Meekison v. Voinovich

• Decision Date: 21 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96 CV 00931.,96 CV 00931.
• Citation: 17 F.Supp.2d 725
• Parties: Beth Ann MEEKISON, Plaintiff, v. George VOINOVICH, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

17 F.Supp.2d 725

Beth Ann MEEKISON, Plaintiff, v. George VOINOVICH, et al., Defendants.

No. 96 CV 00931.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

August 21, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert Karl Handelman, Handelman & Kilroy, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.

Joseph Norbert Rosenthal, Jack Wilson Decker, Noelle T. Tsevdos, Ohio Attorney General, Employment Law Section, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MARBLEY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 27). Plaintiff Beth Ann Meekison filed this action against Defendants George Voinovich, Reginald Wilkinson, and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitations and Corrections ("ODRC") alleging violations of her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to the claims against Voinovich and Wilkinson, and DENIED as to the claims against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitations and Corrections. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Voinovich and Wilkinson is GRANTED and Defendant ODRC's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction operates and manages the State of Ohio's prison system. ODRC opened the North Central Correctional Institution ("NCCI"), where Plaintiff Beth Ann Meekison ("Meekison") was employed, on November 1, 1994.

Meekison applied for the position of Psychology Assistant II at the NCCI on September 2, 1994. The job posting provided, in relevant part, the following description of the position:

Performs initial screening & evaluation of psychological patients & administers, scores & interprets psychological tests, subject to supervisory review, conducts interview & provides individual & group counseling & psychotherapy sessions under direct guidance of licensed psychologist.

Also, according to the job posting, an applicant for the position of Psychology Assistant II was qualified if the applicant possessed:

— Doctoral degree in psychology or other doctoral degree deemed equivalent by Ohio State Board of Psychology; or

— Master's degree in psychology from educational institution accredited or recognized by national or regional accrediting agency or master's degree deemed equivalent by Ohio State Board of Psychology; 3 years psychological work experience of type satisfactory to Ohio State Board of Psychology; or

— 3 years experience as Psychology Assistant I; or

— Alternative, equivalent evidence of the minimum qualifications.

In support of her application, Meekison submitted a form with her employment history and a copy of her academic transcript from the Ohio State University. It is undisputed that Meekison did not have a doctoral or master's degree in psychology, nor was she admitted to a doctoral program in psychology. Although Meekison represented that she was a "Ph.D. Candidate" with "130 [academic credit] hours of clinical psychology" training, she did not represent that she was a doctoral candidate in the psychology program.

Beyond her significant course work in psychology, Meekison also worked as a "Psychology Assistant" under the supervision of Dr. Guy Melvin from December, 1992, through the time of her application for the Psychology Assistant II position at the NCCI in 1994. Also, Meekison was a psychology assistant intern for the Ohio Department of Mental Health in 1983.

After reviewing Meekison's background and qualifications, ODRC hired Meekison as a Psychology Assistant 2 at the NCCI on October 17, 1994. She was not initially hired as a permanent employee. Instead, she was hired on a probationary basis in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

Meekison next attended the ODRC Training Academy for three weeks beginning in late October, 1994. There, she would receive training on things such as self-defense, safety, and handling inmates. Prior to the commencement of the training session, all of the trainees were required to list any conditions which could possibly affect their participation in the training session. On this form, Meekison informed ODRC that she was "dyslexic."

Meekison testified that her dyslexia was identified for her by staff members during a high school academic camp. She also testified that her undergraduate and graduate institutions, Denison and Ohio State, respectively, were aware of her dyslexic condition and made appropriate accommodations for her, such as assignment to a quiet study carrel, additional time to finish tests, and permission to use a dictionary during exams. These allowances were made, at least in part, based on communications between staff members from her high school camp and the educational institution.

Meekison began her probationary employment following her stay at the Training Academy. Throughout this period of employment, there was tension in the relationship between Meekison and her supervisor, Dr. Nancy Steele, centered around Meekison's refusal to conduct unsupervised group sex offender therapy, which she believed to be contrary to the terms of her employment and, moreover, an extreme safety risk. On at least two occasions in November and December, Meekison refused Dr. Steele's directive that she (Meekison) conduct unsupervised group therapy. It is undisputed, however, that Dr. Steele was unable to supervise the psychology assistants and their therapy sessions prior to obtaining her license verification from the Ohio Board of Psychology sometime in December, 1994.

During this time period, Meekison began to complain that the noisy working conditions surrounding her office at the NCCI were unreasonable, in light of her dyslexia, and requested that she be moved to a quieter section of the building. She complained that noise from the inmate television room, which was located next to her office, interfered with the performance of her reading and writing duties. On December 28, 1994, Meekison wrote a memo to Dr. Steele entitled "Meeting with Mr. Bratton and dyslexia." (Emphasis added). In the memo, Meekison informed Dr. Steele that the noise from the inmates in the television room "continues to challenge [her] dyslexic reading and writing concentration." It is undisputed that Dr. Steele received and read this memo from Meekison.

On January 17, 1995, ODRC decided to terminate Meekison's employment at the NCCI. ODRC based its termination decision in part on poor performance evaluations in which Meekison's reading and writing skills were criticized. Meekison filed this action on September 19, 1996, against Governor George Voinovich, Reginald Wilkinson (Director — ODRC), and ODRC, alleging that ODRC's decision to terminate her employment as a Psychology Assistant II was motivated by a discriminatory animus on the basis of her disability, dyslexia, and her age, 40, at the time of termination.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standard For Summary Judgment

Rule 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The movant has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which may be accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., L.P.A., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388-89 (6th Cir.1993). The nonmoving party must then present "significant probative evidence" to show that "there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir.1993). "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute is about a material fact that is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (Summary judgment appropriate where the evidence could not lead a trier of fact to find for the non-moving party).

In evaluating such a motion, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir.1995).

B. Whether Defendants Voinovich and Wilkinson, as Individuals, Can Be Held Liable Under the ADA and ADEA

The Court finds that, as a matter of law, Defendants Voinovich and Wilkinson cannot be held liable as individuals under the ADA and the ADEA. Both the ADA and ADEA prohibits discrimination by any employer, employment agency, or labor organization. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (ADEA). The definition of an "employer" under both the ADA and ADEA mirrors that of Title VII, differing only in the number of employees required for liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees ..."); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (The ADA defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more...