Meeks v. State

• Decision Date: 17 December 1923
• Docket Number: 51
• Citation: 256 S.W. 863,161 Ark. 489
• Parties: MEEKS v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

256 S.W. 863

161 Ark. 489

MEEKS v. STATE

No. 51

Supreme Court of Arkansas

December 17, 1923

Appeal from Ashley Circuit Court; Turner Butler, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

G. P George and Frank Strangways, for appellant.

J. S Utley, Attorney General, John L. Carter, Assistant, for appellee.

OPINION

WOOD, J.

The appellant was indicted for the crime of selling intoxicating liquor. The indictment, omitting formal parts, charged that the appellant "did unlawfully and feloniously sell and give away, and was unlawfully and feloniously interested in the sale and giving away, of alcoholic, vinous, malt, spirituous or fermented liquor."

W. D. Laney, a witness for the State, testified to the effect that some time in November or December, 1922, he bought whiskey from the appellant in Ashley County, Arkansas. He testified to buying a quart of whiskey on two different occasions from the appellant and paying him the sum of $ 3 therefor. It was moonshine whiskey. The appellant was a witness in his own behalf, and he testified that he never sold any whiskey to the witness Laney. He stated that there was no trouble between him and the prosecuting witness Laney, except that witness had reported to Attorney General Coco at Bastrop, La., concerning this case.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty and fixed appellant's punishment at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for one year. Judgment was rendered in accordance with the verdict, from which is this appeal.

1. The appellant contends that there was no testimony to sustain the verdict, inasmuch as the State had only one witness, whose testimony was uncorroborated. But it is not essential that the testimony of the witness for the State be corroborated by any other testimony. Nelson v. State, 139 Ark. 13, 212 S.W. 93. The credibility of the witness was for the jury. The verdict shows that the jury believed and accepted the testimony of the witness for the State. The State, in criminal cases, is not required to establish the guilt of the accused by a preponderance of the evidence, but is required to prove such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court correctly instructed the jury on the subject of reasonable doubt, and the testimony was sufficient to sustain the verdict.

2. The appellant contends that the court erred in giving the following instruction: "Gentlemen of the jury, the court tells you that it is a violation of the laws of the State of Arkansas to sell or give away, or be interested in the sale or giving away of any intoxicating liquor, any alcoholic liquor or intoxicating liquor, any alcoholic intoxicating liquors." The appellant offered a general objection to the instruction.

The appellant argues that, under the instructions, the jury might have found that the defendant had sold a concoction of intoxicating liquors, such as coco-quinine, or other intoxicating drugs, that did not contain any alcoholic liquors. Appellant's contention cannot be sustained. There was no testimony tending to prove that the appellant sold intoxicating liquor of any description except whiskey. It is a matter of common knowledge, of which this court will take judicial notice, that whiskey is an intoxicating alcoholic liquor. Johnson v. State, 152 Ark. 218, 238 S.W. 23. It is obvious that the court intended to define the offense charged in the indictment under the statute as that of selling or giving away, or being interested in the selling or giving away, of alcoholic intoxicating liquors, contrary to the statute. Section 6160, C. & M. Digest. If the appellant conceived that the instruction was susceptible of any other interpretation, he should have made a specific objection to the instruction.

3. The appellant contends that the court erred in giving the following instruction: "By the expression 'reasonable doubt' is not meant every possible doubt because everything relating to the affairs of this life and depending upon the testimony of witnesses to establish it is open to some doubt, but a reasonable doubt is that condition of mind when a reasonable man, after having carefully considered a situation that is of vital interest to himself, and viewed it from every angle and considered it carefully, and then would be uncertain what to do, that is a reasonable doubt; and a juror may be said to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt when, after a careful and candid consideration and comparison of all the testimony in the case, there remains in his mind an abiding conviction that the defendant is guilty." The appellant here objects to the following language in the above instruction: "But a reasonable doubt is that condition of mind when a reasonable man, after having carefully considered a situation that is of vital interest to himself and viewed it from every angle and considered it carefully, and then would be uncertain what to do." The appellant did not offer any specific objection to the above phraseology, but contented himself with a general objection to the instruction. The language above used is objectionable, if for no other reason, because any effort to define a reasonable doubt other than in the simple form that has been so often approved by this court is unnecessary, and by the repetition of the same idea assumes an argumentative phase. But the court below was not asked to eliminate the language which appellant urges as reversible error, and it occurs to us that it was but an effort on the part of the trial court to make plainer that which the court had already sufficiently defined without the use of such language. The language, taken in connection with that which immediately preceded as well as that which followed...