Meeks v. State

• Decision Date: 27 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Citation: 317 Ark. 411,878 S.W.2d 403
• Parties: James D. MEEKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 94-13.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 403

878 S.W.2d 403

317 Ark. 411

James D. MEEKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 94-13.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 27, 1994.

Jan Thornton, El Dorado, for appellant.

Kent G. Holt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

GLAZE, Justice.

The appellant, James D. Meeks, was charged along with two accomplices, his brother Curtis Meeks and a Howard Malone, with the offense of aggravated robbery of a store in Junction City. He was also charged as a habitual offender having seven prior felony convictions. At trial, the state's evidence included Malone's testimony which named Meeks as having participated in the commission of the crime. By jury verdict, James Meeks was found guilty of the charge and sentenced as a habitual offender to forty years imprisonment. His sole point for reversal is that the state's corroborating evidence was legally insufficient to tend to connect James Meeks with the commission of the aggravated robbery. We disagree.

The statute controlling the corroborating evidence issue raised by James Meeks in this appeal is Ark.Code Ann. § 16-89-111(e)(1) (1987), which provides as follows:

A conviction cannot be had in any case of felony upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. The corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof.

In construing § 16-89-111(e)(1), this court has said that the test for determining the sufficiency of corroborating evidence is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice were totally eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Daniels v. State, 308 Ark. 53, 821 S.W.2d 778 (1992); Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983). Corroboration must be evidence of a substantive nature since it must be directed toward proving the connection of the accused with the crime and not directed toward corroborating the accomplice's testimony. Id. In addition to being substantive, the corroborating evidence must be substantial which means stronger evidence than that which merely raises a suspicion of guilt. Id. In other words, it is evidence which tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, but it is something less than that evidence necessary in and of itself, to sustain a conviction. Id. And finally, corroborating evidence may be circumstantial, but it must be of a material nature and legitimately tend to connect the accused with the crime.

On appeal, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, Orsini v. State, 281 Ark. 348, 665 S.W.2d 245 (1984), and in doing so, we conclude that the state's testimony and evidence establish the crime and tend to connect James Meeks with the commission of the aggravated robbery with which he was charged. The state's first witness, Richard McDonald, testified that, on January 14, 1993, he closed his store at 8:00 p.m. and upon leaving, he was confronted by two men wearing ski masks. According to McDonald's and Police Chief Sentiff's testimony, McDonald gave a description of the robbers as one being about six foot and of slender build and the other being short and middle-to-heavy in stature. Both men bore weapons but the taller man demanded McDonald's money and McDonald responded by turning over approximately $3,700....