Meeks v. State

• Citation: 336 So.2d 1142
• Decision Date: 21 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 48080,48080
• Parties: Douglas Ray MEEKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

Page 1142

336 So.2d 1142

Douglas Ray MEEKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 48080.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 21, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 30, 1976.

John F. Howard, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on direct appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

Appellant was indicted for first degree murder in that while engaging in the perpetration of a robbery, he did murder one Chevis Thompson, Stabbing her with a knife, inflicting mortal wounds from which she died. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree and after a separate sentencing proceeding, recommended the death penalty. The trial judge, specifying in detail the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, agreed that the death sentence was appropriate.

The trial judge's written findings in support of the death sentence reflect, as follows:

'This Court finds that the facts of this case do not support the aggravating circumstances in Fla.Stat. 921.141(6)((5)), subsections (a) and (c), in that this capital felony was not committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, nor did the defendant knowingly create a great risk of death to many persons.

'As an aggravating circumstance, the Court finds that the defendant had previously been convicted of a capital felony Fla.Stat. 921.141(6)((5))(b). The Court finds as an aggravating circumstance, that the capital felony, the murder of Chevis Thompson, was committed as a part of another dangerous and violent felony, the robbery of Chevis Thompson, and in flight after committing that felony. Fla.Stat. 921.141(6)((5))(d).

'The Court also finds, as an aggravating circumstance, that the capital felony was committed with the motive of avoiding and preventing arrest, was committed for pecuniary gain and to hinder the enforcement of laws. Fla.Stat. 921.141(6) ((5))(e)(f)(g).

'Turning to mitigating circumstances, the Court finds that the defendant does have a prior significant history of criminal activity. Fla.Stat. 921.141(7) ((6))(a). This fact has been considered as not being a mitigating circumstance.

'Under Fla.Stat. 921.141(7)((6)) subsections (b) and (f), the Court finds that the defendant was suffering from no extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was not substantially impaired.

'The defendant moved for appointment of psychiatrists to examine him to substantiate the insanity of the defendant at the time of the crime. Doctors Barnard and Carrera were appointed and reported the results of their examination. Their report is devoid of any evidence of mental or emotional disturbance of the defendant. The psychiatrists both conclude that the defendant was sane at the time of the examination and at the time of the offense.

'Further, the Court finds that the victim certainly was not a participant in nor consented to the criminal conduct. Fla.Stat. 921.141((6))(c)(e). No mitigation exists under either of these subsections.

'Finally, the age of the defendant has been considered as required by Fla.Stat. 921.141(7)(((6))(g). The defendant is 21. The report of Doctor Barnard contained his medical judgment that the defendant was of dull-normal intelligence.

'The Court finds the combination of the defendant's youthful age and his intelligence to be a mitigating factor.

'The Court, in the circumstances of this case, deemed the requirement of CrPR 3.710 to be directory and not mandatory. Therefore, no pre-sentence report has been considered.

'Upon consideration, it was at the time of sentencing and is now, the inescapable conclusion of the undersigned that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist in the facts to justify the death penalty. The murder of the victim by the defendant was for the purpose of executing the victim to prevent her identifying the defendant, so that the defendant could flee after having committed robbery for pecuniary gain, and to prevent the lawful arrest of the defendant and thus this conscienceless murder was designed to hinder the enforcement of laws.'

Motion for new trial was denied.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because the State failed to prove corpus delicti of the crime committed and erred in not polling the jury individually on the recommended sentence of death. Having carefully examined the record before us, we find no merit to appellant's points on appeal.

Relative to corpus delicti, appellant does not dispute the fact of death nor the identity of the deceased but rather contests the showing of the criminal agency of another, to-wit appellant, as the cause of death. We cannot agree. The evidence is clearly sufficient to establish that the death of the victim was caused by the criminal agency of another.

Appellant argues that, although his fingerprints were found on the cash register and although he had told another...