Meeks By and Through Meeks v. Thompson Tractor Co.

• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
• Citation: 686 So.2d 1213
• Decision Date: 31 May 1996
• Parties: Amanda Anne MEEKS and Tiffany Kaye Meeks, By and Through Deborah M. MEEKS, their mother and natural guardian v. THOMPSON TRACTOR COMPANY. 2941162.

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686 So.2d 1213 Amanda Anne MEEKS and Tiffany Kaye Meeks, By and Through Deborah M. MEEKS, their mother and natural guardian
v.
THOMPSON TRACTOR COMPANY. 2941162. Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama. May 31, 1996.
Rehearing Denied July 12, 1996.
Certiorari Denied Nov. 22, 1996
Alabama Supreme Court 1951840.

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Parker C. Johnston of Enslen & Johnston, Wetumpka, for Appellants.

Michael M. Eley and Bart Harmon of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for Appellee.

SAM A. BEATTY, Retired Justice.

The plaintiffs, Amanda Anne Meeks and Tiffany Kaye Meeks ("the children"), appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant, Thompson Tractor Company ("Thompson"). We reverse and remand.

The children's father, William Guy Meeks, worked for Thompson as a field service repairman. Meeks traveled to various locations in central Alabama to repair forklifts; he also worked occasionally in Thompson's shop. Thompson assigned Meeks a company van that he used for travel to and from job sites. Thompson also authorized Meeks to drive the van between his home and the job

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sites or Thompson's shop. The van was equipped with a two-way radio that Meeks used to communicate with his supervisor at Thompson. Even after Meeks's supervisor released him to go home at the end of a workday, Meeks kept the radio on because he was subject to being called and sent to another job site.

On January 14, 1994, Meeks left Thompson's shop to drive his company van to Lake Jordan, where he had a camper vehicle and where he had parked his personal vehicle. Thompson personnel testified that Meeks was allowed to do this because the mileage from the shop to Meeks's home and the mileage from the shop to his camper were approximately the same. To reach his camper from Thompson's shop, Meeks typically traveled north on Highway 231 from Montgomery to Wallsboro, and then traveled west on Cousins Road to the camper. As he was traveling that route on January 14, Meeks stopped at the Wallsboro Amoco Grocery & Deli on Highway 231 and purchased a six-pack of beer. Upon leaving the Amoco store, he crossed the northbound lane of Highway 231 and pulled into the median before attempting to cross the southbound lane of Highway 231 onto Cousins Road. While Meeks was crossing the southbound lane of Highway 231 from the median, a vehicle traveling south on Highway 231 struck Meeks's van. According to a witness, it was dark at the time of the accident, and, she says, the other vehicle's headlights were not on. Meeks likely was not wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident. He died as the result of injuries he sustained in the collision.

The children sued Thompson to recover death benefits pursuant to Alabama's workers' compensation statutes. Thompson moved for a summary judgment. The trial court granted that motion. In entering the summary judgment, the trial court held that Meeks's purchase of beer and his possession of the beer in the company van were willful violations of both Thompson company rules and United States Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulations. The court then held that because "the decedent would not have been crossing the street when he was had he not deviated from his route by purchasing beer, the element of causation is present." The court further held that the accident did not arise out of Meeks's employment because, it held, he was on his way home and was pursuing a personal objective, that of purchasing beer, when the accident occurred, and was not furthering Thompson's business.

The children contend that the trial court erroneously concluded that Meeks's death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, that the trial court erroneously based the summary judgment on Meeks's alleged misconduct, and that the trial court erroneously concluded that Meeks's alleged misconduct was the proximate cause of the accident.

Our standard for reviewing a summary judgment is well settled. The summary judgment was proper if there was no genuine issue of material fact and Thompson was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P. Thompson had the burden to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Long v. Jefferson County, 623 So.2d 1130, 1132 (Ala.1993). If Thompson made that showing, then the burden shifted to the children to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact, so as to avoid the entry of a judgment against them. Id. In deciding whether there was a genuine issue of material fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Id. The applicable standard of review is the "substantial evidence" rule. § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).

Section § 25-5-51, Ala.Code 1975, requires that the children prove that Meeks's death was caused by "an accident arising out of and in the course of his ... employment" with Thompson. "Arising out of" means that "the employment was the cause and source of

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the accident." Gold Kist, Inc. v. Jones, 537 So.2d 39, 41 (Ala.Civ.App.1988). "In the course of" means that the injury occurs within the span of...