motion to dismiss Count I of her petition because the pleaded facts of her petition met the required elements of declaratory judgment.

We will affirm the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss if any ground for dismissal supports the motion. Koehr v. Emmons, 98 S.W.3d 580, 582 (Mo.App.2002). If the trial court does not specify its reason for sustaining the motion to dismiss, we presume that the trial court dismissed the case based on one of the reasons stated in the motion itself. Id.

In our review of a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, we consider whether the facts as pleaded and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom state any ground for relief. George v. Brewer, 62 S.W.3d 106, 108-09 (Mo.App.2001). If the facts and inferences meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, including a cause of action that may be adopted by the court, then the case cannot be dismissed. Thruston v. Jefferson City School Dist., 95 S.W.3d 131, 133 (Mo.App.2003).

Under § 527.010, RSMo 2000, "circuit courts ... shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." The powers conferred in § 527.010, RSMo 2000, may be exercised "in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty." § 527.050, RSMo 2000. The exercise of the power to enter a declaratory judgment is discretionary, in that "[t]he court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree ... would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." § 527.060, RSMo 2000.

A declaratory judgment is only appropriate where a plaintiff can obtain relief against the defendant, as the function of declaratory judgment is to dispel uncertainty regarding legal rights of the parties. Stinson v. Sharp, 80 S.W.3d 852, 854 (Mo.App.2002). If the...